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Introduction: The Iconic Value of Computers 
 
The Age of Anxiety 
For a few years as I commuted to work I regularly drove past a set of sculptures 
that occupied the driveway of an ordinary looking house on the rural western edge of 
Ann Arbor.  The sculpture was comprised of three large, impressionistic and vaguely 
anthropomorphic steel and wire figures with video monitors for heads surrounding and 
towering over a smaller humanoid sculpture (also steel and wire) that cowered under their 
gaze.  As the years progressed time and weather took their toll on the figures.  The 
humanoid sculpture stooped lower and lower until its torso was supported by the addition 
of a strategically placed broomstick acting as a cane.  By all appearances, the monitor 
headed figures had moved in for the kill and the humanoid figure was the victim of not 
only their oppression but of Michigan winters too.  The message of this particular piece 
of folk art was immediately discernable as a quartet of metal figures illustrating a tableau 
of anxiety and oppression.  The piece was easily read as an indictment of the relationship 
between people and technology, specifically the oppressive systemization that came to 
characterize industrial society in the 20th century.  The humanoid figure, alone and 
isolated, was surrounded by identical technological creatures that, instead of passively 
performing work with the guidance and control of the human, had turned on him-- 
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decidedly gaining the upper hand.  
Sherry Turkle, writing on the subject of technological ‘spin’ or the stories we tell 
ourselves about our technologies contends that we are still anxious about technology 
spiraling out of control, distrustful of the soul of the machine and worried about the 
mechanization of the human mind.1  Unfortunately, my attempts to speak to the owner of 
the house in order to discover if this was in fact the sentiment behind the artwork were 
unsuccessful.  The homeowner never answered the door and ignored the letter of 
introduction I left in the mailbox outside the house.  One day the increasingly decrepit 
sculptures were gone.  The house was empty and for sale.  I never did find out the story 
behind the sculptures: who made them, or how they had come to take up residence on an 
otherwise quiet road on the outskirts of town.    
When I started looking at manifestations of technological anxiety in popular 
culture, I considered the project in terms of larger cultural icons in film and television.  
Mass, broadcast media was filled with killer robots, super computers, and armies of 
identical drones passionate only about taking over the world, the galaxy or even the 
universe.  These artifacts contended that, though the computerized opponents of mankind 
were formidable, the fate of the world was never truly in doubt.  We, as Americans could 
depend on our inherent tirelessness and stoic perseverance as small, loosely knit 
confederacies of humans-- beaten but not vanquished—fighting a guerilla war against 
overwhelming odds.  With very few exceptions the humans would, by stories’ end, use 
                                                 
1 Sherry Turkle, "'Spinning' Technology:  What We Are Not Thinking About When We Are Thinking 
About Computers," in Technological Visions: The Hopes and Fears That Shape New Technologies, ed. 
Marita Sturken, Douglas Thomas, and Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
2004), 19-33. 
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intuition and dreams, folk wisdom and luck, to exploit the fatal weakness of the machines 
and start civilization anew—often as idealized Jeffersonian styled yeoman farmers and 
craftsmen.  I soon realized that the films and television programs that initially drew me to 
this study were echoes of stories that were retold practically everywhere I looked and in 
myriad ways, formats, and media—the result of a Cold War reinvestment in the story of 
American exceptionalism.  The representation of machines and human beings as 
antagonistic opposite poles permeates not only film and television, but popular music, 
children’s culture, working life, jokes, politics, and newspaper and magazine articles that, 
on the one hand, trumpet each technological advance while, on the other, recapitulate a 
sense of unease with the world we are creating.  
Technology and Culture  
This study focuses on the post-war era in American history from 1946 to 1970 
and is an examination of the rhetoric used to describe computer systems and the 
relationship between computers and human beings.  Primarily, this project emphasizes 
the rhetoric of anxiety that surrounded the deployment of computer systems not as a 
matter of alarmist rhetoric geared toward exacerbating anxieties and fears of an unknown 
future, but as a coherent narrative that sought to reassure and ameliorate readers (and 
viewers) with a story of American exceptionalism, and stability.2   
Although not representative of current historiography pertaining to the 
relationship between technology and culture, Leo Marx proposes a view of technology as 
                                                 
2 For extensive readings of the significance of the American exceptionalist myth in contemporary media, 
see: Tom Engelhardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a 
Generation, 2nd ed. (Amherst: Univ of Massachusetts Press, 1998), Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: 
The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Atheneum, 1992). 
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an alien intrusion into an otherwise natural landscape in his description of simple versus 
complex pastoralism; a description that has some value.  For Marx, simple pastoralism 
connotes a willfully naïve response to nature as an Arcadian ideal that is always in danger 
of being sullied by technology and modernity—a pristine space (both physical and 
conceptual) that becomes less and less accessible as we become more embedded in the 
material world of technology.3  Technology is thus alienating and inserts itself between 
humans and the natural world.  Marx contrasts this with what he terms complex 
pastoralism, that, while perhaps no less Romantic than simple pastoralism, concedes that 
our concept of nature as unsullied and pristine and our longing for an Arcadian past are 
possible only through technology.  Our alienation from nature is a product of technology, 
but our understanding of this alienation is a product of technology as well.  Our 
perception of the natural world as distinct depends on technological frames to give it 
meaning—a point Marx maintains is at the heart of postmodern critiques of technology 
and progress as meta-narratives.4  Marx is nothing if not deterministic in his approach to 
technology, but nonetheless, his definition of simple pastoralism is an accurate 
representation for describing the relationship between us, nature, and technology (in 
particular, computer technology) that was the stock position of the popular media through 
the 1950’s and 60’s.   
Scholarship on the public perception of computer technology often presupposes a 
mode of technological anxiety that can be explained, in part, by its alienating effects.   
                                                 
3 Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden : Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1964). 
4 Leo Marx, "The Idea Of "Technology" And Postmodern Pessimism," in Does Technology Drive History?: 
The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, ed. Leo Marx and Merritt Roe Smith (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 1994), 238. 
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Shoshanna Zuboff’s sociological study of modernization and automation in offices and 
paper mills focuses on the alienating effects of the computerized workplace and how 
computerization alters the relationship between the worker, management, and the nature 
of the work itself.  Zuboff argues that the existence of computer technology acts to 
symbolically render activities and processes—to make what was tacitly understood into 
abstracted quantifiable metrics.5  Like Zuboff, I take the view that there is something 
about the symbolic value of computers that makes these reactions to advancements in 
technology worthy of consideration in their own right.  What I propose is that by looking 
at artifacts from the time period that extends from the earliest introduction of computer 
technology to the late 1960’s  (the era just prior to the introduction of the first 
home/personal computers of the early 1970s) we encounter an era of uncertainty 
regarding computer technology and its meaning within a larger society.  Looking beyond 
Paul Edwards’ Closed World/Green World dichotomy, we see that representations of 
nature and technology as polarized utopian and dystopian zones had immediately 
solidified around computer technology and the computer was instead described in turn as 
masculine, feminine, harmlessly childlike, and sinisterly bureaucratic—as an example of 
the heights of human ingenuity as well as a foretaste of our replacement at the top of an 
evolutionary chain.  It is this multiplicity of readings that has been largely ignored by 
scholars of technology and social history in favor of a view that relies on a single set of 
metaphorical relations that conform to a dogmatic view technology as either inherently 
alienating, or of histories that celebrate the inventors and developers of computer 
                                                 
5 Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power (New York: Basic 
Books, 1988), 186-188. 
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hardware, software, and systems.   
Histories of computer technology have often focused on technological 
innovations and the people that have worked to develop ever-faster machines.6  In 
addition, sociologists have studied the effect of computers in the workplace, virtual 
communities, children and computers, and ethnographies of computer scientists and 
development laboratories.7   These studies detail the effects of computer technology on 
specific groups, communities and occupations.  The status of computers as artifacts, from 
the early 1950s on, has shaped public and popular discourses concerning the relationship 
between people and computers, but the iconic value of computer technology as part of the 
broader historical narrative of the late 20th century has not been addressed.  Computer 
descriptions, as reflected in newspaper and magazine articles, television and film from 
the 1950’s and 1960’s often took specific, distinct forms that reflected a sense of 
foreboding about the emerging technology:   
• Computers as an existential threat (direct challenge to humanity) 
• Computers as an economic threat (automation)  
                                                 
6 Although there are far too many titles to list here, some of the more influential include: Janet Abbate, 
Inventing the Internet (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), Herman Heine Goldstine, The Computer from 
Pascal to Von Neumann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), Steve Joshua Heims, The 
Cybernetics Group (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991), Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing : The Enigma 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). Other titles of interest on the history of computing technology 
include: Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men : Science, Technology, And, Cornell Studies in 
Comparative History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), William Aspray, John Von Neumann and 
the Origins of Modern Computing, History of Computing (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), William 
Aspray and Martin Campbell-Kelly, Computer: A History of the Information Machine (New York: Basic 
Books, 1996), Martin Davis, The Universal Computer : The Road from Leibniz to Turing, 1st ed. (New 
York: Norton, 2000). 
7 See, for example Zuboff., Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1984)., Stefan Helmreich, Silicon Second Nature:  Culturing Artificial Life in a 
Digital World (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998). 
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• Computers as a threat to human prestige (our sense of supremacy as 
rational, thinking creatures) 
These same articles and stories metaphorically explored the following anxieties:  
• Cold war apocalyptic fears 
• Fear of loss of control by the middle-class:  a devaluing of the middle 
class office worker/manager  
• Fear of totalitarianism—not concretely communist, but a fear of loss of 
individuality and a sense that there are fewer and fewer areas that are not 
routinized, Taylorized, or closed to creative thinking.   
All these anxieties existed independently of how computers were used and what 
their intended purpose was—factory automation had already, by the 1950’s swept 
through the working class, devaluing traditional trades and methods; mechanical warfare 
and specifically nuclear weapons provided a deep and tangible existential threat to 
humanity; and the rationalization and standardization of many areas of life by the middle 
of the 20th century already placed Americans in a matrix of technologies and methods 
that made more and more people feel like replaceable cogs in a machine that seemed to 
operate by its own intelligence.   
Metaphors and Media: The Conflation of Post-Cold War Anxieties 
The process of using metaphors to describe computer technology as akin to the 
human brain created parallels that could then be contradicted to make the machines less 
threatening.  Metaphor, defined by Andrew Goatly “is not a mere reflection of a pre-
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existing objective reality but a construction of reality, through a categorization entailing 
the selection of some features as critical and others as non-critical. […] metaphors can be 
consciously used to construct […] reality.”8  This use of metaphor functioned in several 
different ways to create an overall picture of computer technology, and our relationship to 
it, that served to both generate anxiety and then diminish it. The open interpretation of 
metaphor provided writers with a convenient disavowal of the implications of their 
statements as not the literal meaning of their reportage, but rather what was being read 
into it by anxious readers.9  “The metaphor, then, becomes an extension of reality—a 
picture of reality that, by virtue of its ready comparison to what has come before, is 
unproblematic and ‘naturalized’; seen as reflecting a known order and, as such, 
uncontested ‘common sense’.10  The use of metaphor to describe computer systems can 
be broken down as occupying the following areas:  
• Computer calculations as mind/Computer as thinking being 
• Computer as human replacement in the field of labor/white-collar 
workplace 
• Computer as symbol of repressive conformism 
These metaphorical associations are still, in many forms, prevalent in contemporary 
popular culture.  But the early associations of computers to known elements of the post-
war world took other forms as well that will form a part of this discussion:  
                                                 
8 Andrew Goatly, The Language of Metaphors (London: Routledge, 1997), 23. 
9 See: L. Cameron and G. Low, "Metaphor," Language Teaching 32 (1999): 77-96. 
10 Veronika Koller, Metaphor and Gender in Business Media Discourse: A Critical Cognitive Study (New 
York: Pallgrave/MacMillan, 2004), 4. 
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• Computers as feminine  
• Computers as representative of a Soviet or Communistic worldview 
• Computers as a controlling element of the state  
• Computers as representative of ‘the system’ 
Of course, computers performed none of these functions in actuality, but the 
language used to define computers mapped out a space in the popular understanding of 
computer technology that made them iconic representations of post-war/mid-century 
anxieties on a number of social and economic fronts.  Concerns responding to perceived 
threats to worker empowerment and autonomy; fear of totalitarianism; and religion and 
‘traditional’ roles and values were absorbed into the discourse surrounding computers as 
put forth by journalists and filmmakers.   As such, computers became an icon of anxiety 
and fear of not just the future, but of the present moment in cold-war America.  This fear 
of technology, as represented by the media’s use of computer imagery was not a fear of 
technology at all, but rather an evasion of the root causes of post war and Cold War 
anxieties concerning class, gender, and legitimate fears of nuclear war, as well as issues 
surrounding the future of labor and employment.   
Daniel Boorstin, writing in 1961, coined the term “pseudo-event” to describe 
stories released to the media as news that were not really news, but stage-managed 
confections designed to distract or take the place of information or events with a 
legitimate claim to newsworthiness.  The point of the event, Boorstin suggested, was to 
manage the news cycle and to keep certain ideas circulating even when there was nothing 
much to say on the subject.  Boorstin described Joseph McCarthy’s penchant for issuing 
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releases or holding press conferences timed to fit within reporters’ deadlines, as a way to 
guarantee coverage with a minimum of fact-checking, as an example of this practice.  
That McCarthy manipulated the media was not news in 1961, but Boorstin went further 
into the consequences of this manipulation and proclaimed that the pseudo-event could 
supplant reality by being more attractive, easier to believe and easier to digest: "We are 
haunted, not by reality, but by those images we have put in place of reality."11   As 
Americans we were, Boorstin suggested, "risk[ing] being the first people in history to 
have been able to make their illusions so vivid, so persuasive, so 'realistic' that they can 
live in them. We are the most illusioned people on earth."  Boorstin’s critique of media 
culture has its current manifestation in the concept of ‘truthiness’ put forward by the 
satirist Stephen Colbert, where one’s feeling about the ‘truth’ of an opinion outweighs 
any factual evidence.   
Though Boorstin was writing about the interface between politics and journalism 
and the cynical manipulation of the public through the media, much of the same (though 
perhaps not quite so cynically), can be said about the relationship between computer 
technology and the corporations that produced it on the one hand, and media culture on 
the other.   The reliance on the pseudo-event was a means for generating an 
understanding of computer technology.  News of advances in computer technology did 
not impact readers as consumers.  They were, especially in the late 1940’s and early 
1950’s, unlikely to have any real exposure to the technologies discussed in new stories.  
However, the existence of the computer as an artifact allowed journalists to use a 
concrete piece of equipment as an icon for post-war social change.  The evasion, in 
                                                 
11 Daniel Boorstin, The Image (New York: Vintage, 1961), 8. 
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Boorstin’s terms, was the use of the computer as an icon of modernity that portrayed 
technological progress as a relentless march forward.  This deterministic view of 
technology masked the economic and social realities and questions of power and capital.     
Although it would be possible to contend that the use of metaphors about computer 
technology was a deliberate means of misdirection; a bit of legerdemain to distract the 
masses from understanding the true nature of their relationship with capital, this 
explanation is not particularly satisfying in that there is little evidence other than the 
effects of such a discourse to recommend it.  Journalists were not engaged in a project of 
misinformation to keep readers in the dark, rather they proceeded with a reliance on an 
older narrative concerning technology that had already become embedded in American 
folklore.  The Althusserian-style reading of interpellation as a matter of false-
consciousness is inadequate here, in that it does not allow for any other awakening than 
that of class-consciousness or a dependence on capital as the only base upon which to 
erect the superstructure of the controlling apparatus of the state.  Media cultures are more 
rich than this explanation allows and the relationship between the broadcast and print 
media and their respective spectators and audiences too complex.  As this was also the 
case in the years immediately following the Second World War, what would be the 
impetus for this evasion?  Although there is no evidence that scores of journalists and 
editors were complicit in changing the subject and consciously using computer 
technology as a way of misdirecting anxiety away from its root cause—the intrinsic 
uncertainty of capitalism—the fact remains that countless articles, editorials, and news 
stories consistently framed computer technology as competing with workers, managers, 
and humanity itself.  I will argue that this use of computer technology as what amounted 
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to a scapegoat functioned, on the one hand, as a means of giving a physical presence to 
what was otherwise an amalgamation of trends in management, economic indicators, and 
general technological innovations, while on the other a means of diffusing any real 
cultural or social critique of the systematic exploitation in the service of capital.  The 
computer as a shorthand symbol also functioned as an evasion by reaffirming 
unquestioned roles and social mores concerning gender, class, and capitalism.  
Like the attacks on rock and roll in the 1950’s and 1960’s, computer technology 
acted as a proxy for other issues, anxieties, and concerns.  Representing rock and roll as 
destructive to the moral fiber of American youth, corrupting, and encouraging 
promiscuity and deviant social behavior can be seen as double-speak for a thinly veiled 
racism directed at the ascendancy of post-war African-American popular culture with 
American youth.  Openly suggestive songs, dances, and rhythms were represented as 
retrograde, primitive, and uncivilized.  But rock and roll was only a symptom, not a cause 
of youthful exuberance, and the hand wringing and anxiety concerning the future of 
America’s children masked a deeper anxiety concerning race and American culture.  The 
call of rock and roll was not only a seduction towards but also a seduction away from a 
particular post-war logic of segregation, repression, and social conservatism.  For 
example, segregationists protesting a rock and roll concert in Alabama carried placards 
stating that “Jungle Music Promotes Integration,” to which, reportedly, a young girl 
shouted out, “then bring me my grapevine!”12 
However, it is easy to overstate the tendency toward social conservatism in 
                                                 
12 "Alabama Pickets Rock-Roll Troupe," Chicago Daily Defender, May 21 1956, 10.  
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American culture in the 1950’s, just as it is easy to overstate the radicalism of the 1960’s.  
The issue of music in the 1950’s as a symptom of youth rebellion is less the point than 
the perception of music in the mainstream media as driving American youth toward 
rebelliousness and degeneracy.  What is worth looking at is the use of rock and roll as a 
nexus of anxieties that can be read as containing much more than just what one critic 
called “the melodic equivalent of a square-wheeled switch engine.”13  Rock and Roll 
music, by virtue of its association with black American popular culture, was reviled as a 
low entertainment designed for a lower class.  The inherent racism of early criticism of 
rock and roll music suggests that the issue of the music was not its aesthetic merit, but 
rather its marker as a racially charged art form, and its resonance within the racially 
charged America of the mid-1950’s.  
Critics of the music were reluctant to represent their misgivings about the music 
as carrying the weight of their larger anxieties concerning the questions of segregation, 
civil rights, and the larger economy of race as practiced in mid-century America.  Race 
was intended to remain invisible within the more pointed critique of youth culture.  
Instead, youth music was offered up as a stand in for the larger social problems for which 
it was not responsible.14  By redirecting social criticism toward a musical form, and the 
white children who were excited by it, cultural critics (and worried parents) were able to 
focus their energies in a direction over which they might have some control, and avoid 
the harder racial issues that the music, and their reaction to it, implied.  After all, the 
critique of rock and roll as a degenerate musical form was not part of the mainstream 
                                                 
13 "Rock 'N' Roll Stage Show Frantic, Noisy," Los Angeles Times, November 4 1955, B9. 
14 See also, David Hajdu, The Ten-Cent Plague: The Great Comic-Book Scare and How It Changed 
America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2008). 
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until the music began to affect white teenagers—the harmful effects of the music 
(previously called Rhythm and Blues) was seemingly not a cause for concern as long as it 
only infected African Americans. As Frank Sinatra testified to the United States Congress 
in 1958, rock ‘n’ roll was “the most brutal, ugly, desperate, vicious form of expression it 
has been my misfortune to hear. […] It manages to be the martial music for every 
sideburned delinquent on the face of the earth.”15 
The nature of this reaction is what parallels the reaction to computer systems as 
they began to find their way into popular discourse.   It may be that the expression of 
anxiety by reporters and writers concerning the technological advancements they 
witnessed were a response to the philosophical currents of the time.  Authors like 
Marcuse, Reisman, Whyte, and Mills wrote of technology as inherently dehumanizing 
and, as public intellectuals expressed the ideas with a certain weight to their opinions.  
Weiner, an expert in the field of cybernetics, enthusiastically voiced opinions on the risk 
of human enslavement in the face of computer technology.   
The point of this discussion on the dangers of rock ‘n’ roll for the impressionable 
generation that would come to be called the baby-boomers is to illustrate both the anxiety 
felt toward such popular pastimes as music and television as a reflection of the post-war 
era and the sense of dread that accompanied the political and social uncertainty of the 
period. In the case of television and rock ‘n’ roll music; this dread became the focus of 
those who made their living as popular critics of contemporary culture on events and 
technologies over which they, as commentators, had no control.   For all the ink spilled 
                                                 
15 Quoted in Paul Friedlander, Rock and Roll: A Social History (Boulder: Westview Press, 2006), 2. 
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bemoaning the inevitable demise of America, if not at the hands of the Soviets, then 
certainly at the whim of computers, the glowing television tube, or the hips of Elvis 
Presley, the technologies that were vilified by the popular print media were remarkably 
successful in capturing the attention and the imagination of the public at large.  
Computers, though largely represented as portentous artifacts throughout the post-war 
period, continued to be manufactured in greater numbers by the late 1950’s and gained 
entrance to more areas of business and industry, and became more and more a part of the 
daily routine of government, banking, and manufacturing.  By the early 1960’s the 
technology began to intersect with the lives of ordinary people through banking and 
billing technologies for consumer credit.  The fear of computer technology did not 
manifest itself as a denial of the technologies usefulness, nor in a larger scale (or really, a 
small scale) revolt against computer technology.  The usefulness of fear in the case of 
computers was not as an explicit attack on the technology as something to be shunned or 
destroyed—rather, the anxiety expressed toward the technology reflected a social 
criticism and fear of totalitarianism, other-directed anti-individualistic behavior, 
conformity and over-specialization.  Computer technology, though not responsible for 
any of these attributes of post-war American culture (either real or imagined) became a 
potent symbol of these trends and the criticisms and fears expressed toward technology 
was a sort of shorthand for a larger societal critique in mainstream media. 
Fredric Jameson’s suggestion that works of mass culture reflect deeply held 
anxieties while at the same time function as utopian texts is a useful concept for this 
discussion.  Jameson writes that the  “deepest and most fundamental hopes and fantasies 
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of the collectivity” are expressed as the flip side of a coin with anxiety on its other face.16   
Steven Goldman points to the large number of film that express either outright 
technological phobia or some negative social consequences to adopting technology.17  
Comstock and Tully’s survey of over 150 science fiction films created between 1939 and 
1976 found that in nearly 60% of the films, technological innovation was portrayed as 
damaging, dangerous, or fatal.18  John Clark’s early  survey of much of the same material 
concludes that although we may not live in total fear of the technological world, we are 
“livid with fear and trembling about the ambiguities and perplexities and delusions of the 
all too human inventors of machines.”19  Recently, Christopher Frayling has contended 
that the modern scientist and the products of scientific and technological labor are very 
often portrayed as menacing in American cinema.20  Toni Perrine, focusing on the cinema 
of nuclear anxiety, theorizes too that it is not so much the bomb (which is, to some 
degree, made manageable by post-apocalypse fictions) that is the locus of anxiety, but the 
rush to technology that makes the bomb a logical conclusion of a technological quest.21   
Where on one hand media culture artifacts that dwell on dystopian relationships 
between humans and machines reflect a legitimate anxiety concerning issues of 
technological replacement, unemployment, and a loss of autonomy (or in some instances, 
legitimate apocalyptic fears) they also provide a mirror image of what is prized by the 
                                                 
16 Fredric Jameson, "Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture," Social Text 1, no. 1 (1979): 131. 
17 Steven L. Goldman, "Images of Technology in Popular Film: Discussion and Filmography," Science, 
Technology and Human Values 14, no. 3 (1989). 
18 George Comstock and Heather Tully, "Innovation in the Movies: 1939-1976," Journal of 
Communications  (1985). 
19 John R. Clark, "The Machine Prevails," Journal of Popular Culture 12, no. 1 (1978): 121. 
20 Christopher Frayling, Mad, Bad and Dangerous: The Scientist and the Cinema (London: Reaktion 
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culture that creates the artifacts and consumes them.  My reading of media culture 
artifacts, specifically television and film, will discuss these works as ideological 
expressions of normalcy that function to perpetuate hegemonic visions of gender, and to a 
lesser but still discernable extent, race and class.  Borrowing from theories of film genre, 
specifically Thomas Schatz’s view that genre films can be seen as performing the 
function of folk tales or myths, I argue that the generic conventions used to represent 
computer technology recapitulate earlier conventions of ‘man-versus-machine’ but as a 
means of reinforcing the folklore of American exceptionalism and ingenuity.22  
 
Black-Boxing and Media Culture 
The nature of computers, what they were for and what they did—was not a settled 
matter for laypersons in the years following the Second World War.  Although systems 
experts, engineers, and scientists may have reached agreement on the utility of computer 
technology, and were slowly reaching consensus and convergence on matters of 
architecture, this closing of computers as artifacts into what Bruno Latour considers 
‘black box systems’23 did not extend to the larger world of private citizens outside the 
engineering community.   This disjuncture is critical in understanding the anxiety 
expressed toward computers in the post-war era.   The black-boxing that Latour 
describes, though necessary from a systems standpoint to codify innovation and 
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standards, leaves the public at large without an accurate understanding of the technology 
that is marketed to government and to corporations as transformative of the way they 
conduct their affairs.  In the matter of computers in the post-war period, the public relied 
upon the media for representations and definitions of a new technology that, they were 
told, was to have a profound effect on their livelihoods, their futures, and their sense of 
self.    
At its outset, computer technology was defined in terms that did not resonate with 
non-technicians.  The technology may have been interesting, but to make it palatable 
journalists, writers, and filmmakers placed the technology into a context that was 
intelligible to a wide audience.  While journalists explained computer technology as 
newsworthy objects, filmmakers had more time to consider the philosophical and social 
implications of the new technology and were better able to integrate it into dramatic 
narratives of family and romantic lives, as well as political and social discourse.  
Discussions of tubes (later transistors) algorithms, and equations had to undergo a 
translation into terms that had some concrete meaning for non-specialist readers and 
viewers.  The symbolic link between the computer and the brain provided one conceptual 
shortcut that provided a concrete basis for abstract discussion.  As N. Katherine Hayles 
points out, this metaphoric relationship between thoughts and data has fueled the engine 
of speculative technological anxiety for the past half century.24  The equating of 
computers and brains, though publicly dismissed by the scientists and engineers 
responsible for developing the technologies that comprised computers as machines, 
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persisted and computers were represented as surrogate minds capable of calculating 
mathematical problems as well as presenting existential questions concerning the nature 
of human thought, uniqueness, freedom, and individuality.  The work of journalists, 
filmmakers and writers took the language of the technical specialist and translated it 
(sometimes mistranslating it) to create interest in a lay audience infused with concern and 
anxious about the direction technology was taking them.  
Although this type of audience is typically described in terms of mass culture or 
mass media, the use of the term ‘mass audience’, like ‘mass culture’ or ‘mass media’ is 
problematic and, following Douglas Kellner, I retain his oppositional definition of ‘media 
culture’ as an improvement for the topic under discussion.  For Kellner, media culture 
emphasizes the site of inquiry “signifying both the nature and form of the artifacts of the 
culture industries (i.e. culture) and their mode of production and distribution (i.e. media 
technologies and industries).”25  Kellner proposes this as an alternative to ‘mass culture’ 
as a legacy of the Frankfurt School that focuses on culture from a perspective that 
segregates culture into 'high' and 'low' expressions-- art and kitsch.  For theorists like 
Adorno and Horkheimer, art is that which is original and unique (expressing an 'aura' as 
Walter Benjamin described).  Mass culture is that which is created for 'mass' 
consumption and is decorative, ephemeral, and reinforces hegemonic ideas of class, 
capital, values, etc.  This dichotomy itself, and the tendency to valorize 'high' art arguably 
recapitulates the very hegemonic principles it purports to deconstruct.  As such, it is a 
useful tool for generating awareness in how culture is used to perpetuate the ideals of the 
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ruling economic class, but the inherent contradictions of this view make it ill suited for 
interrogating how mass culture responds to alternative or oppositional readings.     
Another problem with the concept of mass culture is that it assumes the existence 
of a mass population operating with the same ideas, concerns, and interests.  This view 
projects a single reading for cultural phenomena, usually provided by the media, that is 
uncritically accepted by the public as defining how the public reacts to the phenomena, 
and is shaped by it.  Mass cultural formations are one-way interpretations that shape 
public perceptions through a broadcast model that allows for little feedback from the 
audience back to the producers of media content.  This approach to the role of the media 
suggests that the public are passive consumers of media images and ideas and can be seen 
as a monolithic entity to be manipulated by a class of writers and producers with obscure 
agendas.  This reading of mass media and mass culture does not consider either the 
multitude of possible readings that audiences bring to any cultural artifact, readings based 
within political, gender, or racial frameworks to name a few.  It also presumes that media 
production is the work of a group of people who are somehow able to stand outside of the 
culture they inhabit and who are consciously able to do the hegemonic work of 
interpretation for a passive audience of consumers.   
The concept of ‘mass’ culture is thus problematic in what it presupposes about the 
about the audience, but it is also problematic in what it supposes about the producers of 
news stories and magazine articles.  For me, the story of the symbolic value of computer 
technology requires looking behind what has become commonplace in popular 
descriptions of computer technology as a synecdoche for a totalizing system of command  
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and control.  Computer systems, as commonly described in media culture, are 
discursively positioned as hierarchical, rigidly structured, and totalizing in their logic.  
The genealogy of this mode of discourse is thoroughly considered by Paul Edwards in his 
work on Cold War computer systems.  Edwards places early computer systems within the 
context of military history and the formative debates surrounding artificial intelligence, 
information theory, and cognitive science.26  But where Edwards’ work examines the 
discourses of engineering, scientific, and military communities in the formation of what 
he terms the “Closed World” view of computer systems, I wish to examine the role of the 
media in popularizing computer systems and framing the technology for a wider 
audience.    
I would argue though, in addition to defining mass culture and predicting the end 
of the individual, the Frankfurt school theorists produced a critique of human-technology 
interaction that goes a long way toward explaining the reactions to computer technology 
we see in the 1960s as a wave of anxiety concerning the future of consciousness both as a 
personal and a social construct, as well as the means deployed in defining computer 
technology earlier in its history.  The tension of utopian and dystopian as manifest in the 
rebellion against existing definitions of technology and culture is evident through  
examining the student and anti-war movements and their attacks on computers as 
symbols of the interconnectedness of the US military and college campuses.  The tactical 
logic of occupying computer centers to protest the use of college computers for war work 
is supplemented by the attack on computers as symbols of this relationship, and the 
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relationship between the state, capital, and human beings.   The symbolic value of 
computers in this context is evident in the coverage of occupations by the alternative 
press.  The difference in coverage by the mainstream media and the alternative press of 
the computer center bombings at the University of Kansas and the University of 
Wisconsin in 1970, as well as the non-violent occupation of computer centers across the 
United States highlight the differing symbolic values of computers in the anti-war 
movement.  Where the mainstream media focused on the destructive nature of the 
attacks, the cost of damages, and the criminality of the event, the alternative press 
emphasized the symbolic value of the attacks, not solely as tactical strikes against a 
military target, but symbolic strikes at the machine and what it represented existentially.   
For the people participating in the occupation and destruction of computer 
centers, the iconic value of computers is fused with the idea of a practical threat in a way 
not seen in earlier manifestations of computers as icons of modernity, as stand-ins for 
gender politics, symbols of totalitarianism, or as mirrors reflecting ideas of human 
intellect.  The threat of computer technology as defined by the protesters moved from the 
abstract to the concrete.  By ending with the occupation of computer centers as a form of 
tactical protest, the accumulated weight of the previous symbolic value of the technology 
is exchanged for a new set of symbols that are tied to the state and the perpetuation of 
power through technologies of control.  Where previous representations of computers 
were often abstract responses to vaguely defined threats to the doxa of established tropes 
of human (specifically masculine) superiority, the protesters redefined the symbolism of 
computers as a concrete threat on a personal level (in terms of surveillance) as well as a 
social level where information and information technology created a schism between 
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ordinary people and an abstract governing class. 
What is Anxiety in This Context?  
In order to discuss the social anxieties reveled, magnified, and propagated by mid-
century writers concerning computer technology, it is important to clarify what anxiety is, 
and how we can represent some anxieties as existing in a social rather than personal 
realm.  In her recent book on fear and popular culture, historian Joanna Bourke discusses 
the difference between fear and anxiety in terms that are relevant to my thesis.  Bourke 
positions fear and anxiety as emotional states engendered within a matrix of control.  
Fear is outwardly focused on a tangible, identifiable threat while anxiety is a product of a 
subjective reaction to an unknown foreboding.  For Bourke, this distinction is meaningful 
in that the ability to discern and act against a threat (either in fight or flight) is a response 
to fear that places the subject in the position of control over her environment, or her 
reaction in a given situation.  Anxiety is the feeling that comes from not being able to 
identify what exactly the threat is, and, because of this powerlessness, renders the subject 
unable to act purposefully.27  Anxiety is, then, in this context, a generalized uneasiness, 
reminiscent of W.H. Auden’s 1948 poem, “The Age of Anxiety”:  
Both professor and prophet depress,  
For vision and a longer view 
Agree in predicting a day 
Of convulsion and vast evil,  
When cold societies clash 
Or the mosses are set in motion 
To overrun the earth,  
And the great brain which began 
With lucid dialectics  
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Ends in a horrid madness.28  
 
As Auden suggests, the age of anxiety is an age of helpless dread—of things set in 
motion from other levels over which we have no control nor can expect any quarter.  This 
anxiety has, throughout the twentieth century, been manifest in popular cultural artifacts 
in ways that are not overtly stated. At times, the celebration of technology masked unease 
as to what that technology was bringing to the fore, and what changes were to be 
expected.  From Frankfurt School readings of popular radio as a necessary technology for 
fascism, to the dumbing-down of culture through television, and the half-century dread of 
the atomic bomb, technological artifacts have been presented as somewhat responsible 
for social ills and the failures of community.   So it is not surprising then to see anxieties 
expressed in magazine writing and reportage, and cinematic representations of computer 
technology and these anxieties reflect unease concerning social or political issues.29   In 
the case of computers, specific anxieties about the waning power of the post-war male 
found expression in movies and television shows conflating computers with women, and 
the seemingly harmless game of chess was evidence of human failure.   The conflation of 
human beings with objects, data points or machines was a message repeated over and 
over in the post war and Cold War eras, and the relationship between humans and 
technology reflected a cultural philosophy of technology that, through the Frankfurt 
School, was imported to the US from the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.  
The objectness that sits at the heart of Heidegger's critique of technology does, on 
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one hand, provide an opening into a world of totalizing objectification.  As all things 
become objects (that is ordered, ready-at-hand, classified things) there is nothing unique 
in human beings to exempt them from this objectification as well.  We are all then, in as 
much as we are part of the social/technological fabric of the world, objects ordered for 
some use.  But this is not all we are.  The pessimism of Marcuse, Adorno, and 
Horkheimer regarding the status of the individual in modernity exaggerates this ordering 
principle at the expense of the concept of power as diffuse and not centralized in purely 
exploitative systems.  For Heidegger, technology is an ordering for its own sake and does 
not require a subject, "everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at 
hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever 
is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve."30 
For Heidegger, technology as ordering achieves, ultimately, a sort of leveling out 
where subjects and objects are part of a relational matrix where it is unclear (or 
irrelevant) where any ontic differences reside.  We are imbricated, yes, but our mode of 
participation is not singly exploited and controlled.  We also participate in the 
perpetuation of systems and, through our participation, exert some power and control as 
well.  Heidegger was not against technology in a Luddite sense, but rather opposes the 
type of thinking that technology engenders and supports.  That is, Heidegger saw the 
danger of technological thinking as foreclosing other types of thought: “The approaching 
tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and 
beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as 
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the only way of thinking.”31 
We see this concern about how thought is affected by technology restated using a 
variety of rhetorical strategies and tropes during the post-war era.  One of the unifying 
principles in media descriptions of computer technology is the idea that the advent of 
‘thinking machines’ brings about a tendency to think like machines on the part of 
humans, instead of a more hermeneutic approach to thought.  This is central to Paul 
Edwards’ approach to computers and metaphor as well.  Edwards draws upon the work of 
Lakoff and Johnson to frame his discussion of Cold War computing as a set of discursive 
strategies concerning matrices of power and how meaning was embedded in the closed 
world of the military-industrial complex.  Computers as symbols of cold war power were 
icons of command and control that projected technological superiority and sophistication 
that reinforced a forceful narrative of American technological mastery and superiority.  
Edwards contrasts this with the discourse of the ‘green world’ where power is not 
centralized and monolithic, but contingent and rhyzomic.  
This idea of power as decentralized and contingent is central to Foucault's 
philosophy and his definition of bio-power that he explains is, "power's condition of 
possibility [...] Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it 
comes from everywhere."32  The reality of the power that Foucault describes creates a set 
of cognitive dissonance when contrasted with the very real power relationships of 
advanced capitalism and technological networks.  If, as Foucault suggests, power 
emanates from everywhere and is not a top-down oppressive force, then we are complicit 
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in the realities of power that we experience.  There can be no fascism without hegemony, 
after all.   The anxieties expressed toward computer systems are anxieties of power 
relationships, explicitly anxieties of responsibility and, as such, are not so much tirades 
against abstraction as denials of accountability.   In this way computer anxieties as 
expressed in the media serve the same function as disaster films and, in a way, 
apocalyptic texts.  They are cautionary tales that present us with nameless hordes that die 
for our comfort/salvation.  What makes Dr. Strangelove a black comedy is its explicit 
reference to notions of the elect and the preterite or those who are graced with salvation 
over the expendable masses.   The comedic turn is in our awareness of the truth inherent 
in the scene late in the film where an earnest discussion of mine shafts as shelters for 
elected officials and comely, fertile young women takes place.  The rest of the world is 
doomed, but the happy elect will survive and continue to prosper.   
Chapter Synopsis and Periodization 
The bulk of this dissertation seeks to re-examine the interface between media 
culture and computer technology as not so much a matter of the writers, critics, and 
filmmakers ‘getting it wrong’ regarding computer technology, or to cast the positioning 
of computers as representing an unholy marriage between the growing military-industrial 
complex and a burgeoning mass media, but to take the anxieties at face value as 
representative of a reaction to an uncertain post-war world.  Through an examination of 
print and visual media artifacts and oral history accounts from people involved with the 
introduction of computer technology to a broad national audience, this discussion will 
focus on how the choice of images and metaphors deployed to create the idea of 
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computers served to reinforce traditional national narratives concerning masculinity, 
American exceptionalism and power, and class privilege.  By using what was seen as 
futuristic technology as the jumping off point for speculation, narratives about computers 
could easily reinforce traditional gender and class relations as natural and assure 
continuity into the future as well.  However, the narratives of the 1950’s, because of their 
successes in conflating tradition, nature, and technology, were complicated by the student 
movements of the 1960’s that sought to redefine ideas of culture, class, and gender and 
recast the computer as an icon of ‘the state’ and a corrupt and failing system.  The 
chapters will take up this argument from the following positions:  
Chapter one presents the thesis that the use of metaphors to describe computer 
technology was embedded in a larger matrix of meaning and anxiety in post-war 
America.  This chapter introduces the main concepts of the project and builds around the 
CBS coverage of the 1952 presidential election and the introduction of the UNIVAC 
computer as an artifact and as a concept into the homes of television viewers.  The focus 
of this chapter is the theme of technological unemployment and the introduction of the 
computer as a rival.  An analysis of textual sources contemporary to the event reveals a 
consistent pattern of rhetoric that places the computer in the context of competition and 
magnifies the threat of the entrance of computers into the workspace and into the lives of 
average Americans.  This chapter presents the anxiety concerning computers as a 
manufactured one, where the narrative trajectory of news and magazine articles presented 
a specific anxiety and then assuaged the very fears it conjured by denigrating the 
technology and its limitations.  The effect of this representation is to sensitize the reader  
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to a possible threat, and then downplay the seriousness of that threat.   
What is at work here is less a critique of technology than the creation of 
surmountable obstacles with the effect of reassuring readers that no matter what the 
future brings, essential American values and traditional roles and boundaries (as defined 
by the journalists themselves) will be maintained.  By placing a new, alien, futuristic and 
menacing technology at the heart of the white collar workplace—an arena previously off-
limits for the muscle-replacing machines of the pre-war era—writers presented readers 
with a threat to their well-being and prosperity no less menacing than the creeping 
menace of Soviet expansion. Like the red menace of McCarthyist fantasies, the computer 
would infiltrate the workplace and hollow it out from within.    
Throughout the 1950’s and early 1960’s the metaphors used to describe 
computers ‘naturalized’ computer technology and masked the real decisions behind its 
deployment.  Decisions that were made to increase productivity, profitability, and to 
eliminate classes of jobs were screened from critique by the monolithic approach to the 
computer as akin to a force of nature-- something that was there and thus had to be used.  
In this way, the computer as a technological artifact resonated with its deadly sibling the 
atomic bomb. 
The naturalization of computer technology as an existential threat that provided a 
surrogate victory over the Soviets in terms of the cold war provides the basis for chapter 
two.  The totalitarian aspects of machine logic resonated with the machine-like 
personification of the Soviet system.  The consistent victory over computers in the realm 
of chess was a metaphorical victory over the Soviet Union.  Like the Soviets, however, 
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the computers were never defeated totally, but rather vanquished to return stronger 
another day.   The relationship between computers and totalitarianism is explored more 
fully in the second chapter, which focuses on the media’s treatment of chess playing 
computers as a critique of uniformity and conformity both as symptomatic of the 1950’s 
American middle class, and as intrinsic features of communist totalitarianism.  The 
reportage surrounding the nascent chess-playing abilities of computers followed a 
standard line of critique that de-emphasized the use of logic as a true measure of 
intelligence while championing more intangible and intuitive characteristics belonging 
only to humans.  
The use of computers as an icon of logic did not, however, stop writers and 
filmmakers from making a decidedly female gender association explicit in their 
representations of the technology.  The use of computers within the closed and 
internalized space of American business brought computer logic into the heart of the 
corporation.  Like the wife and mother who loyally tended the hearth and home, the ways 
of the computer could be seen as no less capricious and inscrutable at times—its inner 
workings shrouded in mystery and the products of its reasoning seemingly sui generis 
strange.  The domination of the computer by its human minders acted as a proxy to the 
traditional world of stable gender roles. 
While logic and intuition came into play as sites of difference in the way humans 
and machines pursued solutions on a chessboard, the game itself opened up metaphorical 
power relationships perhaps better explored on film and television.  The drama of conflict 
between human protagonists and other-than-human machines, a trope as old as  
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industrialization (and in the case of the Greek mythological figure Talos, and the Jewish 
folk creature the ‘golem’, significantly older still) gained new relevance in the post-war 
world where the machines were capable of doing the thinking and not just the manual 
labor.  Chapter Three focuses on these cinematic representations to explore the way 
cinematic imagery was used to visualize this conflict and the dramatic use of paradoxes 
to undermine the totalizing logic of computerized systems.  As computers stood for more 
than simply calculating machines and became icons of command and control and the 
totalitarian societies of a dystopic future, the need to demonstrate continued human 
mastery of machines was required.  This was not a simple literal mastery, but a symbolic 
one.  The science fiction universes of Forbidden Planet, Star Trek, and 2001: A Space 
Odyssey were laboratory worlds of possible futures and the ways in which American 
identity and character could be seen to fare. Much like Mark Twain’s Connecticut 
Yankee tests the timeless wisdom of American ingenuity by sending him back in time to 
set the Arthurian court on track, the projection of mid 20th century identities, especially 
masculine identities, into the future presents the values of the post-war world as timeless 
and unchanging, irrespective of the dehumanizing trends of mass-culture, mass-society, 
and mass-production.   
The anxiety concerning the creeping corporatism and conformity within 
American culture was expressed in literature and film as the processing of human beings 
within a great equalizing system, run by computers incapable of discerning the truly 
relevant qualities of human beings.  Chapter Three discusses the victory over machines 
was a victory of the human ‘spirit’ in terms of creativity and a willingness to keep 
fighting in the face of impossible odds.  The emphasis on spirit was relative—that is, 
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spirit as defined by the systems of power within a culture provided an outlet for fears of 
repression while simultaneously promoting American values of independence and 
libertarianism that resonated as ‘traditional’ within the culture.  This impulse in the 
science fiction genre echoed the other popular genre of the time period, the western.  The 
primacy of the western as a generic form both in cinema and television provided the same 
function and shared many of the same tropes as the science fiction genre.33  
Chapter Four explores the symbolic relevance of the computer as an icon of 
conformity, totalizing systems, and dehumanizing processes was incorporated into the 
rhetoric of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement.  As the student movement progressed 
throughout the 1960’s the computer as metaphor was reinscribed upon the physical 
artifact of the computer as object.  Computer centers on university campuses became 
targets for protesters as objects to be held hostage, vandalized, and destroyed as part of a 
larger movement against the Vietnam War, but also as part of the civil rights movement.   
Chapter Four examines the rhetoric of the student movements and the underground press 
as they describe the motivations behind their occupying campus computer centers as a 
form of protest. 
As the metaphors deployed around computers changed as the post-war era moved 
into the Cold War, and the 1950’s gave way to the 1960’s, the computer as an artifact 
changed as well.  The changes in computer technology, and, more importantly for this 
discussion, the associations attached to computers, can be viewed along the following 
lines:  
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• 1945-1955:  The era of early research into computer technology with 
large, room-sized machines prone to breaking down.  Largely government 
sponsored (and largely through the military) these computers were 
strongly associated with scientists and scientific mathematical problems.   
The computer is presented as abstract and intelligent by association with 
scientific work.  This era coincides with the beginning of the Cold War 
and the development of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union.  The 
Korean War and the revolution in China usher in an era of anti-communist 
hysteria in the United States culminating in the McCarthyist ‘witch hunts’ 
of suspected communists in America.34  
• 1955-1965:  The era of the early commercialization of computers for 
corporate bookkeeping.  IBM comes into prominence as synonymous with 
computer technology. Computers are expensive—affordable to large 
corporations, the military, and the government.  Computers are associated 
with Cold War planning and command and control.  The integration of 
computers into large scale organizations is presented as demonstrating the 
totalitarian tendencies of mass culture.  This coincides with the beginning 
of the space race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the beginning 
of American involvement in Viet Nam.  
• 1965-1975:  Transistor and electronic innovations rapidly reduce the size 
of computers, their reliability and affordability.  Still large by 
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contemporary standards, the machines are affordable to smaller 
companies, municipal governments and smaller research universities.  
Computers are part of mainstream American life and are associated with 
the status quo.  The anti-war and ecological movements of this period, 
with their anti-establishment and anti-corporate positions, view the 
encroaching technology with suspicion.   
These periods are roughly drawn, with some overlap as the computer as a 
technological artifact changed, was marketed, and consumed by corporations and 
universities.  But the three eras do describe the major points of concern as well as the 
major technological position of the technology in the marketplace.  These three periods 
also coincide with the timelines for changes in the metaphors associated with computers 
observed in the following chapters:  
• Chapter 1:  initial framing of computer technology as more intelligent (ca 
1946-1955) 
• Chapter 2: Chess playing computers and metaphors of totalitarianism (ca 
1952-1965) 
• Chapter 3, which covers the use of computers in science fiction film and 
television, spans all three eras and merges many of the associations with 
science, totalitarianism, and conformity with a reaction to the changing 
role of gender in American life in post war and Cold War America. In 
many ways, the computer becomes a stand in for gender issues and 
challenges to American masculinity (both real and imagined) and presents 
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a foil for a discussion of social change.   
• Chapter 4: Computers as sites of protest and revolt (ca 1968-1970) 
At the end of the 1960’s and the beginning of the 1970’s the computer as an icon 
underwent a fundamental shift toward diminishing importance as a symbol of anxiety.  
As computers became more commonplace, and with the introduction of small ‘home’ 
computer kits and computer clubs, the computer as an existential threat rapidly fell out of 
favor as a site of anxiety both on its own, or as a symbol of modernity and the modern 
problems of gender equality, unemployment, or the totalitarian state.  Audiences in the 
1970’s began to see the computer as part of the modern environment—a tool like the 
telephone or the automobile—portentous perhaps, but also useful.  Anxieties attached to 
computer technology were anxieties concerning what they were capable of as tools, not 
as a form of consciousness.  There was a shift away from the computer as threat to 
humanity to concerns about the data captured by computers, who has access to and 
control of that data, and what that means in terms of control and privacy.  This move 
from computers as black-boxed icons to vehicles for government and corporate 
surveillance marks the end of the computer as a physical object with iconic properties for 
modernity, and opens up instead the ephemeral construct of cyberspace—the geography 






Chapter 1: Creating the Computer as a Consumable Image: CBS, 
UNIVAC and the 1952 Presidential Election 
 
Introduction  
The story of computer technology as a representation and creation of the media in 
the post-war years is the story of the relationship between the underlying anxiety 
concerning the loss of autonomy and loss of employment conjured up by the idea of the 
computer during the earliest years of its introduction as a consumable image.  This 
chapter examines the function of early representations of computer technology as a 
continuation of earlier depression era concerns of technological unemployment and an 
artifact readily identified with the post-war variant of technological unemployment—
automation.  Coupled with the anxiety surrounding technological unemployment was a 
sense of powerlessness in the face of technological and scientific changes in the post-war 
world.  This fatalistic view enframed computer technology, moving it out of the realm of 
the ordinary and into what David Nye calls the technological sublime.  The idea of an 
autonomous technology—an “electronic brain” that would control the already 
mechanized body, that had, in a previous generation caused so much consternation as 
technological unemployment contributed to, and reflected, a sense of the loss of human 
uniqueness and human primacy in the years immediately following the Second World 
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War.  This loss, and with it, the feeling of a loss of agency and control, what Timothy 
Melley has termed ‘agency panic,’ was exacerbated by the media culture of the 1950’s 
and 1960’s by subtle and not-so-subtle reminders of the expanding role of computers in 
the modern workplace, often coupled with fanciful predictions of futures where machines 
would rule over humankind.35   
The 1952 U.S. presidential election marked the first time that a computer was 
used to predict the outcome of a national election on live television.  Any value of the 
exercise as a service to the news industry (or to viewers) was overshadowed by the 
novelty and sense of gimmickry attached to the event. Whether or not the use of the 
UNIVAC computer added to the accuracy and immediacy of election night coverage, it 
still represented, for most viewers, a first glimpse at the new ‘electronic brains’ that had 
been the subject of so much writing and editorializing since the ENIAC, the first 
electronic computer, was unveiled at the University of Pennsylvania in the Winter of 
1946.   The framing of computer technology in newspapers and magazines, and 
specifically during the night of the 1952 presidential election on television presented 
computers as rarified, and fragile, technological artifacts fresh from scientific laboratories 
and infused with much of the same awe extended toward the atomic bomb.  The 
computer was positioned first as a scientific apparatus, and only later as an object with a 
practical impact on American society.  This impact, as it played out against the backdrop 
of an uncertain post-war economy, was as a harbinger of technological unemployment 
reminiscent of the pre-war depression-era factory.  
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CBS and the UNIVAC: Television Coverage of the 1952 Presidential Election 
The network also has arranged to use UNIVAC, Remington Rand’s all-
electronic, high-speed computer, to help keep the staff of newsmen up-to-
the-minute on voting trends36 
 
On November 4, 1952, with just over 5% of the vote counted, a UNIVAC 
computer predicted a landslide victory for Dwight Eisenhower.  CBS News’ election 
night coverage featured the UNIVAC prominently in its advertising in the run-up to the 
election, touting the computer as the “Magic Brain.”37 The UNIVAC calculated that 
Eisenhower would garner 438 electoral votes to Stevenson’s 93.  The prediction of the 
UNIVAC was quite accurate.  When the final vote tallies were completed, Eisenhower 
received 442 electoral votes to Stevenson’s 89.  The UNIVAC was able to make this 
prediction using a sample of just 3.4 million votes, and the results of its calculations were 
accurate to less than 1%.  The 1952 American presidential election marked the first time 
that a computer was used to project the outcome of an election— previously the task of 
prediction fell only to seasoned journalists and pundits, statisticians and trend-watchers 
who monitored the pulse of the electorate as a full-time job.  The 1952 election was also 
the first exposure most Americans had to the computer as an object—a thing rather than a 
concept.38   
John Presper Eckert and John Mauchly developed the UNIVAC (short for 
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Universal Automatic Computer) in 1950 as the first commercially available electronic 
computer with the first model installed at the census bureau in 1951.  Eckert and Mauchly 
had worked together at the University of Pennsylvania to develop the ENIAC (Electronic 
Numerical Integrator and Computer) in 1945.  The ENIAC was designed to speed the 
creation of ballistic tables for the U.S. Army and was heralded as the first fully functional 
electronic computer.  After their success in developing the ENIAC, and as a result of 
ongoing patent disputes with the University of Pennsylvania, Eckert and Mauchly formed 
their own company, the Eckert-Mauchly Computer Corporation in 1948.  By 1952, the 
Eckert-Mauchly Computer Corporation had been absorbed into the Remington Rand 
Corporation.39  This triangular pattern of university research, military funding and 
corporate commercial development played a large role in the production of early 
computer systems.  Because of the high cost involved with their production, most early 
computers were developed to serve very specific military needs—calculating firing 
tables, tabulating data on nuclear chain reactions and fighter aircraft wing design were all 
original functions of early computers.  The intended customers for early computer 
systems (mostly military and government research contracts) tended to make computers 
more abstract and more removed from the routines of average Americans.  As such, 
media reports of computer systems were often the only frame of reference people had 
with which to imagine this technology.  The role of the media in representing computer 
technology was therefore considerable, and the rhetorical and metaphorical devices used 
by journalists and writers conjured up the whole reality of computer technology for 
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American readers and consumers.  
The UNIVAC computer, on loan from Remington Rand to CBS news and running 
in the company’s Philadelphia headquarters, served a function quite different from the 
military tasks previous computers had been designed to perform.  The UNIVAC’s 
predictions were intended as no more than a publicity stunt, as Walter Cronkite described 
it: “It was agreed that it would be used on our election night purely, quite frankly, almost 
as a gimmick, to try to introduce the American people to what these machines could do, 
and also to give them some added excitement on election night.  I thought it was pretty 
much gimmickry.”  Cronkite concluded, “I didn’t see the great potential of them despite 
the propaganda put out by the UNIVAC people and the others.”40    The UNIVAC was 
programmed with the state-by- state presidential election returns from 1948 and 1944 and 
various statistical algorithms for determining trends from small statistical samples.  As 
returns were phoned in, the data was entered into the UNIVAC and the programs run to 
generate a prediction for the presidential race.  Standard polling had predicted a victory 
for Eisenhower, but when “at 9 with only 3,400,000 votes reported and the polls still 
open in some Western states, UNIVAC made its first prediction.  Eisenhower was a shoo-
in, the brain asserted.  He would receive 33,000,000 popular votes, winning 43 states 
with 438 electoral votes.”41   
In the run-up to the election, pollsters were hesitant to offer any predictions.  This 
was due in part to the perceived closeness of the race, but also due to the fact that so 
many were embarrassed by their incorrect prediction of a victory for Thomas Dewey in 
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1948.42  Although the polls seemed to support a victory for Eisenhower, his lead was seen 
as narrow with up to 10% of voters claiming to be undecided on the day before Election 
Day, with polls registering a trend in increasing support for Stevenson.43  The most 
complete statistical information available had Eisenhower going into the contest with 11 
states and 73 electoral votes and Stevenson with 10 states and 100 electoral votes.44  
Neither candidate was seen as having enough support for a landslide, so when the 
UNIVAC’s first prediction was announced to Charles Collingwood at CBS, it was met 
with a fair amount of incredulity and suspicion.  Walter Cronkite stated, “I doubted it 
completely. When they went to 100:1, I said, ‘well this damn thing doesn’t work.’  I was 
very reluctant to go to [Charles] Collingwood and the UNIVAC, I felt that they were just 
wasting time.  Anyone who thinks the odds are 100:1 can’t have their ear to the ground, 
electronically or otherwise.”45   The engineers were instructed to fine-tune the computer’s 
programming, since the calculation was (so it seemed) so obviously in error.  Over the 
course of the evening during CBS’s election night coverage, the engineers complied and 
after a series of adjustments the UNIVAC predicted a more reasonable Eisenhower 
victory with 28 states and 317 electoral votes, later narrowing the margin to a statistical 
dead heat with each candidate winning 24 states and Eisenhower eking out an electoral 
college victory at 8 to 7 odds-- this last bit of computing being the result of an inadvertent 
addition of a zero to the end of Stevenson’s vote count.  Once that was corrected, the 
computer consistently reported an Eisenhower landslide in line with its original 
calculation.  As Newsweek reported, “since everyone had predicted that the election 
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would be close, the human beings masterminding the machine decided there must be 
something wrong.  They agreed not to televise the prediction, and let the high-powered 
political experts in the broadcasting station go on saying it was too early to detect any 
real trend.  Meanwhile, the experts in charge of the machine threw in a few statistical 
‘correction factors’.”46 
As the election returns continued to come in over the course of the C.B.S. 
broadcast, it became more apparent that the UNIVAC’s original prediction was, in fact a 
more accurate representation than was considered possible earlier in the evening.  In an 
attempt to restore the credibility of the UNIVAC computer and the Remington Rand 
corporation, Arthur Draper, “engineer in charge of Remington Rand’s New Products 
Development went on the TV and apologized publicly to UNIVAC. ‘A mistake was 
made,’ he told TV viewers. ‘But the mistake was human.  We were wrong and UNIVAC 
was right.  Next time we’ll leave it alone.”47   CBS commentator Ed Murrow summed up 
the UNIVAC’s performance with, “The trouble with machines is people.”48 
Morrow’s analysis was correct, though only partially so.  The UNIVAC was 
‘right’ in that the machine did execute the program correctly (something taken for 
granted today but, given the questionable reliability of vacuum tubes, was not to be 
readily granted in 1952), but the algorithms used to make the predictions based upon 
early polling statistics were less accurate with each revision, making the output of those 
calculations less and less accurate as a predictive model as the night wore on.  Nor were 
the humans absolutely ‘wrong’ in their revisions to the algorithms—they were acting on 
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opinions and techniques that had been useful in the past.  CBS’s experiment with the 
UNIVAC highlighted the ways in which statistical data could be manipulated to reinforce 
a desired result.  The UNIVAC computer, though capable of rapid and precise 
calculations, was still a usurper in a role inhabited by human experts. It was up to the 
engineers to prove the UNIVAC was more capable than the experts, not the other way 
around.  This media coverage of the UNIVAC computer’s role on election night 
displayed a distinct sense of competition between the machine and its human counterparts 
with columnists like Wayne Oliver of The Washington Post reporting that “it will be men 
versus machines on radio and television election night to see who can pick out trends and 
forecast the winners most accurately on the basis of early returns.” 49   As The Nation 
reminded readers of the event some time later, “Startled statisticians and newsmen 
entreated the electronic brain to come up with a more reasonable answer but UNIVAC 
ignored its timid masters with scornful consistency.”50    
Giant Brains 
For the first framers of computer discourse, the celebratory aspects of the new 
technology were often tempered by wariness in the face of a new order of being whose 
intentions were unclear or suspicious.  It is this uncertainty about the motivations of the 
early computers that presents us with the depth of concern regarding their status, not only 
as machines, but also as machines that think.  Computers were machines—complex 
machines no doubt, but the ease with which writers, illustrators and journalists were able 
to assign intentionality to computer systems is an indication of just how unusual these 
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machines were, and how normal terms of classification failed to ameliorate the anxiety of 
a perceived threat.  Early popular writers and journalists deployed an array of metaphors 
and comparisons that conjured images of computer technology that were both terrifying 
and banal—often in the same article, in an attempt to describe these machines and place 
them within a context of similar objects and subject positions.   
The problem for writers seeking to describe computers is that there were few 
readily available constructs to use in explaining the technology to lay audiences.  The 
new machines weren’t mechanical, but electronic, and they were capable of calculating at 
speeds exponentially faster than most people could imagine.  Because they were so fast, 
they were capable of producing solutions to very complex mathematical problems.  They 
seemed to be more like brains than anything else, and the metaphorical connection 
between computers and brains was expanded to include consciousness, intention, will, 
and desire, no matter what the engineers said to the contrary.  
In January 1950, Time magazine dedicated its cover to the Mark III computer.  
The illustration showed an anthropomorphized machine assiduously studying the data it 
was itself producing, and computing the results.  The caption of the picture “Mark III: 
Can man build a superman?”51 suggested the ways in which computers were enframed as 
artifacts that have moved beyond human beings in both power and consciousness.  The 
accompanying article provided a list of computer achievements and grim predictions of 
the computerized world of the future.  “Some scientists think that Bessie’s [the article’s 
nickname for the old Mark I computer in Harvard’s computer lab] descendants will have 
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more effect on mankind than atomic energy.  Modern man has become accustomed to 
machines with superhuman muscles, but machines with superhuman brains are still a 
little frightening.  The men who design them try to deny that they are creating their own 
intellectual competitors.”52 
John Kobler, writing in the Saturday Evening Post, presented the threat of 
computers as a creeping menace:  “out of scientific laboratories from New York to 
Moscow there is emerging in ever-increasing numbers a series of wonder-working robots 
whose power for good or evil, for creativeness in peace or destruction in war, exceeds 
that of supersonic flight and nuclear fission.[…] They are the gigantic computing 
machines with the bizarre names—SSEC, ENIAC, Edvac, Binac, Mark I, II, and III, 
Rudy the Rooter, to list a few—and they can solve in infinitely less time than it would 
take Albert Einstein merely to state them almost any practical mathematical problem and 
many problems in pure mathematics.”53 
In a very short period of time popular print media ceded consciousness to 
computers over the objections of the scientists and engineers that created them.  Although 
reporters reminded readers that, for example “Dr. Howard H. Aiken, director of the 
laboratory, does not like to hear his machines called ‘mechanical brains,’”54 journalists 
continued to refer to computers as ‘brains’ throughout the 1940s and 50s.  In preparation 
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for the televised coverage of the 1952 presidential election, Walter Cronkite recalled, “the 
UNIVAC people convinced us that we should not call them electronic brains—that they 
were no such thing.  They depended entirely on human brains to feed the material into 
them,” 55 but reporters reviewing the election night coverage persisted in stating that the 
“UNIVAC’s mistake, it seems, was simply to trust the human race on election night.”56   
Monstrous Machines and Raw Power: Describing Early Computing Machines  
The ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer) computer was 
developed over a period of several years beginning in 1942.  John Mauchly, who along 
with J. Presper Eckert, was the principal architect behind the development of ENIAC, 
originally envisioned a project that would aid in making weather predictions.  With the 
outbreak of the Second World War, funding for research into technologies that would aid 
in the war effort poured into research universities.  Instead of a weather-predicting 
calculator, the ENIAC was developed to aid in the calculation of artillery firing tables.  
These tables were notoriously time-consuming to produce, requiring thousands of 
calculations and requiring a unique set of calculations for each type of artillery shell and 
fuse combination under a wide range of weather conditions.  The manual calculation of 
these tables required thousands of person-hours and any errors would cause whole sets of 
calculations to be recomputed.  The ENIAC was not completed in time to do the work it 
was originally designed for.  Instead, the first set of calculations performed during test 
runs in 1945 was a set of calculations concerning theoretical problems for the hydrogen 
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bomb.57  The ENIAC was designed as a general-purpose calculating machine capable of a 
wide range of applications.  This flexibility allowed it to be re-configured to 
accommodate a variety of wartime (and post-war) problems.  This flexibility also 
provided an opening for how to think about the machine.  The ENIAC, as a computer, 
was intended to perform the task of calculating previously delegated to human 
“computers.”  This occupation was, during the Second World War, a task largely 
performed by women with mathematics degrees and specially trained women from the 
Army's Women's Auxiliary Corps.  These women performed the manual calculations that 
the machines were designed to reproduce electronically.58  
 The issue of status for computers as thinking machines can be inferred from the 
original press release revealing the existence of the electronic computer to the world in 
February 1946.  The press release for the ENIAC on February 14, 1946, enters the debate 
of machine consciousness and human anxiety by stating, before anyone wondered aloud 
about the implications of the new machine that, “the electronic calculator does not 
replace original human thinking, but rather frees scientific thought from the drudgery of 
lengthy calculating work.”59  Less than one year after the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki had left Americans feeling paradoxically apprehensive and proud of their 
technological achievement, the announcement of the ENIAC computer added to the sense 
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of foreboding in the face of the overwhelming changes wrought by engineers.60    This 
sense of foreboding surrounded the essential issue of how were we expected to relate to 
this new machine.   
Drawing upon a history of machines as replacements for manual labor, the initial 
reports of the ENIAC extolled its power in human terms.  Time captioned its photo of the 
ENIAC with the line “Electronic Calculator: In two hours, a year’s work for 100 trained 
men.”61  Newsweek concurred “The first problem put to ENIAC was a nuclear-physics 
calculation that would require 100 man-years of work by a trained computer.  The 
electronic device solved it in two weeks, of which two hours were used for actual 
electronic computing and the remaining time for operating details and review of 
results.”62  The New York Times stated that the ENIAC “was then told to solve a difficult 
problem that would have required several weeks’ work by a trained man.  The ENIAC 
did it in exactly fifteen seconds.”63   
The ENIAC presented a problem of scale for writers attempting to put into words 
the engineering that went into its construction.  It was a tool for performing mathematical 
operations, not unlike the mechanical desktop calculators that were already common prior 
to World War II.  But the size and complexity of the ENIAC was of an order of 
magnitude greater than the most sophisticated mechanical adding machines ever 
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produced.  Reporters marveled at the 18,000 vacuum tubes and miles of copper wire and 
thousands upon thousands of soldered joints.  The sheer size of the machine was 
intimidating: at 50 feet long and 30 feet wide, the giant U-shaped machine was pictured 
as dwarfing the engineers who operated it.  This manner of visualizing early computers 
consequently diminished the human presence in the computer’s processes.  The engineers 
appear as a means of ascertaining scale, not as intrinsic to the operation of the machine.  
The function of the ENIAC as a calculating machine was obscured by its magnitude. 
Early computers were given a physical presence by references to their size and 
complexity.  The size of the machines could be quite daunting.  Walter Cronkite, 
speaking about his first encounter with the UNIVAC prior to election night in 1952 
makes an interesting intersection between the machine’s size, its complexity, and the aura 
that surrounded it.  Speaking about the UNIVAC, Cronkite states “there was a lot of 
publicity right at that time about this ‘electric brain’ that had been created in 
Philadelphia, and that everybody was talking about—what it might do.” Cronkite 
remembered that he and “Sig [Mickelson] went down to Philadelphia and saw the huge 
machine.  It filled an airplane hangar practically— it seemed so big.  It wasn’t exactly 
that size, but it was quite immense. They ran some figures into it.  And I quite honestly 
understood nothing that they were saying.”64  The size of the UNIVAC reflects the 
complexity of the machine, as well as its ties to the military (almost the size of an aircraft 
hangar).65  Cronkite’s memory of the UNIVAC is of a machine that has a presence—it’s 
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embodied, and that body, though embedded within certain aspects of the corporeal human 
body, transcends our normal perceptions of the physical and is imbued with a 
monstrousness that borders the sublime.  
 
Computers and the Technological Sublime 
David Nye describes the technological sublime as a means of infusing 
technological works with an air of transcendence.  The experience of the sublime is the 
feeling of awe, wonder, and transcendent terror one feels in the presence of a 
breathtaking natural landscape that was a basis for Romantic philosophy and literature in 
the nineteenth century.  For Nye, the natural sublime is an experience of the eternal.  The 
technological sublime shares this focus on space and time in that it “aims at the future 
and is often embodied in the instruments of speed, such as the railway, the airplane, and 
the rocket, that annihilate time and distance.”66  To this list of instruments we can add 
computers.  The early computing machines were described as embodying speed and the 
calculating power of computers were, like the natural wonders of a Romantic landscape, 
striking in comparison to the common world of everyday calculations.  
Jay Forrester, director of the new Digital Computer Laboratory at MIT in 1947, 
described his new project (that would, a few years later be christened “Whirlwind”) as 
capable of “solving problems 100,000 times as fast as the human brain.  The high-speed 
computer will complete in five minutes calculations that would take a human operator 
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one year.”67 Not only would these new machines outstrip the human brain, but previous 
machines as well: “To solve the problems mathematically would require about 5,000 
hours of computation on the most efficient machines now available.  The new machines 
could solve such problems in one hour.”68  But to view these machines as a vast 
improvement over other machines is to diminish the significance of the power described 
by the author.  Comparing machines with other machines is too abstract—the description 
must be grounded in human experience to maintain the sublime power at work: “They 
will handle ordinary computations, such as multiplication or division, in a matter of 
‘microseconds’ – or about 1/200,000th of the time a human being requires to snatch his 
hand from a hot stove.”69    
‘Giant Brains’ were seen as “capable of solving in ten minutes a problem which a 
skilled mathematician working day and night by ordinary means, would require three 
years to complete.”70  While at the University of Illinois, a machine was being designed 
that could “multiply 999,999,999,999 by 999,999,999,999—or any pair of twelve-digit 
numbers – 1,000 times in a second.  In an eighteen-hour test it did 52,000,000 
multiplications without error.”71   As early computers quickly matured, and new designs 
began appearing in research labs throughout the country, the number of calculations 
steadily increased and the new computers were capable of faster and faster computations; 
aspects of real intelligence were attributed to them.  The New York Times describes the 
new computer built for the National Bureau of Standards in 1950 as “the robot genius, 
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S.W.A.C. is an electronic calculator capable of solving 150 simultaneous algebraic 
equations involving 4,000,000 arithmetic operations, in four hours of computing time.”72  
ORDVAC (Ordnance Variable Automatic Computer) creators speculated that this new 
breed of machine could “solve a problem that would take a human equipped with a 
standard desk calculator more than 1000 years.”73  
Kant identifies magnitude, specifically a magnitude that can only be appreciated 
as a product of mathematics, as a key attribute of the sublime experience.  The natural 
world in its physicality cannot, on its own, create the sensation of the sublime in the 
observer, no matter how large the object being perceived.  If the object can be grasped in 
terms of itself (e.g. a mountain range) the experience may be described as an 
apperception of beauty, but not in itself as sublime.  For Kant, the fear or terrors that 
evoke sensations of sublime are those whose enormity cannot be perceived physically, 
but only comprehended as an order of abstraction— specifically something that is 
sensible as a multiple of human understanding.   
Computers are not, after all, natural phenomena, but rather artificial constructions 
and thus, in Kantian terms, not eligible for sublime apperception.  In as much as 
mathematics was viewed as the language of science, capable of explaining the mysteries 
of the universe, a machine that could manipulate numbers at speeds outside of our 
comprehension became a link to the infinite and its wonders.  The paradoxical 
construction of computers as natural objects is grounded in the very physicality of the 
systems.  Descriptions of computers that emphasized size, weight, and power brought to 
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the forefront the presence of these machines as awesome and intimidating—seemingly 
surpassing their creators and possessing powers orders of magnitude greater than ours.74  
The relative boundlessness of computer speed in comparison with the computational 
power of humans rapidly became the defining characteristic of computers as described by 
the media.   
Computers were not, of course, organic or essential, or forces of nature, but this 
impression was the product of the manner in which computers were described prior to 
election night, 1952 and helped to establish the frame in which the technology was 
perceived, and to precondition the audience to look at the UNIVAC as more than just a 
televised gimmick.  Three different types of frames, media, technological, and cognitive 
were deployed to define computer technology in general and the UNIVAC computer 
specifically in the time surrounding its use in the 1952 election.  Each mode of framing 
has a distinct, but related method for describing framing and its effects.  
Three Framing Narratives 
Roland Marchand describes the corporate advertising in the first half of the 20th 
century as an attempt to give the corporation—the apotheosis of industrial capitalism—a 
‘soul’.  Marchand traces the history of print advertising for major corporations (AT&T, 
Ford Motor Company, General Electric) as an attempt to shape the perception of the 
corporation into something more human, or at least of human scale.75  The casting of an 
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entity so distinctly non-human as the corporation as an entity possessed with values, and 
emotions and empathy served to represent the corporation as a positive, ‘neighborly’ 
force in the lives of Americans to defuse the hostility felt toward corporations and trusts 
in the progressive era, and replace it with a feeling of wartime camaraderie and kinship.76     
The pre-election coverage of CBS’s decision to employ a UNIVAC computer created the 
same problem of scale for the reporters covering the event.  The central problem with the 
UNIVAC for reporters in the run-up to the election was how to describe the computer to 
their audience.  Computers were not seen as synonymous with corporations; the impetus 
behind computer development would be the state, specifically the state as a military and 
bureaucratic organization, until after the Viet Nam war in the Mid-1970’s.  But the 
process of anthropomorphizing the machine, for all its vastness and cold calculation, is 
reminiscent of the drive to ‘humanize’ a faceless corporate entity as described by 
Marchand.   
 What Marchand presents as the method for making corporations seem friendly, 
neighborly, or human, is a process of re-framing accomplished by changing public 
perception of an entity (a corporation, a politician, etc.) through selective and controlled 
exposure through the media.   Media framing as stated by Todd Gitlin is: “principles of 
selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, 
what happens, and what matters."77  Gitlin takes his definition of frames from Irving 
Goffman’s theory of Frame Analysis and extends it from Goffman’s original emphasis on 
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cognitive and social uses for framing and focuses instead on the significance of frames as 
a function of the media and the determination of what is, in fact, news.  Goffman’s 
frames are conceptual—at the same time personal negotiations and social structures.78  
Frames allow a context in which to operate relative to perceived normative experience.79  
In short, frames allow us to apply normative rules to social interactions.  Central to 
Goffman’s thesis of frames, however, is the idea that frames are inherently inadequate to 
everyday experience. There are situations that are not easily framed or uncertainty as to 
how an event is to be framed based on past experience. Also, the ability to mis-frame a 
situation can cause anxiety—a sort of cognitive dissonance where the situation does not 
match our pre-conceived mental picture.   
Goffman’s initial description of conceptual frames has been appropriated as a 
method for describing the effect of mass media on the public.  Todd Gitlin and Hubert 
Gans, for example, present the media—specifically television—as institutions responsible 
in large part for the interpretive framing of social and political events for public 
consumption.80  Deciding what is news and determining the language used to describe 
events as news presents an encoded reality replete with discursive strategies that are 
anything but benign.81   Often, the overt editorial stance of the writer is not as significant 
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as the more subtle contextual cues that inform the reader how to contextualize the content 
of the story.82   In the case of the UNIVAC, the coverage of the event immediately prior 
to Election Night focused on defining the computer for audiences that (if the news 
coverage is any indication) were unsure how the machine worked, or what exactly it did.  
The UNIVAC was presented to the public as something of an unknown 
quantity—a secret to be revealed.  The mysterious power of the UNIVAC suggested 
something supernatural that the spokesmen from Remington Rand were not quite able to 
dispel: “Officials of Remington Rand, which built the machine, emphasize that it is not 
psychic.  UNIVAC […] is a machine with a memory.  Figures fed into the machine are 
recorded electronically on metal tapes and mercury memory tanks.”83  Officials of 
Remington Rand, or a variety of other institutions endlessly requested that reporters 
refrain from describing the machines as ‘electronic brains’, or ‘giant brains, or any kind 
of brain at all.  A Harvard professor and designer of the Mark III computer in 1947 was 
reported as stating that he “does not like to hear his machines called ‘mechanical brains’.  
‘These humanitarian terms are unfortunate,’ he says severely.  But he does admit that 
they work more or less like fast, narrow-minded brains.”84   Or again that, “Although the 
experts use words like “memory,” they don’t like to hear their machines described as 
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“brains.”  The mechanical computers have no creative ability; they merely follow 
instructions.”85  The engineers were rarely successful.  The difference in presentation and 
the reluctance to change the frame used to describe computers as electronic brains is, in 
part, a difference between the manner in which the media frames emphasize repetition to 
create quick reference points useful for packaging events as a type of verbal shorthand, 
and the manner in which the engineers preferred to think about their creations.    
The consequences of couching descriptions of computer technology in terms of 
human cognition marked the site of computer-human interaction as competitive—with 
winners and losers and deep anxieties for the future of humanity.  The metaphoric link 
between human brains and machine processing set into relief specific social issues 
concerning definitions of self, society, labor, gender, and control.   This sense of 
competition between human and machines was evident in the representation of computers 
used to calculate predictions on election night, and the coverage of these predictions as 
media events.  How well the machines performed as predictors compared with their flesh 
and blood counterparts was often the focus of new accounts in the print media’s reportage 
of election night, and of subsequent reviews of the various network attempts to be the 
first to report on presidential or congressional victories.  Although the representation of 
the events on election night television was not always overtly framed as competitive, the 
drama of the accounts often took the form of ‘man-versus-machine’.   As C. Dianne 
Martin suggests, journalists who write about science and technology, in an effort to make 
their articles more entertaining, focus on drama, controversy, and aberration, complete 
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with heroes, villains and conflict.86  Martin’s review of media representations of early 
computer systems focused on newspaper headlines as accurate markers of content and as 
shaping the attitudes of readers.  Looking at the textual context of the articles, specifically 
the way in which technology is described in ways that are simultaneously celebratory and 
cautious, I find the same focus on conflict and resolution in favor of the human reader 
and spectator.  Speaking on science (but equally applicable to technology) Dorothy 
Nelkin explains that, “for most people the reality of science is what they read in the press. 
They understand science less through direct experience or past education than through the 
filter of journalistic language and imagery.”87 
Unlike media frames, technological framing is the means by which a 
technological innovation is structured by actors working within the environments that 
produce technology (e.g. engineers, inventors, researchers) and the environments that 
promote the technology for consumption (e.g. marketers, salespeople) as well as the 
demands of the artifact itself (in this case, the limitations of early computer technology 
and language).  The producers produce not only the artifact, but also the means for 
defining the artifact and the discourse that surrounds it. This definition is a matter of 
constant negotiations between groups having an active stake in the perpetuation of the 
artifact. Technological frames as an investigative tool is the product of the Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT) school of science and technology studies.  
Technological framing as a mode of technological discourse proposed by Wibe Bijker 
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along with Trevor Pinch and John Law.88  Bijker and Pinch assert that technologies are 
subject to interpretation by different groups with a stake in the production of a specific 
artifact, and that these groups may see the use and purpose of a technological artifact in 
radically different ways.   This series of negotiations regarding definitions of ideas, 
methods and artifacts results in casting the technological artifact (whether physical or 
conceptual) as a stable referent.  The resulting ‘black box’ (an object the inner workings 
of which are dependable but unexamined) is used as a building block for further 
innovation.   
The subject of early computer technology and black-boxing is played out in a way 
that is different from the way the SCOT paradigm describes it.  The uniqueness of early 
computers, that they had no real consumers for the advertising and news coverage that 
were likely to purchase them, made the black boxing of computers as artifacts follow a 
different track than that of other consumer technologies.  Because the computer was 
almost purely a symbolic construct to the lay reader of newspapers and magazines, as 
well as for television and movie watchers, the black boxing of computers was a matter of 
bringing closure to the computer as an icon with a stable set of referents, as well as a 
stable position within American culture.  As Langdon Winner, in his critique of social 
constructivist views of technology observed, one of the issues or shortcomings to the 
SCOT approach is the exclusion of actors determined to be non-relevant.  Winner 
questions who gets to determine the status of actors in the construction of a technological 
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artifact—who is relevant and who is not, and contends that this question brings to the fore 
political and social issues that SCOT dismisses.89 
Technological framing, as defined by Bijker stipulates that the negotiated logic of 
the technological system creates a set of practices that further define how the system will 
progress going forward.  For the UNIVAC computer, the establishment of the machine as 
a universal calculating device stipulates that the data to be calculated is immaterial to the 
process of calculation. The numbers expressed by the UNIVAC showing a landslide for 
Eisenhower are merely the expression of a set of calculations performed on a data set 
where it is perfectly acceptable to generate different results by manipulating variables.  
The emphasis is on the internal logic of the machine to accurately compute the solution to 
a given problem rather than the significance of the solution to the world outside the 
machine.  Whether the machine is right or wrong is determined by whether or not it 
accurately performed the calculation as structured, not whether the variables programmed 
into the machine were accurate to begin with.  This distinction, though not useful to the 
news anchors at CBS was nonetheless significant to the designers and engineers at 
Remington Rand.   
This distinction is also useful to my discussion as it informs a limitation of 
technological framing when one considers the role of non-actants in the process of 
enframing.  Technological frames evolve around artifacts as a product of the perceptions 
of stakeholders in the development of the technology—from engineer to consumer.  But 
in the case of early computer systems, consumption occurred on two distinct levels.  The 
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corporations and government agencies that purchased these systems were the primary 
consumers as much as they were the ones using them, but the general public could also 
be considered consumers of the idea of computer technology.  Although the average 
household was unlikely to budget for the purchase of computer technology until the 
1990’s, computers were a growing part of American ideas about technology, modernity 
and the future and these ideas were shaped less by the consumption of the technology 
than by the consumption of images and metaphors of what computers were and what they 
meant as markers of progress.  Although there is a great deal to recommend SCOT as an 
analytical framework for interpreting technological change, for my analysis, the society 
that SCOT imagines is something of a closed system, with producers and consumers 
negotiating to construct technological frames that then structure an artifact’s place in the 
matrix of consumables.  Computer systems were not available for use in the same way 
that home appliances or automobiles were consumed.  The framing of computer 
technology for the general public did not present opportunities for negotiation as 
consumers.  Rather, computers were, like nuclear weapons, external technological forces 
that required metaphorical construction prior to their consumption as ideas.  This gap 
between the general public as consumers of ideas and images concerning computer 
technology and the framing of the computer as an artifact by the engineers that produced 
them, as well as the government agencies and corporations that purchased them, created a 
realm of disjuncture between the intended use of the machines and the newsworthiness of 
the perceived threat of computer technology by writers and reporters.   This gap 
engendered an increased reliance on the news media to frame the technology as 
consumable as an image.  Computer technology was represented less as something of 
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concrete value to readers and viewers (in fact, the practical use of computers for average 
citizens was extremely limited, if not non-existent) and more as a condition of modernity 
to be described and incorporated into existing views of technology and mechanization.  
 Even when reporters reminded their readers that the machines didn’t think, they 
still, however humorously, placed themselves in unflattering juxtaposition with the 
machines.  Bill Henry, a columnist for The Los Angeles Times describes the computers 
that were to be televised as: 
The electronic gadgets are known as Monrobot (NBC) and UNIVAC 
(CBS)—the NBC boys think their machine should be christened 
Nrobnetlak (Kaltenborn spelled backwards) in honor of the dean of radio 
analysts—and I’m told by those who profess to know about such things 
that the way they work is something like this.  You take the figures for 
Zilch County, California, for 1948 and feed them into the machine and 
then you take the figures for the same county in1952 and feed these into 
the machine and the bright little collection of tubes and wires will whirr 
for a while and then come up with a prediction as to how Zilch County, 
California, will eventually come out this year.  If you care about Zilch 
County, that’ll be highly important.  In short, the darn thing doesn’t 
‘think’—as some people choose to believe—it merely calculates.  Since 
most of us reporters can’t add 2 and 2, the advent of the Monrobot and 
UNIVAC should be something of an improvement.90 
 
 The technological frame of calculations as benchmark for speed and engineering 
advancement were inadequate to describe the machines’ capabilities to non-specialized 
audiences.  For the computer to be useful in the marketplace, these terms had to be recast 
in terms of profitability and human scale.   This metaphorical association between 
machines and human beings tapped into a pre-existing set of anxieties concerning the role 
of machines as replacements for human labor, and the uncertainties that surrounded a 
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world where machines could replace the human mind and perhaps democracy itself:  
But we hope much from the UNIVAC.  It will eliminate human error.  It 
will surely succeed if people will just eliminate the human perversity of 
changing their voting patterns betwixt elections. […] And what vistas are 
opened up when voters will just vote with robot predictability. With a 
prophetic UNIVAC we won’t have to bother to count all the votes.  
Indeed, if we can just improve the breed we won’t even have to hold an 
election at all.91   
 
This last sense of computers as a replacement for humans has its roots in depression era 
fears of technological unemployment.  
Technological Unemployment 
Walter Cronkite made the link between computers and the fear of being 
marginalized explicit.  Speaking about his impressions of the UNIVAC computer, 
Cronkite described his experience as being encroached upon:  
I was a little bit put out by the fact that they seemed to be taking over my 
job as the anchorperson. The human interpretation of the returns, our use 
of our knowledge of how that part of the country had voted before and 
how it was expected to vote upon certain indicators-- the way they voted 
in early primaries or in local elections-- and our analysis in projecting that 
into the presidential election.  All of that was quite clearly endangered and 
taken over quite quickly by the computer people and they were telling us 
exactly what the percentages were in this situation and that situation, 
exactly what the difference was in the vote this year and 100 years 
previously in this heavily Democratic district, that hadn’t gone Republican 
in a certain amount of time. And they could find the evidence of that in the 
voting.  That kind of interpretation was the sort that we were used to 
doing.  I think we were all just a little annoyed that our jobs were being 
superseded by these “keyboard wizards.”92 
 
As the early returns came in and the initial predictions from UNIVAC were dismissed, 
Cronkite was both amused and pleased to see the computer fail: “Those of us there were 
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kind of overjoyed like any hand worker would be at the introduction of machinery in his 
shop--we were kind of delighted that it didn’t work.  It was only poor old [Sig] 
Mickelson’s neck that was out with the management of CBS. The rest of us were kind of 
gloating about it.”93 
As Amy Bix points out in her study of the issue of technological unemployment, 
Inventing Ourselves Out of Jobs?, the ultimate question of the scope of technological 
unemployment, or whether it existed at all, remained decidedly complex and impossible 
to answer with any certainty.  Economists and labor advocates, government officials and 
academics wrangled over how to frame the debate, and argued over definitions, statistics, 
and methods from the 1920’s until the end of the century.  The lack of objective measures 
fostered an environment where the emotional appeals of labor had no more veracity than 
the calculated dictates of capital.94   This does not mean that, in the case of computer 
technology, appeals to the anxiety of readers and viewers were any less prevalent for 
their lack of supporting evidence.  The theme of technological replacement was a 
holdover from the interwar period of the 1920’s and 1930’s when the large-scale 
mechanization of American factories and mills was perceived as a driver of persistent 
unemployment during the depression.  While the artificial economy of the Second World 
War created an environment of very low unemployment, a return to depression era 
unemployment was a concern among public planners as well as the subject of countless 
editorials and commentaries.  While fears of technological unemployment were renewed 
at the close of the Second World War, emerging computer technologies were presented as 
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an increased threat.  The mechanization of the factory floor or the farm may have 
displaced blue-collar and farm laborers, but the computer was presented as a threat to 
white-collar and middle-managers as well.  Experts like “Dr. Robert F. Jackson, 
Associate Professor of Mathematics at the University of Delaware,” said that  
Within a decade electronic calculators might take over the tasks now done 
by millions of white-collar workers. […] An electronic brain can turn out 
as many and as good results as hundreds of payroll clerks, hand-
computers, shipping clerks, job-routing clerks—almost any type of clerical 
job.95   
 
John Pfeiffer, reviewing Edmund Berkeley’s Giant Brains, or Machines That 
Think, explained, “In the past, technological unemployment has been largely confined to 
people who work with their hands, but many white-collar workers may find themselves 
replaced by ensembles of vacuum tubes when commercial computers are manufactured 
by the hundreds.”96   Berkeley, one of the earliest proponents of computers as machines 
that foreshadow a new era of technological advancement and a reduction in human 
drudgery and toil was not unaware of the possible consequences of his predictions.  In 
one of the first books on computer technology geared toward lay readers, Berkeley 
illustrates the possible paradox of automatic processes in the workplace as  
When we combine automatic producing machinery and automatic 
controlling machinery, we get a vast saving in labor and a great increase in 
technological unemployment […] The robot machine raises the two 
questions that hang like swords over a great many of us these days.  The 
first one is for any employee: What shall I do when a robot machine 
renders worthless all the skill I have spent years in developing?  The 
second question is for any businessmen: How shall I sell what I make if 
half the people to whom I sell lose their jobs to robot machines?97 
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Echoing this relationship between labor and technology, the New York Times, in 
an article with the celebratory title, “Automation Puts Industry on Eve of Fantastic Robot 
Era,” concludes that the fantastic potential of automation is not without some downside.  
While it was seen as true that automation:  
Opens up new vistas of unparalleled abundance and comfort; at the same 
time it stirs fears of mass unemployment and frustration.  It promises a 
vast expansion of goods and services, sharp reductions in prices and 
increased opportunity for the enjoyment of leisure.  It makes the three-day 
week-end a realizable goal; it offers emancipation from the drudgery of 
routine repetitive tasks.98 
  
But, the article concludes, “with these prospective blessings comes concern that 
liberation from drudgery also will mean liberation from any regular paycheck for large 
numbers of workers.”99 
Warner Bloomberg, writing in The New Republic, made the connection between 
the factory floor and the front office as explicit as possible in ominously titled, “Man’s 
New Role as Caretaker of the Machines.”  In it, he relates the story of “Stash,” an 
uneducated laborer in a machine part factory.  Stash, Bloomberg explains, “doesn’t really 
understand his job,” nor does he perceive the threat of computers that could do what he 
does and keep the line moving and the automatic milling machines supplied with parts.  
Stash and his fellow workers “prize the new work-life in the factory to which the 
changing technology has made a real contribution—the decline of truly hard jobs,” even 
though “Some of his white-collar friends have already advised the younger men in the 
department to start looking about for other jobs.”100  Bloomberg’s story is a retelling of 
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pre-war narratives about factory closings and the impact on the working class families 
dependent upon factory labor for their livelihoods.  Stories like these are perhaps best 
illustrated by the 1940 film Valley Town: A Study of Machines and Men, produced by the 
Educational Films Institute at New York University and directed by Willard Van Dyke.  
The film follows the closing of a steel mill in an unnamed Pennsylvania town and the 
workers responses to being out of work.  Shot with real workers instead of actors, Valley 
Town presents the workers as unable to compete when their old mill is razed and a new 
mill is built with modern furnaces and machines.  The film is explicit in its call for 
retraining programs for workers idled by mechanized production, and in its sympathy for 
the men of the factory and their wives and children.  Van Dyke highlights the human cost 
of mechanization and draws the viewer into their world by focusing on them and not the 
mill owners.  The narrator, the only fictitious character in the film, introduces himself as 
the mayor of the town to add a sense of paternalistic concern over the worker’s fates.  
Bloomberg’s story is a retelling of this narrative that extends its concern to the 
middle-class, middle manager as well.  He concludes that “Automation not only makes 
obsolete more and more workers in overalls, whom the white-collar class tended to 
absorb, but for the first time it challenges the very growth of the white-collar class itself.” 
He further warns that, “occupational mobility is also threatened.  If anything, automation 
shows positive signs of being able to reduce significantly the number of employed in 
every major occupation save professional and social service.”101  Bloomberg cuts through 
the class barrier between the factory and the office to remind readers that in the face of 




automation, all workers are expendable.   But where Bloomberg was sympathetic to the 
workers (both white and blue-collared) Louis Ridenour, writing in Fortune, put the blame 
for increased unemployment squarely on the shoulders of the worker when he wrote that 
“the present activities of some labor organizations seem calculated to encourage this 
trend [automation of American businesses].” Ridenour chastised labor, charging that, 
“rising wages put a premium on high productivity per worker, and thus on fewer workers.  
Any act of capricious irresponsibility or malicious obstructionism on the part of labor 
unions […] put[s] a premium on as complete an elimination of the human worker as 
possible.”102 
Harold Leavitt and Thomas Whisler, writing in The Harvard Business Review, 
and predicting the conditions of office life in the future in an article titled “Management 
in the 1980’s” foresaw increasing conflict and strife in the white-collar workplace as a 
result of automation.  They warned that “major resistances should be expected in the 
process of converting relatively autonomous and unprogrammed middle-management 
jobs to highly routinized programs,” and predicted rebellion among mangers who were 
“programmed out of their autonomy, perhaps out of their current status within the 
company, and possibly even out of their jobs.”103 
  The potential for computer labor was unbounded according to the Reader’s Digest 
in its discussion of advances in computer technology: “Computers can be programmed to 
do almost any mental work a man can spell out,” says Dr. Alan Perlis, one of the 
mathematician-philosophers who have played key roles in extending the scope of 
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computers.  “Each generation of human pupils must be taught afresh, but once you’ve 
taught any single computer to perform a process, you’ve taught them all, forever.”104   
The Controller magazine was just short of apocalyptic in its predictions concerning the 
future of work in the age of automation: “human beings are going to be displaced in 
staggering numbers by electronic equipment.  Productivity will soar as white-collar 
employment and purchasing power drops. […] The effect of electronic equipment on our 
economic life is one of the same magnitude as the effect of the H-bomb on our military 
strategy.”105 
In R. H. MacMillan’s Automation-- Friend or Foe?, MacMillan’s overall upbeat 
assessment of the future of labor and consumption coupled with the advent of automatic 
factory production and controls is not borne out in the ominous title, or in the illustration 
that graces the frontispiece of the book.  The drawing of a heavily shadowed robot 
approaching and towering over a lone worker peering warily out of a factory door 
presents the reader with an assumption about technology in general and automation in 
particular that coincides with much of what has come before.  MacMillan’s text goes on 
to describe various automatic factory processes and the impact on earlier production 
methods, but as benign as his text is, the mood is set by the illustration of the robot and 
his opening question “Are we in danger of being destroyed by our own creations?”106 
Information technology promises to allow fewer people to do more work.  
The more it can reduce the number of middle managers, the more top 
managers will be willing to try it. […]  One can imagine major 
psychological problems arising from the depersonalization of relationships 
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within management and the greater distance between people at different 
levels. […] In particular, we may have to reappraise our traditional notions 
about the worth of the individual as opposed to the organization, and about 
the mobility rights of young men on the make.  This kind of inquiry may 
be painfully difficult, but will be increasingly necessary.107  
 
Donald N. Michael, writing for the New Left think tank, the Center for the Study 
of Democratic Institutions, saw the unfolding cybernetic revolution or ‘cybernation’ as he 
termed it, as leading to increased unemployment with the government presented with 
little choice but to create massive public works projects to pick up the slack in the labor 
market. “What would be the effects on the attitudes and aspirations of a society, and 
particularly its leadership, when a significant part of it is overtly supported by 
governmental public works programs? […] Whatever else the attitudes might be, they 
certainly would not be conducive to maintaining the spirit of a capitalistic economy.”  
Michael’s tract, Cybernation: the Silent Conquest, ends with vague threats of a war 
destined to “make the world safe for human beings by destroying most of society’s 
sophisticated technological base.”108 
Michael is echoing the sentiment of F.H. George, writing a few years before.  
George, leery of technology and technological (if not all) change, cautions that a future of 
computers and cybernetic principles is a future that “seems to suggest that the freedom of 
the individual may be in peril, and this at a time when he is at last having the opportunity 
to be free of so many political and other kinds of oppression.  The biggest of all problems 
may be that of retaining the rights and liberties of the individual human being from 
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within the structure of a scientifically organized society.”109 
Robert Cubbedge quotes the National Association of Manufacturers less than 
approvingly when they state, “for the expanding dynamic economy of America, the sky is 
indeed the limit.  Now more than ever we must have confidence in America’s capacity to 
grow. Guided by electronics, powered by atomic energy, geared to the smooth, effortless 
workings of automation, the magic carpet of our economy heads for distant and 
undreamed horizons.  Just going along for the ride will be the biggest thrill on earth.”110  
Cubbedge relates the “grim realities” of this enthusiasm in the form of statistics, 
explaining that “Since World War II more than a million farm workers have lost their 
jobs to automated equipment” along with more than 260,000 coal miners, 540,000 
railroad workers, and decreases in the number of automotive workers, bakers and 
meatpackers.  At every instance, production increased with fewer workers and more 
machines.  “It is not without cause,” Cubbedge states, “that in a recent public opinion 
poll, the American worker declared that what he most fears, ‘next to Russians’, is 
automation.”111 
 
Time magazine, predicting a revolution in office automation relied on experts to 
offer their opinions on the way machines would impact the workplace.  Management and 
efficiency expert Luther Gulick stated that “machines can now perform most of the 
routine operations performed by human beings in mass production manufacturing, mass 
clerical operations, and in the exercise of technical control processes.” Gluck then 
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calculated that “these accomplishments of the new machines will allow them to replace 
78.4% of the men in factories employing more than 100, and 16.5% of the white-collar 
help.” Gulick estimated by 1960, “some 7,500,000 workers will be replaced by the 
intelligent machines.”112  Time also interviewed Norbert Wiener, mathematician and 
author of the 1948 book, Cybernetics: Or, Control and Communication in the Animal and 
the Machine.  Wiener coined the term ‘cybernetics’ to describe the process of automatic 
feedback that allowed for the automatic control of machines.  Mechanical feedback 
devices such as steam engine governors were products of the 19th century, but with 
advances in mechanization during the first half of the 20th century, the potential for 
automatically regulated machines had grown exponentially.  With the development of the 
digital computer in the post war period, Wiener saw a new era of computers taking the 
place of humans as controllers of ever more complex machines.  Cybernetics, as Weiner 
explained it, hinged on control, and the ramifications of control within systems.  On the 
surface, Wiener’s rhetoric pointed to a devaluation of labor that seemed insulting to 
workers, especially white collar workers who saw their role as managers existing outside 
the normal flow of material and labor.  Wieners observation that the control function that 
human beings brought to a process could (and would) be replicated more efficiently and 
with fewer errors seemed to point to a world where human labor, both mental and 
physical, were completely devalued.  In fact, Wiener would often equate machine labor 
with slave labor as a means of representing its cost, and the comparative cost of 
employing people to do work that machines could do better and cheaper.  Wiener’s 
reduction of the value of labor was, in his reading, a logical evolutionary step for 
                                                 
112 "Come the Revolution," Time, November 27 1950, 66. 
73  
humanity, with humans destined to take over the role of inventors, researchers and 
artisans in a world of material plenty guaranteed by cheap mechanical labor.  However, 
the transition to this technological utopia was a rocky one, with Wiener warning of mass 
unemployment and a temporary turn to socialism to maintain stability.   
Wiener was exceedingly lively in his predictions for the future of humanity in the 
aftermath of what he termed ‘the second industrial revolution’.  The New York Times 
reported that “Dr. Wiener declared in an interview that machinery controlled by 
‘electronic brains’ could within a decade ‘completely wipe out the (factory) assembly 
line,’” and that he “foresaw unemployment resulting in a mass exodus to rural life.”  
Wiener explained the ramifications of this revolution in political terms and declared “We 
must prepare for this by the intelligent use of welfare until a time of stabilization occurs.  
We must change our judgment of value from a quantitative to a qualitative one.  We can 
no longer fear the word ‘socialism.”113  Though his predictions were hyperbolic, Wiener 
did understand the impact of ideology on the decisions we make concerning technology.  
In this he was unusual for his time.  He implicitly understood the value of labor in a 
capital-driven economic system as not intrinsic to human beings but rather tied to process 
and output.  Where other writers presented work as a human activity by definition, 
Wiener disagreed.  He presented the labor equation in stark terms, describing automated 
machines as “the precise economic equivalent of slave labor.  Any labor which competes 
with slave labor must accept the economic conditions of slave labor.”  Weiner predicted 
that, “this will produce an unemployment situation, in comparison with which the present 
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recession and even the depression of the thirties will seem a pleasant joke.”114   
 Time, however, betrayed a lack of patience with Wiener’s rhetoric.  After some 
introductory remarks, Time reported that Wiener,  
Launched into his standard warning: automatic factories and mechanical 
‘brains’ to run them may come into use too quickly and society may not be 
able to absorb or provide for the human hands and brains that they will 
replace.  This is very likely to happen, said Wiener, if there is a third 
World War. The armed services will require enormous numbers of men 
and the U.S. will have to fill their place on the home front with mechanical 
men who (being cheaper and more efficient) will keep their jobs after the 
war is over.  The ensuing crisis of unemployment, said Wiener, will 
threaten the stability of society.”115 
 
 Time, though somewhat impatient with Wiener, was not above the 
sensationalizing of computers and unemployment.  Some (though not many) were more 
skeptical.  The editors of Management and Business Automation wrote:  
The ‘electronic brain’ has proven to be a product of 20th century 
mythology.  But, myths die hard.  The appalling ignorance of computer 
functions evidenced by the editors of the daily press, combined with the 
affinity for science fiction headlines, have been chief factors in keeping a 
confused image of the electronic computer in the public mind.  Constant 
use of such terms as ‘electronic brain’ and ‘thinking machine’ have only 
served to promote the computer as a modern ‘Frankenstein’s Monster’ 
designed to replace man’s mind and his livelihood. 116   
 
In the same journal, William Christian expounds on the deleterious effects of this myth 
on the American psyche:  “The ‘electronic brain’ is a myth, not a machine.  But the myth, 
unfortunately, rivals the machine in popularity.  The paradox arises from the continuing 
efforts of journalists, cartoonists, and science fiction writers to give ‘personality’ to the 
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inanimate digital computer.  This constant misrepresentation has confused the public to 
the point where they now look upon the computer as some kind of electronic monster that 





































(electric brain) or (magic
brain) or (machine brain)
 
Figure 1: Usage of ‘Computer’ or ‘Electronic Brain’ as descriptor of computers in major U.S. 
newspapers, 1946-1967 (Source: Proquest Historical Newspaper Database).  
 
As the above chart shows that the use of metaphorical terms like ‘brain’ to describe 
computers in the 1940’s and 1950’s peaked around 1957, with 180 instances in 
comparison with the term ‘computer’ with 217.  After 1957, the metaphorical terms for 
computer rapidly declined in comparison with the adoption of the standard term 
‘computer’ to describe the technology.  The chart shows the rapid standardization of the 
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term ‘computer’ after a relatively long period where any number of euphemisms could be 
used.  The falling off of the use of other terms to describe computers coincides with the 
increase of non-sensational news about computer technology in business.  Specifically, 
the settlement of the U.S. government’s anti-trust suit against IBM, and the formation of 
larger computer companies marketing directly to business.  RCA’s BIZMAC, for 
example, was advertised as a computer designed primarily for business use, instead of a 
government built machine with some business functionality on the side.  As the news 
about computers became more business-centered, talk of ‘mechanical brains’, ‘giant 
brains’, and ‘robot brains’ faded into disuse.  This change in terminology coincides with 
the periodization I discussed previously, and the falling off of associations with 
specialized scientific intelligence (and its attendant ‘braininess’) and the entry of 
computers as a more prosaic, consumer object for serious business needs.  
Arnold Keller, writing in the same journal a year later wryly commented that the 
computer industry itself was partially to blame for the way computers were perceived as 
threats to employment and general well-being:  
The reason for such a booming industry being pictured as a ‘job destroyer’ 
in public minds can be traced right back to the industry’s own doorstep—
or at least to its public relation departments.  The tendency to label 
computers as ‘electronic brains’ or ‘magic brains,’ and the coupling of 
these terms with stories about the clerical replacement possibilities of the 
machines has created a ‘monster’ image in the public mind, one on which 
union leaders and other ‘welfare minded’ individuals have been quick to 
capitalize.118 
 
As mentioned above, it is difficult to point to hard evidence to support a direct 
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relationship between office automation and unemployment.  However, certain policies 
and procedures introduced along with automation projects do suggest that office 
automation did take a toll, at least locally, on office staffing levels.  At least one book 
published contemporaneously with the move toward office automation from the late 50’s 
to early 60’s, Ida Hoos’ Automation in the Office, speaks to some of the strategies used to 
mask the overall effect of the introduction of technology in the office.  As Hoos reports, 
the jobs of less skilled clerical functions, largely performed by young women, were 
targets of reduction primarily through attrition and “cupid and the stork,” that is marriage 
and childrearing would provide a “natural” means of removing young women from the 
payroll.119   The issue was not so much to fire the women outright, but rather to chose not 
to replace them when they left for ‘family reasons’.  This is echoed in David O. 
Woodbury’s, Let ERMA Do It.  Woodbury relates the story of a firm with 350 workers 
that hesitates to automate because of the effect that automation would have on 23 women.  
Working through the personnel records, the company determines that the turnover rate 
for the jobs these women held was “close to 100 percent.”  The company figured that the 
women would leave anyway, thus removing the impediment to automation.120  The 
question then becomes less a matter of how many jobs were lost to automation in terms 
of direct layoffs or terminations, and more a matter of how many jobs were never created 
in the first place.   
The other issue to consider is that, for all the negative portrayal of machines, why 
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did people accept them as readily as they did?  There is no evidence of anyone presenting 
any challenge to computers’ infiltration of the workplace, resistance to automation 
displacing workers, or protests of technological unemployment.121   There was no 
reporting in the mainstream press of any activities or work actions targeting machines of 
any kind, not just computers.  It isn’t until the late 1960’s that computers became a target 
of sabotage, and it wasn’t workers, but students and activists that were responsible.  If the 
threat of automation was so great, what was stopping American workers from performing 
acts of sabotage on machinery and computers that threatened their livelihoods?  
Though certainly less confrontational than in the great labor battles of the first 
half of the 20th century, organized labor was still capable of mounting strikes, work 
actions, and work stoppages throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s.  The fact is that the 
strikes mounted against industry in the post-war era were primarily over wages, health 
benefits, and guaranteed yearly wages (this to counter the auto industries’ practice of 
laying off workers every fall while factories were re-tooled for the upcoming model 
year).  In some instances, automation was used as a rationale for increased wages by 
union officials citing increased productivity and profits due to the introduction of the new 
machines.122  The unions, as well as their rank and file members, seemed to accept 
automation as something akin to a force of nature rather than as something that could be 
challenged.   
A partial reading for this can be found in the teleological views of technology 
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espoused by the American pragmatist John Dewey and scholar Louis Mumford (not to 
mention the Marxist view of technology as central to the proletarian state-- technological 
determinism being one of the few post-war areas of philosophical agreement between 
east and west).  The mode of historical inquiry into the nature of technology and 
technological change pointed to a determinism that, like evolution and the advance of 
civilization, seemed to be a one-way street.  Technological advancements were the sign 
of a healthy and advancing civilization and any changes that were required to integrate 
technology and society would have to be made on the human side of the equation.  This is 
a part of James Beniger’s thesis in his The Control Revolution. Beniger contends that, 
since the industrial era, technological advances create crises of distribution and 
communication that in turn engender technologies of communication and information 
that raise our ability to control our technologies.  As deterministic as his theory is, 
Beniger explains how the increase in information and information technologies leads to 
standardization and automatic processes that served to increase efficiency while at the 
same time streamlining labor and making craft and skill less meaningful and less 
desirable to employers.123  
Another partial explanation is that technological unemployment due to 
automation in factories or computers in offices was overstated by sensationalist 
newspaper and magazine stories. Of course, William Christian and Arnold Keller, writing 
in the trade journal Management and Business Automation could hardly be considered 
unbiased, nor would their likely audience be skeptical of their claims.  The overall 
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employment rates for non-agricultural jobs fluctuate throughout the post-war period, but 
dips are followed by recoveries that, if automation were responsible for eroding 
employment in America, would not have occurred.   
 
 
Figure 2: Average Hourly Earnings of Production Workers, 1947-1960 (Source: U.S. Department of 
Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
 
However, if the issue of automation both in factory and clerical work was not an issue in 
terms of employment levels, could wages have been impacted by the influx of technology 
into the workplace?  For the manufacturing sector, real wages more than doubled in 
between 1947 and 1960, while the consumer price index posted an inflation rate of 30% 
for the same period.  The average manufacturing wage of $1.03 in 1947 reached $2.16 by 
1960—an increase of approximately 107%.  In general terms, wages as well as the 







U.S. Unemployment Percentages 
Year Number (in thousands)  Percent 
1947 2,311 3.9 
1948 2,276 3.8 
1949 3,637 5.9 
1950 3,288 5.3 
1951 2,055 3.3 
1952 1,883 3.0 
1953 1,834 2.9 
1954 3,532 5.5 
1955 2,852 4.4 
1956 2,750 4.1 
1957 2,859 4.3 
1958 4,602 6.8 
1959 3,740 5.5 
1960 3,852 5.5 
Figure 3: Annual U.S. Unemployment Rate, 1947-1960 (Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau 
of Labor Statistics) 
 
However, a look at the gross unemployment figures for the same period reveals a 
trend of increased unemployment, with approximately 1.5 million more people out of 
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work in 1960 than in 1947.   How many of these workers were idled because of 
automation is not recorded, but regardless of the real number of the technologically 
unemployed, the impression of the American worker was that computer technology, 
specifically in the form of automation of the office and factory floor, was partially 
responsible.  Further, they perceived that the streamlining and efficiency practices 
adopted by American industry required computers to make them work.  
 
Metaphors and Frames 
In my examination of the way metaphors impact the way computer technology 
was perceived and represented in the post-war era, I borrow from Paul Edwards’ use of 
Lakoff and Johnson’s investigations of metaphor, and the political stakes inherent in 
seemingly benign metaphorical constructions.  Edwards frames his discussion of cold war 
computing within the constructs of metaphors that extend beyond mere rhetoric.  For 
Edwards,  
A metaphor channels thought and creates a coherent scheme of 
significance not only by making certain features central, but by 
establishing a set of connections with other metaphors and openings 
toward further elaboration.  This means that metaphor is not merely 
descriptive, but also prescriptive.124 
 
What is at stake in our use of metaphors then is not only how they are used to 
describe reality, but also, and more importantly, how they set out the contours of what 
can be described.  Edwards continues that metaphor is, then, “far more than a rhetorical 
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device.  It mediates the relationships among language, thought, and experience.  The 
elaboration of metaphorical schemes is both a central function and a central method of 
cultural exchange, and it is based on action and experience.”125  This is important in that 
metaphors shape what is possible within a discourse.  As Edwards suggests concerning 
the Turing test, it “uses the computer as metaphor not only to delineate the nature of 
intelligence abstracted from any embodiment, but also to describe us to ourselves.” 126 
Metaphorical frames are on one level much more basic than either technological 
frames or media frames and involve the cognitive processes behind learning and 
communication.  For George Lakoff metaphors are the means by which knowledge is 
constructed and how we, in large part, understand reality.  By constantly examining 
phenomena as like or unlike other phenomena, humans build up metaphorical maps to 
reality.  These maps are essential for communication.  As Lakoff and Mark Johnson have 
discussed, metaphors are constructs that enable us to conceptualize our world as a series 
of things that are either similar, or dissimilar to things we already know.  Furthermore, 
Lakoff and Johnson argue that all mental concepts are produced by metaphorical 
associations, and truth is the product of conceptual systems that are, at bottom, 
metaphoric.127  Lakoff goes further to demonstrate how metaphors are built into 
categories, and these categories (“prototype-based categories”) form the basis of 
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cognition.128  Prototype-based categories, unlike Kantian or Positivist categories, are not 
based upon ideal models or sets that remain true under any circumstance.  Instead, Lakoff 
argues that prototype-based categories are categories comprised of metaphorical 
similarities and equalities that grow and change over time.  Lakoff and Johnson, writing 
out of the field of linguistics, are interested primarily in how semantic utterances and 
concepts are structured by, and structure, the mind.  Their work remains valuable as a set 
of interventions that highlight the primacy of metaphor in the way we construct our 
world.  Borrowing from their ideas on the centrality of metaphor, we can argue that 
metaphors are equally central to our cultural understanding and the construction of social 
categories.  The distinction between humans and computers, and the contours that map 
the evolution of computer systems, act as loci of anxiety that reflect differing responses 
to the shape of technology and information.  Further, metaphors of technological anxiety 
feed back into the original metaphorical construction of prototype-based categories, 
shaping our understanding of the object used for comparison.  In the case of computer 
technology and the human mind, the original metaphorical equation 
computer=logic=thought becomes easily reversed as thought=logic=computer. Just as the 
computer is conceptualized as an electronic brain, the brain is seen to function like a 
computer, complete with hardware (the brain) and software (thoughts, concepts).129  
Whereas technological framing privileged the accuracy of the machine as much as 
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it reflected the conditions of the program, media framing created a concept of the election 
(through polling and general newsworthiness) that privileged the closeness of the election 
and the idea of the race as contested and dramatic.  The climax of the evening should 
come later rather than sooner.  Cognitive and metaphorical frames served to identify the 
computer as both like and unlike human beings and created associations that contrasted 
people and machines in such a way that the primacy of humans could be threatened.   
 These three modes created a space in which the machine prediction, though 
correct, was seen as inaccurate based upon the traditional polling methods and the 
experience and intuition of the pundits.  Media commentator Jack Gould saw little to 
recommend the new technology, stating,  
Tuesday night also saw the first use on Election Night of the supposedly 
super-duper electronic brains, which can think in terms of a couple of 
quintillion mathematical problems at one time.  Both gadgets were more 
of a nuisance than a help. […] The C.B.S. pride was called ‘UNIVAC’ 
which at the critical moment refused to work with anything like the 
efficiency of the human being.  This mishap caused the C.B.S. stars, 
Walter Cronkite, Ed Murrow, and Eric Sevareid, to give ‘UNIVAC’ a 
rough ride for the rest of the evening in a most amusing sidelight to the 
C.B.S. coverage.  At a late hour, N.B.C. was still taking its electronic 
brain, ‘Mon-Robot,’ pretty seriously.130   
For Gould, the gimmick was just that, and an amusing one as well.  But when the 
UNIVAC’s prediction was revealed as accurate, the failure was described in terms of 
human failure and mechanical superiority:   
Well, it now seems that Professor UNIVAC, the celebrated mechanical 
brain, damn well knew what he was talking about when, in answer to the 
questions put to him, he asserted early last Tuesday night that General 
Eisenhower would get the electoral votes of 40 states and Governor 
Stevenson those of only 8.  The trouble was that none of those stupid 
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humans, including his inventors, would believe him, so they started 
jiggling with his levers or buttons or tubes or whatever they were, and 
ended by throwing the poor thing out of whack entirely.131    
 
The Washington Post continued on to attribute not only superior cognitive abilities to the 
UNIVAC, but sensitivities as well: “Of course, it’s easy enough to say that a machine has 
no feelings, and therefore we needn’t worry about having damaged the feelings of 
Professor UNIVAC.”  The Post’s writers seemed perfectly willing to grant personhood to 
the machine by accusing those who would deny an internal emotional state of the 
computer of chauvinism, stating that “we can remember having heard the same thing 
about certain animals and even about certain races of mankind.”  The Post concluded 
that:  
It seems to us that if the professor is capable of performing intellectual operations 
far beyond the cerebral powers of any human being, it is at least possible that he 
may have an unrecognized emotional organization so complex as to make him 
sensitive to a degree quite beyond the power of our coarse and callous species 
even to imagine.132 
 
  The Washington Post’s somewhat tongue-in-cheek response to CBS election night 
coverage prompted this reply from Charles J. Swift, a reader in Washington D.C.:  
Your editorial of November 8 on ‘Professor UNIVAC’ unhappily tends 
to further the mistaken notion that the UNIVAC worked out a system of 
election predictions.  It did not.  What it did was process at high speed 
the election returns according to a scheme worked out by human beings.  
The time may very well come when an electronic computer may use 
previous election returns to work out its own predicting system, but that 
has not happened yet.133   
Replies like Mr. Swift’s were surprisingly rare, however.   
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Although computer projections are as commonplace as to no longer warrant 
mentioning, the track record of the UNIVAC in 1952 and 1954 did leave some 
broadcasters reluctant to continue the experiment. As a sidebar to his coverage of the 
media leading up to the 1956 elections, Jack Gould mentioned that, “Channel 13 in 
Newark announced last week that its coverage of election returns Tuesday night would 
not involve any electronic wizardry.  A spokesman for the station said: ‘the only 
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In brisk and brutal fashion, the I.B.M. computer Deep Blue unseated 
humanity, at least temporarily, as the finest chess playing entity on the 
planet yesterday, when Garry Kasparov, the world chess champion, 
resigned the sixth and final game of the match after just 19 moves, saying, 
''I lost my fighting spirit.''135 
 
On May 11, 1997, after playing six games against an IBM computer nicknamed 
‘Deep Blue’, chess grandmaster Gary Kasparov, widely held to be one of the greatest 
chess players in the history of the game, conceded defeat.  After winning the first game of 
the match, Kasparov lost the second and played to a draw in the next three games.  His 
loss in game six gave Deep Blue a one-point margin of victory.  This event marked the 
first time that a chess grandmaster and champion was defeated by a computer in standard 
tournament play.136  The match was followed closely around the world, with millions of 
people accessing the running commentary on the games through IBM’s website, and 
media reports and commentary after each game.  The pressure on Kasparov was great.  
The media (as well as IBM137) had billed this event as ‘Man versus Machine’ with 
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Kasparov standing in for humanity as the John Henry of the chess world.   
 After Kasparov’s defeat, voices from across the media spectrum weighed in with 
grim prognoses and rhetorical questions that described the event in somber tones.  “Does 
the defeat of Kasparov by the Deep Blue computer mean that humans are no longer the 
only possessors of true intelligence?”138 asked Michel Lockwood of the Independent, 
while the Atlanta Journal wondered, “Are humans now obsolete?”139   Business World 
stated flatly, “Indeed, humankind as we know it has just ended,”140 and the San Francisco 
Chronicle wondered, “Outwitted by Machine: Who's the Master Now?”141 On television, 
Susan Rook, host of CNN’s ‘Talk Back Live introduced the topic of her May 12th 
broadcast with “Are machines getting advanced enough to take over our lives? Where 
should we draw the line?”142  
 The hyperbole surrounding the event was, on the one hand, typical media 
sensationalism.  The rhetoric used to describe Kasparov’s defeat, however, is reminiscent 
of the terms used in the first newspaper reports concerning computer technology fifty 
years before.  Irrespective of the introduction of personal computers into millions of 
homes, the routine use of computers in the guise of automatic teller machines, and the 
explosion of the Internet, computers were still, in 1997, portrayed as threatening to the 
very fiber of humanity and our definitions of self.  While it is true that many news reports 
did not couch Deep Blue’s win as further evidence that we would soon be obsolete as a 
species, the fact that many did remains striking.   
                                                 
138 Michael Lockwood, "Man V Machine," The Independent, May 13, 1997, 14. 
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Sheryl Hamilton, in her article on the Deep Blue-Kasparov matches, describes 
computer versus human chess matches as media events that produce ‘spectacular 
intelligence’.143   She considers the chess matches of the 80’s and 90’s as media events 
designed to promote computer intelligence against the benchmark of human intelligence 
where the stakes are such that it is possible for a human chess player to lose.  The 
matches were promoted with the purpose of determining who is ‘smarter,’ the human or 
the machine.  Because computer programming had evolved to the point where a human 
victory was not a foregone conclusion, the events were billed as true matches with real 
consequences for humanity, the eventual victory of Deep Blue in 1997 produced a flurry 
of reporting and editorializing predicting the inevitable decline of humans as masters 
intellect.  Hamilton points out that once Deep Blue won, the use of chess as a benchmark 
for intelligence faded away, we “simply move the goalposts and say it doesn’t matter.”144  
Although I agree that this seems to be the case with the post Deep Blue-Kasparov match, 
I disagree with Hamilton’s reading of the lack of spectacle surrounding chess playing 
computers from the 1950’s and 1960’s.  Hamilton refers to passing media references to 
computers and humans playing chess, but theorizes that these garnered little attention 
because the risks were too high, both to humans if they lost, and to the nascent computer 
industry if the machines were defeated.   
While the references to chess playing computers in the early years of computer 
technology were relatively few and far between, the significance of chess playing 
computers was no less relevant to our understanding of human-machine interaction in the 
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1950’s and 1960’s.  Unlike the later matches, these early matches demonstrated our 
continued mastery of technology during a period where such mastery, at least in the 
media of the time, was not guaranteed.  That humans could win and win consistently was 
just as significant as the possibility of our losing 30 years later.  In fact, without these 
early matches, the events creating spectacular intelligence that Hamilton describes would 
not have taken place.  The ongoing defeat of machines by humans in pursuit of an 
intellectual activity provided a means of reinforcing human mastery over the quickly 
expanding potential of machinery and automatic processes—even if that defeat occurred 
at a gaming table.   
The nature of competition is significant for our discussion in that it builds upon 
the concern about computers replacing people as thinking machines as we examined in 
the previous chapter.  Here, the competition is overt and measurable.  Defeat at the chess 
board is a tangible defeat.  What makes the Deep Blue-Kasparov match compelling is 
that the computer and the chess master met in a defined space with agreed-upon 
conditions for victory.145  This idea of competition also feeds the concurrent anxiety upon 
which much of the anxiety expressed toward computers had been displaced—the cold 
war and the largely virtual conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.  As I 
will explore below, in the 1950’s the computer took on much of the negative associations 
of Soviet totalitarianism, with the regimented logic of binary systems standing for the 
lack of originality and imagination perceived as one of the defining characteristics of 
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Soviet life.  The ‘thinking machine’ of the early descriptions of computers was replaced 
by concerns that we were being molded into thinking like machines ourselves.   
The fact that the defeat of the machine took place in the context of competition at 
the gaming table is more significant than, at first glance, it might seem.  Computer 
scientists and engineers, for all of their dismissive talk about not equating machines and 
minds, continued to present computer technology as competing with human intellect 
through games.  On the one hand, programming a computer to play chess is a theoretical 
exercise in multi-variable problem solving and a means for testing out theories of raw 
computational power versus heuristic approaches to learning that had practical 
applications.  However, the use of chess as an idealized form of human cognitive 
exercise, and using human players as benchmarks, could be seen as engaging in a direct 
comparison between the capacity of human beings and the power of computers.  The 
question of chess playing computers as reflected through media culture artifacts suggests 
a preoccupation with ‘who won’ that serves to emphasize the limitations of computers 
and the continuing advantages of the human mind over its machine counterpart.   
Computer chess provides a complex reading of what David Nye, borrowing from Leo 
Marx, terms ‘technological sublime’ where the awesome, abstract calculating power of 
computers can be encapsulated by a transcendent human awareness of our ability to 
comprehend, (in Kantian terms) and thus manage, the abstraction.  The result of these 
ever-increasing calculations leads Stuart Chase, in a Reader’s Digest article, to perform 
some simple, but meaningful calculations of his own, comparing himself with the IBM 
701 computer: “The 701, they tell us, can add or subtract 16,000 times a second.  On a  
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typical problem it performs 14,000 mathematical operations a second.  These figures 
mean little to me until I relate them to what I can do myself. […] Assuming that the 
machine can multiply numbers like these 2000 times a second, instead of once in 50 
seconds, it is clear that the 701 is just 100,000 times a better man than I am!”146  This is, 
at first, a strange conclusion to jump to. But the movement from abstract statistics for 
calculations per second requires a concrete link to human capabilities in order to resonate 
as numbers with awesome or sublime connotations.   
Historically, however, computer chess also represented a general field of 
competition where the results of the competition were more or less known in advance.  
This competition was not, therefore, real, but a simulacrum of competition.  Like sport 
standing in for local or nationalistic sensibilities and functioning as a proxy for war, 
aggression, etc., matches between humans and computers were a proxy of competition 
between orders of intelligence.147  As such, it is significant that early chess competitions 
focused on amateurs and, specifically in the case of initial chess matches, women who 
were unfamiliar with the game.148   
  An arena of more overt human-machine competition was the 
representation of programs designed to play games—especially chess.  These programs, 
though designed to explore methods for solving analytical problems with many variables, 
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captured the imagination of reporters and journalists and presented them with 
opportunities for framing the technology more explicitly within the realm of competition 
and sport.  In this chapter, I examine the process of defining computer programs that play 
games as an extension of a discourse of competition not only between humans and 
computers, but also between the United States and the Soviet Union, and between 
differing definitions of intelligence.  As the analytical ability of computers increased 
(along with the public’s awareness of them) the identification of analytical ability as that 
which defines human beings as intrinsically separate and superior to other life forms was 
threatened as well.  The competition between humans and computer chess and checker 
playing programs became a competition between modes of thought—that which a 
computer could do and that which it couldn’t.    
The discourse concerning chess and, to a lesser extent, checker playing programs 
presented a world where common human intelligence was still valuable in the face of 
technological encroachment and reveals a considerable level of anxiety concerning the 
future of humanity so closely wedded to technology.   As Paul Boyer points out in By the 
Bomb’s Early Light, his media history of the atomic bomb in the immediate post-war era, 
“America’s airwaves, pulpits, and lecture halls were full of such frightening fare in the 
early post-Hiroshima period, as the nation’s atomic fears were manipulated and 
exacerbated by the media and by political activists.” This fear, Boyer suggests, though 
fanned by outside institutions, “was in no sense a synthetic creation of activists or the 
media.”149  Boyer’s thesis is relevant to our discussion of computer technology during the 
same era.  The media, though, instrumental in perpetuating these anxieties, likely 
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magnified a sense of uneasiness about the technology more that they manufactured it.  
They also used computer technology as a way of talking about other issues, such as fear 
of the Soviets, or of totalitarianism in general.  The computer was, for reporters and 
writers of the post-war period of the 1950’s, locked in a zero-sum game with humanity 
(specifically American humanity).  Each advance of computer technology meant an equal 
loss of human power and individual autonomy—a great game played out on a 
metaphorical chessboard that, in turn, was a symbol too potent to resist.   
Early Game-Playing Machines 
'ARE you serious? -- do you really believe that a machine thinks?' 
I got no immediate reply; Moxon was apparently intent upon the coals in 
the grate, touching them deftly here and there with the fire-poker till they 
signified a sense of his attention by a brighter glow. For several weeks I 
had been observing in him a growing habit of delay in answering even 
the most trivial of commonplace questions. His air, however, was that of 
preoccupation rather than deliberation: one might have said that he had 
'something on his mind.' 
Presently he said: 
'What is a "machine"? The word has been variously defined. Here is one 
definition from a popular dictionary: "Any instrument or organization by 
which power is applied and made effective, or a desired effect 
produced." Well, then, is not a man a machine? And you will admit that 
he thinks -- or thinks he thinks.' 
'If you do not wish to answer my question,' he said, rather testily, 'why 
not say so? -- all that you say is mere evasion. You know well enough 
that when I say "machine" I do not mean a man, but something that man 
has made and controls.' 
‘When it does not control him,' he said, rising abruptly and looking out 
of a window, whence nothing was visible in the blackness of a stormy 
night.150 
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Machines that play games were not new to the post-war world.  Mechanical 
engineers had been creating machines that could functionally play simple games since 
early in the 20th century.  Prior to that, the most famous game playing machine, Baron 
Von Kemplen’s ‘Turk’ graced the courts of Europe through the late eighteenth century 
and found its way around America during the first half of the nineteenth.  Designed as a 
parlor trick and as a masterful illusion, the Turk was constructed in 1769 by Baron 
Wolfgang von Kemplen as a piece of engineering virtuosity.  The somewhat larger than 
life automaton was seated behind a cabinet filled with gears, pulleys, and leavers that 
were exposed to spectators as part of the exhibition, prior to a match between the Turk 
and a human volunteer.  Von Kemplen, as part of his routine, would open the various 
doors of the cabinet and show those assembled the inner workings of the machine, even 
holding a lantern behind the cabinet to demonstrate that light could pass through and 
therefore the illusion was not accomplished with mirrors.   
The ingenuity of the machine was not, ultimately, in its ability to play chess, but 
rather in the presentation of illusion and the concealment of the human chess master 
concealed within.  The Turk had an illustrious career in the courts of Europe—reputedly 
defeating Benjamin Franklin in Paris in the 1780’s and, some time later, Napoleon—
before being dismantled and later sold after von Kemplen’s death in 1805.  Through the 
first half of the 19th century, the Turk toured the U.S. with a variety of owners and chess 
masters before being destroyed in a fire in Philadelphia in 1840.   
The Turk and its inner workings was the subject of several articles by 
contemporary authors trying to demonstrate how the illusion was managed.  Most  
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famously, Edgar Allen Poe took up the subject of Maelzel's Chess-Player  (Maelzel was 
the impresario who toured the U.S. with the Turk at the time Poe composed his essay) in 
1836.  Poe demonstrates how the order in which the inner workings of the Turk are 
revealed would allow for a man to move unseen from one half of the cabinet to the other 
while maintaining the illusion that the cabinet was filled only with machinery.  Poe was, 
it turns out, almost entirely correct in his discerning of the process by which the interior 
was displayed.  More interesting than Poe’s power of observation to determine how the 
illusion of the Turk was accomplished are his insights into why the idea of a chess 
playing machine was impossible.   
Poe contrasts the Turk as a marvel of engineering with another machine—
Babbage’s difference engine—to explain what is possible through calculation and 
deductive reasoning and lays out the process of deductive logic and calculation as a 
closed process of narrowing results from a static set of data.  This is the type of work that 
Babbage’s machine was capable of as a set of closely matched gears and levers that were, 
by no account, influenced by a hidden mathematician.  Poe contrasts this type of 
mechanized work with the work required in making decisions about the position of pieces 
on a chessboard.  
But the case is widely different with the Chess-Player. With him there is 
no determinate progression. No one move in chess necessarily follows 
upon any one other. From no particular disposition of the men at one 
period of a game can we predicate their disposition at a different period. 
Let us place the first move in a game of chess, in juxta-position with the 
data of an algebraical question, and their great difference will be 
immediately perceived. From the latter--from the data--the second step of 
the question, dependent thereupon, inevitably follows. It is modeled by the 
data. It must be thus and not otherwise. But from the first move in the 
game of chess no especial second move follows of necessity. In the 
algebraical question, as it proceeds towards solution, the certainty of its  
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operations remains altogether unimpaired. The second step having been a 
consequence of the data, the third step is equally a consequence of the 
second, the fourth of the third, the fifth of the fourth, and so on, and not 
possibly otherwise, to the end. But in proportion to the progress made in a 
game of chess, is the uncertainty of each ensuing move.151 
 
Poe presents a logical rationalization for his contention that the sort of open-ended 
reasoning necessary for chess play precludes the design of a machine capable of ever 
playing the game.  From this pre-condition, Poe determines that it is impossible that the 
Turk is a pure machine and uses this insight as the starting point for his deductive 
reasoning into the concealment of a human within the machine.  Poe’s rationality is in the 
service of a Romantic position that posits an ineffable quality to the human mind that 
cannot be duplicated or codified.   Poe was, of course, correct in that the Turk was not a 
machine capable of playing chess at all, but rather a machine designed to produce the 
illusion of a robotic chess player.  The explanation that the machine was simply an 
illusion and not an actual chess-playing automaton spares Poe and his contemporaries 
from having to consider the machine as actually capable of playing the game, and Poe’s 
insistence that the machine was not the chess player suggests that some anxiety was 
present.  However, by 1920, Spanish engineer Leonardo Torres Quevedo, was able to 
create a mechanical device capable of solving end-game problems involving three pieces 
against an opponents king.  The machine reportedly would flash a warning light at an 
opponent that attempted to cheat and would proclaim “checkmate” when it had 
outflanked its human player.152  The machine was limited to this single end-game 
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scenario and could not play a whole game, or account for more than one piece (and a king 
at that) as an opponent.  Quevedo’s machine was, like the Turk, seen as a novelty and not 
as a fundamental challenge to early twentieth century concepts of human self.   
Other games were mechanized prior to the age of the digital computer as well, 
such as Nim, a purportedly ancient game involving sticks placed in several rows.  The 
object of the game is to take the last stick.  Engineers at Westinghouse developed nim for 
machine play in 1940.  The ‘Nimatron’ was one of the hits of the 1940 New York 
World’s Fair.  Programmed to lose on occasion, the Nimatron would then present its 
opponent with a token coin stamped with the words “Nim Champ.” An article in the 
Christian Science Monitor compares the binary language used to compute the machine’s 
strategy with the method of counting “used even today by some of the oldest tribes of 
Australia, the Torres Straights, and New Guinea.”153   In their story on the fair’s 
attractions, the New York Times lumps the Nimatron in with other novelties such as 
“Elsie” the cow, a feature of “Borden’s Dairy World of Tomorrow,” who was set to 
appear in a “special glass boudoir.” 154  In 1953, B.V. Bowden discusses the British 
mechanical Nim player: “Nimrod” as a featured attraction at the Festival of Britain (no 
date given). Rather than represent the machine as iconic of any sort of intelligence, he is 
content to observe that, during its subsequent appearance at a trade fair in Berlin, the 
Germans in attendance were so taken with the machine that they neglected the bar at the 
other end of the room.155  As with Quevedo’s machine, and with various automated tic-
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tac-toe machines, the ingenuity involved in the production of these machines was 
considerable, but not enough to outweigh their usefulness as carnival-style attractions.  
No one, it seems, would mistake what these machines could do for intelligent behavior, 
but as computer engineers attempted to build a machine to play chess, the novelty of the 
technology was often tempered with a thinly veiled anxiety concerning the implications 
of a machine that could think.  
Theoretical Chess Playing Computer Programs 
Curiously, even though the first working chess program was still several years 
away, the media latched onto the idea of computers that could play chess and their 
potential impact.  In 1949 during a talk at the National Institute for Radio Engineers 
Convention in New York, Bell Laboratories engineer and pioneer in the field of 
information theory Claude Shannon discussed the theoretical steps required to produce 
the type of machine logic capable of calculating chess positions.  Shannon emphasized 
that the problem of creating a program that could play chess was, “Although perhaps of 
no practical importance, the question is of theoretical interest, and it is hoped that a 
satisfactory solution of this problem will act as a wedge in attacking other problems of a 
similar nature and of greater significance.”156  Shannon explains the suitability of a 
attempting to represent programmatically the human decision making process through 
examining the activity of chess playing by breaking down the goals of his investigation as 
an investigation of the definition of thought.  Shannon writes that  
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The chess machine is an ideal one to start with, since: 1) the problem is 
sharply defined both in allowable operations (the moves) and in the 
ultimate goal (checkmate); 2) it is neither so simple as to be trivial nor too 
difficult for satisfactory solution; 3) chess is generally considered to 
require ‘thinking’ for skillful play; a solution of this problem will force us 
either to admit the possibility of a mechanized thinking or to further 
restrict our concept of ‘thinking’; 4) the discrete structure of chess fits well 
into the digital nature of modern computers. 157 
 
Shannon makes explicit what becomes an implicit idea in the mass media 
discourse on computer technology—that a broad definition of what constitutes thinking 
either has to include computer processes and mathematical computational ability, or the 
essence of thought needs to be re-defined to make the definition more selective in order 
to exclude machines.  Chess represents a practical point of engagement with this 
definition, for the game was a routinely cited icon of intelligence.  Chess was considered 
the touchstone of human intellect according to Goethe, and the mind’s gymnasium for 
Lenin, and for writers on the topic of machine intelligence:  
Chess is the intellectual game par excellence.  Without a chance device to 
obscure the contest, it pits two intellectuals against each other in a 
situation so complex that neither can hope to understand it completely, but 
sufficiently amenable to analysis that each can hope to outthink his 
opponent.  The game is sufficiently deep and subtle in its implications to 
have supported the rise of professional players, and to have allowed a 
deepening analysis through 200 years of intensive study and play without 
becoming exhausted or barren.  Such characteristics mark chess as a 
natural arena for attempts at mechanization.  If one could devise a 
successful chess machine, one would have penetrated to the core of human 
intellectual endeavor.158   
 
But why invest the time, money and effort into creating a program capable of playing a 
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game?   G.H. Hardy in his discussion of chess problems states that, “Chess Problems are 
the hymn tunes of mathematics.”159  Bowden insists that the chief purpose of developing 
programs to play games is simply because it is fun to do so, but if necessary, the 
argument that game playing algorithms are valuable tools for the analysis of 
programming techniques and methods can be supported as a ‘pretense’.160   Shannon 
suggests that the line of inquiry is not to create a chess-playing machine simply for the 
sake of novelty (as in the case of Von Kemplen’s ‘Turk) but rather for research into the 
decision making process itself, and how complex, multi-variant tasks could be routinized 
and codified.  Shannon posited possible advances to be gained in areas such as: machines 
for designing filters, relay and switching circuits; machines to handle routing of 
telephone calls based on individual circumstances rather than by fixed patterns; machines 
for performing symbolic (non-numerical) mathematical operations; machines capable of 
translating from one language to another; simplifying strategic decisions; or even 
composing or orchestrating music.161   The idea of computerizing chess was not 
Shannon’s alone; Alan Turing had considered the idea as early as 1938 and had created 
his own paper program for playing chess by 1950.  Norbert Wiener had proposed the 
utility of a chess-playing machine in his 1948 book Cybernetics.  In it, Wiener explains 
how one could theoretically create a machine program to play a passable game of chess.  
For Wiener, the challenge wasn’t to construct a program making the rules of play 
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intelligible to a machine, that was easily enough done, but to make a program that was 
capable of playing a game of chess that wasn’t terrible—a perfect game being out of the 
question. Wiener, in his updated 1961 edition of Cybernetics explains the rationale 
behind creating game playing machines. Wiener talks about machine/human gaming as 
like the dance of the mongoose and the cobra, the roadrunner and the rattlesnake, and the 
matador and the bull.  In each case, the creature that utilizes an understanding of 
feedback oscillations (presumably instinctual in the case of the mongoose and the 
roadrunner) win out over the animal who repeats the same behaviors or the same patterns 
of behavior.  Humans have the upper hand over bulls in the bull-fighting arena and 
computers playing games because (as yet) the machine cannot learn from experience—
they play every game to win against a theoretically perfect opponent and cannot adjust 
their strategy to take into account individual idiosyncrasies of play.162  Though idea of a 
chess-playing computer occupied the thoughts of the leading mathematicians and 
engineers of the time, Wiener never considered actually designing one, Turing’s program 
(Turbochamp, written with his associate David Champernowne) was never implemented 
other than as a paper model (where it performed rather poorly163) and Shannon never 
wrote a chess program that ran on a machine, but rather expounded on the theories behind 
creating one.  The theoretical work of a chess-playing model was more significant than 
the actual practice of constructing a machine.  As Shannon reminded journalists intrigued 
by his idea for a chess-playing computer: “We are not designing chess equipment at Bell 
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Laboratories.”164  
 Shannon’s reticence concerning chess-playing computers did not detract from 
journalists’ claims concerning the ability of a machine that did not yet exist.  Reporting 
on his remarks, and in subsequent stories that followed the publication of his paper in 
Philosophical Magazine in the spring of 1950, the stories tend to understate the 
theoretical nature of Shannon’s work, and move straight to its portentousness.  Newsweek 
reported that, “By assigning numerical values to the king, queen, rooks, bishops, knights, 
and pawns, and to their possible positions on the board, Shannon showed how a computer 
could explore the situation two or three moves ahead.  The result would not be brilliant 
chess of master caliber but a game skillful enough to interest the average amateur.”165   
John Pfeiffer, writing for the New York Times explained to readers how  
These machines are not science-fiction dreams; they, or their components, 
already exist.  In a special appendix, Dr. Wiener discusses the more 
speculative possibility of building an electronic chess player (one young 
scientist is actually planning to do this).   
 
Whether a chess automation is ever built, the future is going to see the 
development of electronic brains […] that may replace many persons 
trained to answer questions involving only the routines of detailed 
repetitive thinking.166 
 
Unlike Newsweek’s story that reflected a slightly more realistic prediction of the chess-
playing computer, Time claims that, “Dr. Claude E. Shannon of Bell Laboratories is 
figuring out how to make a calculator that can play chess.  He thinks that one could play 
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well enough to beat all except the greatest chess masters.”167    
 The issue of whether a computer utilizing Shannon’s paper as a basis for a chess 
program could actually beat a human player remained a subject of discussion long after 
Shannon had moved on to other theoretical problems in information theory.  The idea of a 
chess-playing computer remained a “Shannon Machine” for some writers who remained 
convinced of the need to distance human ability from the potential prowess of the 
computer:  
The Shannon machine, on the other hand, could not beat a master.  Chess 
masters make few careless mistakes; when appropriate, they figure half a 
dozen or even fifteen to twenty moves ahead; they have an enormous 
knowledge of stock situations and maneuvers.  The robot, to be sure, 
might be designed to calculate farther ahead and might be equipped with a 
dictionary of situation and maneuver combinations; other refinements 
could be provided as well.  But even if we were to do the impossible and 
build these properties into a machine with as many computing and 
memory elements as there are neurons in the human brain (about ten 
billion), the robot would still fall short of the human chess master in 
performance.   
 
He [the human chess master] is endowed with a power beyond the 
machine, called recognition.  He sees at a glance that the position on the 
board before him is somewhat like the situation he encountered – and dealt 
with thus—some time before; machines can detect such similarities only if 
all possible variations are spelled out in advance.168 
 
That actual chess playing programs didn’t exist didn’t seem to affect the reporting 
on machines as though they were real.  Writing about “Shannon’s Machine” in 1954, 
Reader’s Digest reported “to watch it print: ‘EXPECT TO WIN IN FIVE MOVES’ gives 
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some observers an uneasy feeling.”169  In the fall of 1951, in another account of 
hyperbole, business competition, and quick thinking, the company’s vice-president of 
marketing touted the Computer Research Corporation’s CADAC (Cambridge Air Force 
Digital Automatic Computer) portable computer’s chess-playing prowess.  The vice-
president, stated that a machine like the CADAC was powerful enough to play chess and 
win against a human opponent.170  This boast was picked up by the wire services and 
reported as fact and a rival computer manufacturer, Donald Jacobs of the Jacobs 
Instrument Company seized upon the opportunity to publicly challenge the computer to a 
‘man-versus-machine’ match for a one thousand dollar prize.  The news reports of a 
“Mere Man Defies A Robot At Chess,” “Determined to defend man’s honor and his 
ability to think better than a mere machine is Donald H. Jacobs, president of Jacobs 
Instrument Company of Bethesda, MD.  Mr. Jacobs, who admits he plays chess ‘quite 
badly’ offered to bet $1000 he could beat an ‘electronic brain’ that is supposed to be, 
among other things, an unbeatable chess player.”171  Jacobs admitted, The Washington 
Post reported, “Although I am a poor chess player, pure egotism makes me unwilling to 
concede that a computing machine can play better than I can.”172   With the stipulation 
that Claude Shannon of the Bell Laboratories would referee the match, CRC’s Richard 
Sprague accepted Jacobs’ challenge and an attempt was made to have the match hosted 
by Edward R. Morrow on his See it Now program on CBS.173  By the next day, the wire 
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services reported that the CRC-102 (CADAC) computer would be unavailable to take up 
the challenge because it would be too busy with national defense tasks: “’The urgency for 
this machine in the defense effort makes such a tournament untimely’. The statement was 
made by Richard Dabney, president of Computer Research Corporation.  The statement 
canceled acceptance by Richard E. Sprague, a director of the computer company.”174  The 
CADAC computer could not, needless to say, play chess at all.  Rather, whether it could 
or not was never determined because there were no operational chess programs available 
to test the claim of its marketers.  The earliest operational program for playing chess was 
not developed until 1957, when Alex Bernstein and his team at IBM programmed an 
IBM 704 to successfully play the game.  
Computers as Competitors 
Mechanical brains check income taxes, forecast the weather, and run 
assembly lines. But, every once in a while, the machine looks 
gratifyingly stupid.   
Though Maurice Dagbert, 44, never got past junior high school in 
his native Calais, France, he beats the thinking machine not 
occasionally, but every time.  
Two years ago, Dagbert battled a Swedish electronic computer on 
television, beat it by eight seconds in figuring out the cube root—
and the machine got it wrong.  
Dagbert is eager to take on any American computer— 
‘Only in America do they like geniuses and freaks.  They have 
enough money to pay for their talent.’175 
The episode of the CADAC computer makes explicit a subtext in reportage on 
                                                 
174 "Machine Spurns Chess: Electronic 'Brain' to Be Too Busy at Defense Tasks," New York Times, 
November 13 1951, 31. 
175 "People: Mind over Machine," Newsweek, September 9 1957, 52. 
108  
computer systems in the late 1940’s and 1950’s—the implicit assumption that computers 
and humans were competing on both an existential and practical level for dominance in 
the field of intellect and cognitive ability.   For the first framers of computer discourse, 
the celebratory aspects of the new technology were often tempered by wariness in the 
face of a new order of being whose intentions were unclear or suspicious.  It is this 
uncertainty about the motivations of the early computers that present us with the depth of 
concern regarding their status, not only as machines, but also as machines that think.  
Computers were machines—complex machines no doubt, but the ease with which 
writers, illustrators and journalists were able to assign intentionality to computer systems 
is an indication of just how unusual these machines were, and how normal terms of 
classification failed to ameliorate the anxiety of a perceived threat.  Early popular writers 
and journalists deployed an array of metaphors and comparisons that conjured images of 
computer technology that were both terrifying and banal—often in the same article, in an 
attempt to describe these machines and place them within a context of similar objects and 
subject positions.   
The problem for writers seeking to describe computers is that there were few 
readily available constructs to use in explaining the technology to lay audiences.  The 
new machines weren’t mechanical, but electronic, and they were capable of calculating at 
speeds exponentially faster than most people could imagine.  Because they were so fast, 
they were capable of producing solutions to very complex mathematical problems.  They 
seemed to be more like brains than anything else, and the metaphorical connection 
between computers and brains was expanded to include consciousness, intention, will, 
and desire, no matter what the engineers said to the contrary.  
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In January 1950, Time magazine dedicated its cover to the Mark III computer.  
The illustration showed an anthropomorphized machine assiduously studying the data it 
was itself producing, and computing the results.  The caption of the picture “Mark III: 
Can man build a superman?”176 suggested the ways in which computers were enframed 
as artifacts that have moved beyond human beings in both power and consciousness.  The 
accompanying article provided a list of computer achievements and grim predictions of 
the computerized world of the future.  “Some scientists think that Bessie’s [the article’s 
nickname for the old Mark I computer in Harvard’s computer lab] descendants will have 
more effect on mankind than atomic energy.  Modern man has become accustomed to 
machines with superhuman muscles, but machines with superhuman brains are still a 
little frightening.  The men who design them try to deny that they are creating their own 
intellectual competitors.”177  
For the authors of Time’s articles, the engineers were deceiving themselves, 
mistaking their tenuous hold on the new technology for permanent control.  The authors 
spoke to Claude Shannon, stating he was “figuring out how to make a calculator that can 
play chess.  He thinks that one could play well enough to beat all except the greatest 
chess masters.  Machines are also capable, he thinks, of orchestrating a melody and of 
making simple logical deductions.”178  For Time, and by extension Time’s readers, 
computers were on the verge of performing even the most abstract human pursuits. The 
seeming endless capacity of computers to fill the intellectual needs of humanity would 
lead, Time speculated, to a world where “Men may come to specialize on the simple, 
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narrow task of serving the machines. Men’s brains may grow smaller and smaller as the 
machines’ brains grow larger.  Will the time come at last when the machines rule—
perhaps without seeming to rule—as the mysterious ‘spirit of the colony’ rules individual 
ants?”179  The development of computer technology posed a distinct threat to human 
agency by virtue of its speed and power.  This threat is given voice in the Washington 
Post’s Hal Boyle editorial/story ‘Human Slave Praised by Future Robot,’ where the 
mechanical brains of the future pay a complement to a human servant by noting that “I 
have the eerie feeling you’re almost mechanical.” 180  The message that we are being 
overrun and replaced by a higher order of intelligence and our future is one of slavery is 
quite explicit.  As the significance of the technological breakthroughs that produced the 
first computers began to filter through the post-war culture of the United States, they 
were accompanied by a distinct uncertainty, reflected in newspapers, magazines, 
television, and films, concerning the status of human consciousness in the face of a new 
‘other’ that would usurp human primacy on the planet.  Or, as one reporter described it: 
“It is now within logic that earth’s final rulers will be a race of lifeless, emotionless 
machines with superhuman brains.”181 
John Kobler, writing in the Saturday Evening Post, presents the threat of 
computers as a creeping menace:  “out of scientific laboratories from New York to 
Moscow there is emerging in ever-increasing numbers a series of wonder-working robots 
whose power for good or evil, for creativeness in peace or destruction in war, exceeds 
that of supersonic flight and nuclear fission.”  He identifies this threat as the nascent 
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computer industry and “the gigantic computing machines with the bizarre names—SSEC, 
ENIAC, Edvac, Binac, Mark I, II, and III, Rudy the Rooter, to list a few—and they can 
solve in infinitely less time than it would take Albert Einstein merely to state them almost 
any practical mathematical problem and many problems in pure mathematics.”182 
   “Development of a mechanical mathematical wizard with an electronic ‘brain’ 
that calculates 12,000 times faster than the human mind was announced tonight by the 
Eckert-Mauchly Computer Corporation of this city,”183 trumpeted an article in the New 
York Times titled “’Brain’ Outstrips Man’s.”   Waldemar Kaempffert, the long-time 
science editor for the New York Times reported, “At any rate, some airplane designers, 
are beginning to regard man as a specialized robot—and not a particularly satisfactory 
one for their purposes.”184  The difference between computers and humans seemed to 
have been decided in favor of machines.  Even a discussion of college football that 
speculated on the role of computers in Princeton’s success on the playing field described 
the situation: 
Behind a wall of secrecy as imposing as those guarding Princeton’s atomic 
research projects, the Princeton University athletic department has set an 
‘electronic’ brain to work on football. […] It is reputably immune to 
weariness, distractions, day dreaming and the occasional mental lapses 
that afflict even the best human thinkers.185  
 
Warner Bloomberg echoed the sentiment of Time’s authors by titling his article in the 
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New Republic, “Man’s New Role as Caretaker of the Machines,” and stated matter-of-
factly that “quite obviously, any machine that can do 2,000 multiplications and divisions 
or 16,000 additions or subtractions in a second has no parallel in the world of mere 
mortals.”186   
In the reporting on computers in the 1950’s, humans were increasingly 
represented as drags on the capabilities of computers: “Humans are too slow in their 
reactions to control the industrial mechanisms now coming off their drawing boards.” 
Reporters cited experts and engineers who claimed “the speeds, temperatures, radiation, 
complexities are too much for the human nervous system to handle, and men, the 
engineers say, are becoming bottlenecks in production.”187  A revolution in the way 
humans positioned themselves as intellectual beings created a world in which old 
definitions and assumptions concerning human primacy were failing to hold.  Louis 
Ridenour, commenting in Fortune, succinctly stated the premise that,  
in the forgoing, much has been made of the tremendous advantage the 
human brain enjoys over the much simpler electronic computing machines 
we now build.  It must not be inferred that the advantage is all on the side 
of the brain.  Computing machines, even those of the present day, are 
incomparably superior to the brain in speed of operation. […] It is so fast 
that it cannot stop and wait for pitifully slow human reflexes to instruct it 
on each individual operation: hence it must have a control organ whose 
speed matches that of its computations.188  
 
It is unclear how readers were supposed to react to this drumbeat of anxiety 
producing and anxiety assuaging stories prevalent in the 1950’s description of computer 
technology.  It is clear that some measure of emotional response was intended, and the 
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focus on descriptions of the machines as a new order of dominant species was almost 
always tempered with a way out of a predetermined future.  These narratives speak not 
only to a prophesy of human decline and inevitable replacement, but more importantly 
the stories provided a way of reemphasizing traditional American virtues of individuality, 
creativity, and the ability to improvise and bend the rules.  Computers, it was 
emphasized, were incapable of any of these things and were limited, like the subjects of 
totalitarian regimes, to a more stunted existence.   The representation of computers as 
competitors was a manufactured fear, propagated by the writers and editors of 
newspapers and magazines to create a sense of drama—a tension that needed resolution.  
The resolution, as a return to normalcy, was provided by the experts and engineers that 
populated accounts of a bleak and soulless future.  The competition for intellectual 
supremacy might be fought over the chessboard, but the more prosaic game of checkers 
presented a clearer contrast between the human as individual and the machine as an 
interloper, an outsider unable to assimilate into the mainstream.  
 
Computerized Checkers and the Limits of the Game 
Paul settled into his chair again.  Dispiritedly, he pushed a checkerpiece 
forward.  One of the youngsters closed a switch, and a light blinked on, 
indicating Paul’s move on Checker Charley’s bosom, and another light 
went on, indicating the perfect countermove for Berringer.  
Paul moved again.  A switch was closed, and the lights twinkled 
appropriately.  And so it went for several moves.   
The machine apparently took a long-range view of the game, with a grand 
strategy not yet evident.  Checker Charley, as though confirming his 
thoughts, made an ominous hissing noise, which grew in volume as the 
game progressed.   
Paul exchanged one man for three.  
“Say—now wait a minute,” said Berringer.  
“Wait for what?” said Finnerty. 
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“Something’s wrong.” 
“You and Checker Charlie are being beaten is all.  Somebody always 
wins, and somebody always loses,” Said Finnerty. “That’s the way it 
goes.” 
“Sure, but if Checker Charlie was working right he couldn’t lose.”  
Berringer arose unsteadily. “Listen, we’d better call this whole thing off 
while we find out what’s wrong.”  He tapped the front panel 
experimentally. “Jesus Christ, he’s hot as a frying pan!”  
“Finish the game, Junior.”189 
 
In Kurt Vonnegut’s 1952 novel Player Piano, the checker-playing computer is 
placed at the center of a battle of wits between the novel’s protagonist, Paul Proteus, and 
Berringer, a brash upstart out to make a name for himself in the company that employs 
them both (a company that is the only source of employment for the entire community, 
the rest of the unemployed workers subsisting on public works-type jobs).190  The chess 
playing computer, Checker Charlie, is wheeled out to demonstrate both Berringer’s 
ingenuity, and his position as an engineer/manager of the future out to embarrass the old-
guard personified by Proteus. Proteus’ victory over the machine is read as a victory over 
both the somewhat obnoxious Berringer and over the closed system that the machine 
represents.  As Berringer observes, and Proteus understands, the machine, if functioning 
correctly cannot lose, but the loose wire that Finnerty (Paul’s companion and a dissolute 
former engineer) observes and fails to point out, causes the machine to malfunction.  
Although on a level playing field, the machine would inevitably out play Proteus as a 
human opponent, the real world, Vonnegut reminds us, is not the same as the game world 
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and conditions outside the rules of the game can sometimes intrude.    
Vonnegut, writing in 1952, was prescient in his casting of a computerized 
checker-playing machine. But the unavailability of a reliable chess-playing computer 
program did not dampen the enthusiasm for human-computer competition through the 
early 1950’s.  By 1955 a Russian computer was reportedly able to play the game.  This, 
as reported, was natural, given “Russian national proclivities. The mechanical brain can 
play a good game of chess, Mr. Hall reported, although it is said that the best Soviet 
players can outthink it.”191  The existence of the Russian chess-playing program was 
never confirmed outside this one passing reference, and it would be several years before 
any mention is made of Russian chess-playing computers again.  Though possibly 
lagging behind the Soviets in computer chess programs, U.S. newspapers were able to 
announce by 1956 that the IBM 704 computer was able to play a better than average 
game of checkers.  The Wall Street Journal related the story of Arthur Samuel, engineer 
for IBM that created and refined the checker-playing program from 1952 to 1956 to run 
on IBM’s model 704 computer.  
For a look at the computer that’s playing checkers, Talk to Arthur Samuel, 
a research advisor for International Business Machines.  He’ll tell you, 
with a shy smile, that teaching the game to I.B.M.’s 704 computer—a 
hunk of hardware that rents for something like $30,000 to $40,000 a 
month—‘it’s just a hobby.’  
 
But when he warms up, Mr. Samuel displays some little pride in his 
hobby: ‘In two minutes I could show you, even if you’ve never played 
checkers, what to tell the machine so it could beat the average player.  It 
really plays quite an acceptable game.  It will look forward four moves—
that means considering 10,000 possible moves—to try to pick out a good 
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strategy.  The machine will sacrifice two pieces in a row so it can come 
back and make a triple jump.’192 
 
Samuel’s achievement, though quietly represented as his ‘hobby’ is nonetheless reason to 
give one commentator pause when writing the next day, stating that,  
One machine whirrs and spins out such a bang-up game of checkers it can 
plan four jumps ahead which is far better than the average fire chief can 
do. […] Such capabilities in a mere machine are close enough to magic to 
give an ordinary man quite a turn, for ordinary men may wonder when one 
of these smart machines might turn up and do his job.193   
 
The New Yorker wasn’t as worried, listening instead to R. W. Bremer (IBM assistant 
manager) who stated that while:  
[A] computer has been designed that plays checkers and has beaten all 
comers so far, Chess is still beyond it, but it won’t be for long. […] Some 
people fear that these machines will put them out of work.  On the 
contrary, they permit the human mind to devote itself to what it can do 
best. We will always be able to outthink machines.”194   
 
While publications may disagree on the significance of computers and the future of labor, 
with the Wall Street Journal seemingly more anxious than the cavalier New Yorker, they 
all seemed to agree on the nature of the competition between computers and humans.  As 
Kurt Vonnegut predicted in his 1952 novel, Player Piano, the misfortunes of a machine 
were represented in the news as victories for the human ego:  
Few things bolster the human ego these days, so we would call your 
attention to an otherwise obscure news item from back east.  In face-to-
face competition, mere man has defeated one of those big mechanical 
brains.  It detracts nothing from the achievement to add that the 
competition was a game of checkers.   
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For years men who may hold their heads high in the intricate world of 
business have trembled before the simplest of mechanical gadgets.  Then 
along came the masterminding monster of tubes and wires, which would 
solve problems at the rate of 1,000,000 a second and perform other 
terrifying miracles.  Men were unnerved.  Philosophers worried. Would 
man ever demonstrate that he is master, not slave, to the machine?  
 
We would not suggest that the recent checker contest on the MIT campus 
is the final proof.  But for the moment, at least, man is one up on the 
machine. And if he is as smart as we think he is, there’ll be no return 
match.  Better quit a winner.195  
 
The news story related the checker match as part of the installation celebration for the 
IBM 704 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in June of 1957.  “[The IBM 704] 
started its career [at MIT] rather ignominiously by conceding defeat in a game of 
checkers. As part of the dedication festivities June 20, Saul Weslow […] took on the 
machine in an exhibition game.  After 40 minutes of play, the machine conceded to its 
human opponent,” reported the New York Times, explaining how “Mr. Weslow’s victory 
[…] was an example of the human brain’s ability to adapt to situations.”196  The New 
York Times title of the account, “Mechanical Brain Good at Checkers,” reversed their 
opinion in an earlier story on the same event that the “Computer Prove[d] a Dud at 
Checkers.”197 The MIT engineers were forced to point out that “the 704 had beaten 
several other people before it faced the checker champion,” conceded the Robert Cowen 
of the Christian Science Monitor, but they also stated that the IBM 704 “started its career 
[at MIT] rather ignominiously by conceding defeat in a game of checkers.”198 
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 Arthur Samuel continued to refine his checker-playing program for the IBM 704 
computer for several years.  Dr. Samuel’s goal was not to create a checker-playing 
program that would always win, but one that would become better over time by self-
correcting and ‘learning’ from experience.  By 1959, Samuel’s program was beating him 
routinely.   
The day when man is replaced by an IBM machine seems to have 
arrived—at least for Dr. Arthur L. Samuel. […] The computer learned the 
game by being beaten in its early matches with the inventor.  But now 
machine is master of its creator. […] Come what may, the machine that 
plays checkers is not so adaptable (we believe) as to be capable of learning 
such other old favorites as chess, Parcheesi, or (heaven forbid) bridge.  So 
right now we humans can claim the edge in the games department. 199 
 
The New York Times reported that the “I.B.M Brain Beats the Hand That Fed It Data on 
Checkers”200  and suggested that, “varieties are as much a part of checkers as the people 
who play it, and this is what makes the game one of the most thoroughly ‘human’ games 
we have.”201  The representation of checkers as existing on a more human scale than 
chess colored the way the computers were described as checker players.  As Samuel’s 
IBM 704 continued to play checkers into the early 1960’s, the description of checkers as 
a human game served to reduce the significance of the game as a measure of human 
intelligence, and emphasize the more colloquial nature of the game as an American 
pastime.  The IBM 704 running Samuel’s checker program was placed within a non-
threatening niche as it continued to win some and lose some:   
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In Dallas, a checker champion sat down to play two games with an 
electronic computer, IBM 704. He lost the first game, proving that to err is 
human.  Then the 704 lost the second, presumably proving that to err is 
machine.  A spokesman for the 704 has assured the world that the machine 
will never again lose from that particular sequence of play.  A very human 
touch, again: learning by sad experience.202 
    
Samuel conceded that his checker-playing program was limited and pointed out that 
“even in the simpler game of checkers no computer is fast enough to figure out all of the 
possible consequences of a move through the end of a game.”  To do this, he claimed, 
would take several centuries before the computer could make its first move.  “Hence, 
though the computer, by figuring several moves ahead, may become smart enough to beat 
the man who writes the checker problem to ‘program’ it. Mr. Samuel concludes that a 
master of checkers can still beat the best checker program.”203  By 1962, the Samuel 
checker program failed to make headlines.  Its mixed record of success and failure versus 
different flesh and blood checker champions demonstrated that the computer, in this 
instance, was not definitive in that its victories did not demonstrate an overall mastery 
that could not be challenged, but that the machine could play an American game as well 
or as badly as an American champion.  The seeming difference between chess and 
checkers, with no one willing to claim the same level of intellectual prowess for checker-
players, meant that the checker-playing program and the IBM 704 did not represent a 
threat that could not be reasoned with, but rather a challenge that could be accepted good-
naturedly.    
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 Automatons and the Totalitarian Threat 
Looking at the condition of modernity and anxiety in the 1950’s, it is easy to see 
certain conflations and accretions of concern around specific issues, and how these issues 
resonated across areas of social and technological development that, at first, may seem to 
add little to the net anxiety of the period.  The roots of computer anxiety that transcends 
the pragmatic concerns of being replaced by a machine as a matter of livelihood and 
unemployment is reflected in the concerns of the postwar period surrounding the status of 
the human self as a construct.  By the beginning of the 1950’s public discourse was rife 
with articles, essays, and books detailing the origins of the totalitarian wave that had so 
recently swept across Europe under the banner of Fascism and had taken root in Asia as 
Soviet and Chinese Communism.  The concept of the ‘mass man’, that is, the subject 
stripped of autonomy and individual desire and instead reduced to a collection of class 
concerns easily manipulated by the media and exploited by a powerful elite, was the topic 
of countless volumes as well, originating from both the left and right of the political 
spectrum.  Both the left and the right were in agreement that the specter of mass man was 
the root cause of totalitarianism in both its fascistic and communistic forms.  In his study 
of the self in American history, Wilfred McClay points to the American obsession with 
authority and authoritarianism and the revision of these concerns in the post-war era.204  
The fear of Communism lead to an attendant rise of McCarthyite tyranny, and 
intellectuals, alarmed by the seeming ease with which the public could be swayed by 
jingoism, nationalism, and simple hatred, and compelled to relinquish civil liberties in the 
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name of security, published increasingly dire forecasts for the future of America. 
George Kennan, writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in October of 
1953, saw alarming trends in the growing conformity within the public sphere of post-
war America.  Kennan placed the blame squarely on whom Vance Packard would, a few 
years later, label “the hidden persuaders.”  For Kennan, “the immense impact of 
commercial advertising and the mass media on our lives is—let us make no mistake 
about it—an impact that tends to encourage passivity, to encourage acquiescence and 
uniformity, to place handicaps on individual contemplativeness and creativeness.”  
Kennan, an acknowledged expert on the Soviet Union and author of the “Long Telegram” 
outlining a containment policy that would shape cold-war thinking for a generation, saw 
nothing special in America that would make us exempt from the same sort of 
totalitarianism that had recently rolled across Europe.  He continued by stating that there 
was no 
[G]reater mistake we of this generation can make than to imagine that the 
tendencies which in other countries have led to the nightmare of 
totalitarianism will, as they appear in our own midst, politely pause—out 
of some delicate respect for American tradition—at the point where they 
would begin to affect our independence of mind and belief. 205 
 
This sentiment was echoed by Hannah Arendt, who agreed that the danger of 
conformism and its threat to freedom was inherent in all mass societies. “But its 
importance has more recently been overshadowed by the horrors of terror when 
combined with ideological propaganda—the specifically totalitarian form of organizing 
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great and unstructured masses of people.”206  Arendt, like Kennan, saw a warning in the 
history of Europe and of the Soviet Union.  Specifically, Arendt suggests that the lack of 
an overt class system in America is no safeguard against totalitarianism inherent in all 
mass cultures regardless of class structure.   
Writers drawing upon similarities between America in the 1950’s and Europe in 
the 1930’s, focused on the rise of mass consumption and mass man as pointing to a 
significant loss of the inherently Romantic ideal of the independent man, the Jeffersonian 
yeoman farmer, updated as the modern entrepreneur and self-made man.  The danger was 
made explicit by one writer commenting that “this is the age of gadgets, of popular 
culture and popular emotions; it is an age particularly suited to bureaucracy, to efficiency 
experts, technological specialists, rocket makers, Organization Men—an age to the forms 
of which the Germanic temper is eminently suited.”207  David Reismann’s inner-directed 
man as a pre-war specimen of American drive, industriousness, and vision was contrasted 
with his degenerated descendant, the ‘other-directed’ ‘organization man’ of William 
Whyte.  Whyte, writing in Fortune magazine in 1952, lamented the contemporary ‘social 
man’ who was “completely a creature of his environment, guided almost totally by the 
whims and prejudices of the group and incapable of any real self-determination of his 
destiny.”208  Editors charged, throughout the 1950’s that the new “Organization Man has 
lost his individuality and has become no more than a cog, indistinguishable from other 
cogs, in a machine composed not of metal parts, but of linked and intermeshed human 
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beings.” 209 
Longing for a return to unity was an enduring theme of the Romantic movement 
in an age of rationalization and division.  The age of Enlightenment, with its 
classifications and subdivisions, engendered a fragmented society and an equally 
fragmented self.  The apperception of the sublime, the marked nostalgia for gothic forms, 
guilds and crafts that were a conspicuous part of the Romantic movement’s aesthetic 
sensibilities translated, in the Modernist era of the early 20th century, into a privileging of 
ancient and classical texts, exoticism, and an appreciation of primitivism that sought to 
force the issue of psychological and social fragmentation to the forefront of aesthetic 
concerns.  The romantic philosophies that survived in the popular media of the 1950’s 
emphasized the fragmentation of modernity—specifically the fragmentation of the self 
that was a product of mechanization, automation, and mass production.  The assembly 
line with its repetitive routinized tasks that made a more holistic approach to craft 
obsolete was presented as a synecdoche for the disassembly of humans into component 
parts.  As advances in automation increased the speed of production and the quality of 
unit parts rolling off production lines they also reduced the number of laborers needed to 
perform routine tasks.  The automated production line integrated laborers into the 
mechanized process and created an environment where men were made to feel as cogs in 
a machine. 
 That computers were seen as scapegoats for social and psychological 
fragmentation is not significant in itself—what is relevant is that the technology was 
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consistently framed to function as a symbol of a specific aspect of the social order that is 
a source of anxiety.  The computer, as a symbol of rationalized process and method was 
cast as antagonistic to that which cannot be rationalized—love, intuition, inventiveness, 
and play.  As humans became more imbricated into the technological order of things (we 
are all cyborgs, after all, as Haraway claims), we viewed computers as icons of the forces 
that led to our loss of tradition, mystery, and an awareness of our environment that can be 
encompassed by general knowledge and pragmaticism.  
This is the message behind Norbert Wiener’s 1954 book, The Human Use of 
Human Beings-- that book being, in turn, a popularized version of his 1948 Cybernetics.  
The implication of cybernetics, drawn by the popular media beyond Wiener’s actual 
intent, was a system of human/machine interaction that devalued human beings as 
nothing more than flesh and blood machines caught in a causal loop.  Wiener’s recasting 
of his theories, in a distinctly humanistic vein, was an attempt to frame cybernetics as a 
liberating discourse ushering in a third industrial revolution.  Wiener was only partially 
successful, if at all—for there remained for every discourse celebrating technology at 
least the same number of voices expressing discomfort, anxiety, and alarm over what we 
stand to lose as individuals, societies and cultures.  Popular celebrations of technological 
innovation often contain within them the rhetoric of anxiety.   
This anxiety, in the case of computer technology and competition is intrinsically 
bound up with a fear of authority, and the diminishing sense of control that was a major 
concern for post-war writers looking back on the totalitarian fascism of Europe.  In 
Friedrich Georg Juenger’s The Failure of Technology (written in Germany in 1934), 
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Juneger, writing about the role of technology in pre-war Germany asked:  
Where does this all this efficiency lead to?  Where does it leave man?  
That question cannot be answered by means of functional thinking, which 
focuses forever upon the wild confusion of phenomena only, and which 
pursues forever the sequence of phenomena through lifeless time in order 
to dissect them.210  
 
Walter Marx, reviewing Juenger’s book, translated into English and published in the U.S. 
in 1949, agreed, stating that “the more human a person is, the more inefficient he is from 
the standpoint of the machine. It is human to work at an irregular pace the machine will 
not tolerate.  It is human to take more than a half-hour for lunch, or to want to put S 
before R once in a while, or take a break from monotonous work.”211  This tension 
between conformity and humanity played out over countless editorials and articles on the 
state of the American consumer, worker, manager, citizen as timid and striving for 
anonymity and contentment.  As the Christian Century magazine lamented, “In spite of 
all the Sturm und Drang of our era, men are smoothing themselves out, pulling in their 
horns, losing the individuality of their selfhoods.”  The lure of conformity was as a refuge 
against uncertainty and “because of the storm and stress of our time, men are hiding in 
the herd.  They are adopting camouflage.  They are squeezing their opinions through the 
public colander.  No one wants to jar or be jarred anymore.  No boats are to be rocked. 
No apple carts will be upset.”212   
In the 1950’s, as in the 1930’s, the machine became synonymous with conformity 
and sameness.  But while the 1930’s emphasis was on the factory as the site of mass-
produced mass-man, leaving the managerial and middle classes untouched and free to 
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pity and fear the working class, the 1950’s saw the arrival of a dangerous conformity that 
threatened management and the white-collar world as well.213  This conformity was 
represented as a threat to American technological and scientific advancement: “Uncritical 
conformity is dangerous to our progress […] Conformity, in the sense of uncritical 
adherence to some established doctrine, is a deadening thing to the scientific and 
intellectual growth on which progress depends.” 214   Following authority, formerly the 
preferred mode of conservative business, was challenged by a growing discontentment of 
conformity, not so much as a spontaneous outpouring of repressed creativity, but as a fear 
that conformity was making Americans less American.  
We are today authority-dominated to the point of abjectness.  We are 
handed (and accept) more advice, more counsels as to what is wrong, 
more urgings to a docile conformity, more authoritarian They-Says, than 
any creatures calling themselves free should dream of bearing. […] There 
is no counting the publications today devoted entirely to handing us ‘rules’ 
for rightly forming our characters, rules for dressing right and eating right 
and speaking right and rightly getting ahead in the world and having 
marital intercourse at exactly suitable intervals. […] Just follow these 
rules and you too can join a standardized populace in one great gray goo 
of bumpless similarity.” 215    
 
The editors of Fortune, reporting changes to the career guidance manual ‘So You Want A 
Better Job’ passed out by the Socony-Vacuum company to its employees, stated that the 
manual, which for many years contained the advice “personal views can cause a lot of 
trouble.  Remember then to keep them always conservative.[…] Business looks with 
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disfavor on the wild-eyed radical or even the moderate pink.”216  The updated manual, 
disavowed the earlier dictum, replacing it with “the world needs different viewpoints; 
blind conformity means stagnation.”217  The editors of Fortune conceded, however, “the 
original statement probably reflects quite accurately the present state of mind of many 
managers and would-be managers. […] Fledgling executives not only tend to be wary of 
expressing strong political opinions, they often don’t seem to have any to express.”218 
Even mothers worrying about their children’s futures while perusing Good 
Housekeeping or McCall’s magazine were presented with testimonials from mothers who 
insisted on raising non-conforming children, and hints on how to bring up children to be 
rebels and individuals, round pegs in a square-holed world.219  Meanwhile, Woman’s Day 
magazine warned of “the danger of being too well-adjusted,”220 lest a mother run the risk 
of raising a family of automatons.  
 
Computers and Robots 
Although it is clear that computers are not robots, the two types of machines 
having distinct functions, as well as different roles as icons in the evolving discourse on 
automation, mechanization, and modernity, were nonetheless blended in early 
descriptions of computer technology.  In a few examples, the New York Times described a 
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new computer built for the National Bureau of Standards in 1950 as “the robot genius,”221 
Science Digest titled one article on computers and the engineers that build and maintain 
them “Care and Feeding of Robots,”222  the computer used by NBC to predict the 1952 
presidential election was christened ‘Monrobot’, and magazines routinely depicted 
computers in illustrations as having electronic gadgetry intended to suggest eyes, mouths, 
and even grasping arms.  The representation of robots and mechanical men has a long 
tradition in American print media dating back to the end of the 19th century.  Karel Capek 
coined the term ‘robot’ in 1921 in his play R.U.R (Rossum’s Universal Robots); a 
dystopian story about artificial workers who eventually rise up and destroy humanity.  As 
automated processes and mechanized factories grew in number and complexity through 
the first half of the 20th century, images of robots increased as well.  As robots became 
synonymous with the routinization and mechanization of the factory and the life of the 
laborer, they also became icons for anything automatic that functioned without direct 
human intervention and control.223 
 It isn’t surprising that this iconography flowed into early descriptions of computer 
technology as well, with terms like ‘robot brain’ almost as common as ‘electronic brain’ 
and ‘mechanical brain’ as descriptors for digital computers.  The closest parallel for 
describing computers was analogous technology from the world of industry.  The 
computer was an automatic machine capable of performing its work (running through the 
steps sequenced in its program) without human intervention, just as automatic factory 
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machines on a production line.  Just as machines were perceived as a threat to blue-collar 
workers in factories and machine shops, the computer was understood as a threat to the 
white-collar worlds of accounting and decision-making.  Robert S. Lee conducted 
preliminary research into social attitudes toward computer technology in 1963.  Lee 
discovered that, while people perceived computers as accurate, fast, and capable of 
improving quality of life, there was an additional counter narrative in his respondents that 
held, at the same time, that the machines made them feel somewhat inferior or that the 
machines were destined to control our lives.  Lee discovered in one of the few surveys of 
people’s attitudes toward computer technology that there remained a deep uneasiness 
concerning computer technology that seemed to correlate to one’s economic status and 
security:  
A nationwide survey indicates that the American public views the 
electronic computer and its significance in terms of two independent 
belief-attitude dimensions.  The first views the computer as an instrument 
of man’s purposes—helpful in science, industry, space exploration, etc.  
The second portrays the machine as a relatively autonomous entity that 
can perform the functions of human thinking.  People tend to react in awe 
and a sense of inferiority to this later conception.  
 
[The view that computers can perform human-like thinking activities] co-
exists in the culture along with the more conventional and accepted view 
that sees the computer as a progressive and welcome development.  It is, 
however, a highly symbolic and disquieting undercurrent of great 
emotional significance centering on the notion that the machine is 
autonomous and that it ‘thinks’ as humans do.  
 
The findings of this study suggest that the computer as an object of social 
perception functions to a certain degree as a Rorschach blot or TAT card.  
It is a complex and ambiguous stimulus—how individuals perceive it and 
give it meaning depends very much on their fundamental values, on their 
personality dynamics, and their basic orientations toward life.224 
                                                 




Lee’s findings echo the mixed bag of anxiety and celebration that run through media 
narratives about computer technology in the post-war era.  The computer as icon was a 
combination of nationalistic pride and fear.   
 The computer as robot was also iconic as a metaphor for thinking, or at least one 
type of thinking.  The computer was portrayed as a rigid and dispassionate thinker that 
was bound by rules of logic, but not rules of intuition, creativity, or empathy.  In this 
regard, the computer, as represented within media culture, was reminiscent of a closed, 
totalitarian way of envisioning the world that was synonymous with depictions of the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War.  The ideology of Marxism, as practiced by the 
Soviets, engendered a society of mindless automatons unable to think for themselves.  As 
Arthur Compton noted in Atlantic Monthly at the height of the cold-war: “I am told that 
for a considerable period after the Second World War, the teaching of scientific 
indeterminacy was under a ban in Russia.  Marx, who was a younger contemporary of 
Laplace, had taught that man is a machine that obeys exact mechanical laws.”225  Further, 
various pundits and public figures from the American right were in the business of 
constantly reminding readers that post-war America ran the risk of falling into this 
mindset as well.  Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, in an address to the American Bar 
Association in Cleveland, Ohio, declared that Americans were in need of spiritual 
rehabilitation evidenced by, “the confusion of the present conception of the nature of man 
which forms a part of many widely held ideologies. ‘Under this view, man is a mere 
automaton incapable of sharing in the determination of his own destiny, bereft of dignity, 
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capable of responding to the grosser of materialistic motivations and irrational 
passions.’”226  William Henry Chamberlain is even more explicit.  Writing in his article, 
‘The Treason of Some Intellectuals’, Chamberlain wants to make it perfectly clear that a 
weakly understood progressivism creates an unreasonable dependence on the state and 
“The mental atmosphere would be vastly cleared if it were more generally understood 
that the free society is flexible and progressive in the true sense of the word, while the 
totalitarian state is static and reactionary.”  The reactionary nature of totalitarianism 
creates as static and unchanging world, Chamberlin contends, and leads to a stasis that is 
“not the least of the reasons why life under dictatorship is undesirable […] thanks to the 
ironing out of the slightest semblance of independent critical expression, this life must 
always be a crashing bore, except to the perfectly conditioned robot.”227  Chamberlain 
latter asserts that:  
It is certainly not without significance that the era of the great schism in 
civilization has also been a time of declining individualism.  There has 
been a tendency to look to the state as a universal planner and provider.  
There has been an increasing popularity for theories which deny man’s 
individual moral responsibility, which would make the human being a 
mere puppet or robot, helpless in the grip of impersonal economic and 
biological forces. There is no prospect of healing the schism without the 
rebirth of a healthy individualism in men’s minds and hearts and souls.228   
 
As liberalism and the welfare state of F.D.R were represented as laying the 
groundwork for a soul and work-ethic sapping system that was destined to transform 
America into a nation of automatons, readers were asked to look no further than the 
Soviet Union to see the logical outcome of the decline of individuality.  Cyril Forster 
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Garbett, Archbishop of York, speaking to the Commonwealth Club of California in the 
fall of 1949 proclaimed that “we must make it plain to all that in resisting Marxian 
communism we are defending the elementary rights of man against an attack which if 
successful would deprive him of freedom and change him into a robot.”229    
Malvina Lindsay, writing on education, literacy, and the minds of youth in the 
Washington Post, cautioned against totalitarianism and concluded that:  
The world is moving in science, technology, and human aspiration, it 
seems likely that national strength may soon not be measured in terms of 
masses of robots with regimented minds, but rather in individuals of 
creative power, invention, initiative, psychological maturity, boldness of 
thought, leadership—all the things free education seeks to develop.230   
 
Paul Jordan-Smith, reviewing Charles Morgan’s collection of essays, Liberties of the 
Mind, describes Morgan’s view of materialist worldviews like those evolving in the 
Soviet Union.  Morgan, Jordan-Smith explains, “simply examines the Soviet trials and 
draws conclusions.  Then he looks upon the tendencies toward mechanization and 
standardization that have been so obvious since 1918.  Add to that the philosophy of 
materialistic totalitarianism and you have a nice plan for a world of docile robots.”231  
Jordan-Smith’s condensation of Morgan’s essay provides us with an example of the 
perceived plan of global communism, and the necessity of a mechanized and routinized 
society for this plan to come to pass.  Our material success masks a creeping 
totalitarianism and provides the milieu needed for the enslavement of the mind.  That 
success also makes us the target of robot-minded, totalitarian hordes, as Malvina Lindsay 
prophesied.  Lindsay, who appeared to have specialized in drawing parallels between 
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totalitarian regimes and robots, as well as stoking the fires of xenophobia, writes that the 
American child of the future “will be outnumbered at least two to one by the backward, 
the illiterate, and the hungry.  But he may also be outnumbered by what is even more 
dangerous, the totalitarian personality—the rigid, impersonal, nonreasoning robot.”232   
 The Soviet system was not only depicted as a culture of robots as an abstract 
entity, but individual Russians were robot-like as well.  Walter Lippmann, commenting 
on Soviet communications with the west and their abrupt and abrasive style noted that,  
“the style is quite plainly the authoritarian or dictatorial style. […] The Soviet style is the 
flattest kind of deadpan assertion.  It does not aim to please or persuade.  It is a style 
suitable for the instruction of robots.”233  Columnist Bill Henry quoted Winston Churchill 
on Soviet leader Molotov as saying that he has “never seen a human being who more 
perfectly represented the modern conception of a robot.”234   
With the demise of Stalin in 1953, Georgy Malenkov briefly became the leader of 
the Soviet Union (he was deposed by Nikita Khrushchev in 1955).  Malenkov was 
something of an unknown quantity to the West.  Speaking of Malenkov, in 1953, Malvina 
Lindsay describes the media’s anticipation, “awaiting with much curiosity the first moves 
designed to build a benign father halo around the robot face of the Soviet Union’s new 
dictator.”235  Lydia Kirk, wife of former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union Alan G. 
Kirk, in an article titled ‘New Red Chief Termed Robot’, agreed with Lindsay’s 
assessment, stating that Malenkov, “is not a very appetizing looking person. […] He’s a 
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Soviet-made robot, efficient and cruel.”236  
As the Cold War wore on, and the specter of communist China was increasingly 
described in similar tones, with the Wall Street Journal reporting on “the spectacle of 
China, with it’s 650 million people and constantly growing, being turned into one huge 
camp of armed automatons.” 237  The Washington Post liked this description enough to 
repeat it a couple of weeks later, stating that “Mao Tse-tung has begun to whip his 650 
million people into a completely regimented race of automatons dedicated to long, hard 
work for the state, and ultimate defeat of Western democracy.”238  If the Chinese 
Communists and the Soviet Union were to be populated (at least in the popular 
imagination of the media, and by extension, the lay reader) by robots and automatons, the 
American anxiety toward computers, and the totalitarian world they suggested, was 
tempered by the fact that computers, at least when playing games like average people 
could do, didn’t seem to be taking over quite yet.  
The Failure of Chess Playing Computers 
 By early 1957, the MANIAC computer had been programmed to play an 
abbreviated game of chess on a 6X6 square board.  Stanislaw Ulam and Nicholas 
Metropolis programmed the MANIAC, installed at the Los Alamos laboratories, to play a 
game of chess on the board with the bishop pieces removed.  The MANIAC chess 
program was the topic of the news because it was the first time a computer defeated a 
human player.  The Washington Post headline “Mechanical Brain Beats Human Player at 
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Chess,” sounded definitive enough at first glance, but readers soon learned that the 
person who lost to the computer was a “human beginner with one week’s chess 
experience.”239  The MANIAC was billed as “an electronic computing machine [that] has 
been taught to play beginner’s chess on its own and capably enough to give its human 
opponents a good tussle.” To put the event into perspective, the Post explained, “Chess is 
the brainiest of all games. Maniac is the electronic computer whose calculations helped 
demonstrate the feasibility of the hydrogen bomb.”    
To defeat the chess-playing computer then would be a significant feat.  As a 
representative of a mechanized form of thinking, beating the chess computer could be 
synonymous with beating the totalitarian mindset of Soviet Marxism.  As the New York 
Times explains:   
Since having ideas is the basis of all conscious volition, man retains the 
power to make a selection from among the alternatives offered to him—
often, as it turns out, the wrong one.  It is this ability, for example, that 
allows man to win against the mechanical chess player, one of the latest 
triumphs of electronics engineering.  The machine can reply only to 
certain moves.  Thus it is in a position to give the correct answer only to 
the human opponent who makes what the masters have held to be the best 
possible move according to the situation.  The mechanical chess player 
therefore is unable to take advantage of the errors of his human opponent, 
as could another human.240  
 
The MANIAC was intended for research at the Los Alamos laboratories and was 
unable to continue its role as a chess-playing computer.  Another IBM 704 (not 
Samuel’s) was programmed to play chess by a different team lead by Alex Bernstein in 
1958.  The Bernstein chess program did not have a particularly winning record, but was 
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capable of looking ahead two moves (the average human player routinely looks ahead 
three).  The New York Times reported, “Operating on its chess-playing instructions, the 
computer is no match for a human chess master.  But is considerably above the beginner 
level.”  The characteristics of the machine inherently separated it from human players in 
that “as a chess player, the computer seems to be immune to foolish blunders, always 
capitalizes on bad mistakes by its opponent and sometimes makes masterful moves.”241 
The outcome of the match between the IBM 704 and its human opponents was to lose all 
four games.  Even though the IBM 704 proved to be a less than inspiring chess player, 
reporting for Science Digest on the event did not preclude a certain sensationalism mixed 
with foreboding: “Where will it all end? Will machines from IBM challenge those from 
Sperry Rand? Will the chess champs of the future be robots?”  And, to make the 
connection between Soviet totalitarianism and chess explicit, the Times asked, “since 
Russians have figured importantly among the chess masters of the world, must we now 
also worry about their technological advances in the computer line?”242   
It wasn’t until the middle of the 1960’s that the American chess-playing machines 
were matched against the best of the Soviet chess programs.  The outcome led columnists 
like C. L. Sulzberger to question the validity of computers in general: “One cannot help 
wondering whether computers sometimes go wrong.”  Computer intelligence led to 
original assumptions that the Vietnam War could be won without an intensive U.S. effort.  
Computer diplomacy led to original assumptions that France, because of its relatively 
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small size and power, could not be a serious factor in shaping policy in Europe.”243  
Instead of a battle of electronic titans, the match shaped up to be somewhat less dramatic, 
as Sulzberger continued: “a chess game is being staged between two computers in 
California and Russia.  John McCarthy, Stanford University’s Professor of Computer 
Science, comments: ‘By human standards the machine is weak.’  A chess expert of the 
London Observer writes: “at the moment, it is not clear which computer is the weaker 
player, but it is already certain that both are dim-witted.”   The Washington Post was so 
enamored of the idea of a dim-witted computer that they used the exact language to 
describe the chess match in their article a few days later.244  The play between the 
machines is described as “low, to put it mildly,” “a trifle unimaginative,” “pitiful 
weakness”, a “wanton violation of the basic principles of opening play”, “dogged,” and 
“blundering.”245 The chess playing machines that were so anxiety producing seemed, 
when in competition with each other, to be put into perspective with the stakes of the 
contest considerably lower.  The contest was no longer a contest between ‘man and 
machine’ but instead “not so much a competition between machines as between scientists 
who laid down programs for them.”246  The Soviet computers won against their American 
counterparts in an anticlimactic match of four games played simultaneously.247  The 
relative weakness of the machines was such that, no matter who won, the idea of 
American adaptive thought (and analogously, Western capitalism) was secure against 
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machine domination either as manifested by computers or by Communist ideology.   
As preoccupation with the Soviets and the Cold War was replaced by the 
escalating war in Vietnam, the anxiety about Soviet domination diminished and with it 
this specific anxiety about computer domination.  It was clear that the computer as chess-
player had a long way to go before it was ready to challenge ranked, world-class players.  
Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s computer chess programs increased in sophistication 
and ability, and computer hardware increased in processing speed.  It would be another 
thirty years before a computer would beat the reigning chess grand master and the 
computer as an iconic representation would have undergone several more transformations 
before then.  The anxiety about the machine as an example of totalitarian thought and 
Cold War survival would be replaced by an understanding of the machine as a physical 
artifact and as a symbol of the state as information gatherer.  In the mid-1960’s, the 
processing power of machines soon took a backseat to the understanding of information 
and data processed by the machines as the more important (and anxiety-laden) artifacts of 
the age.  
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Chapter 3: Syllogisms and Meta-Solutions: The Computer as Feminine 
and Childlike in American Film and Television  
 
Introduction 
Where the previous chapters have presented rhetorical strategies that warned of 
computers as out of control, this chapter focuses on reigning in computers as 
metaphorical objects.  Cinematic depictions of computers often amplified the sense of 
conflict between human and machine for the sake of dramatic tension and as metaphor.  
Computers represented any number of dangerous ‘others’ disrupting the relative peace of 
the post-war world.  Vivian Sobchack, in reading the science fiction films from the 
1950’s to the present day observes that the genre is a “popular and poetic mapping of 
American culture’s ambivalent romance and disenchantment with a life-world become 
increasingly technologized since World War II.”248   The computer as a logic machine 
did, on one hand, reflect a certain masculine ideal where the hyper-rationality of the 
machine resonated with a traditional sense of the masculine as the ordered, proper 
individual that was not prey to sentimentality or emotion.  But the obscure nature of 
computers, due in large part to their black boxing as artifacts, meant that when computers 
did generate erroneous or confusing data due to a programming error or mechanical 
failure, the output could seem capricious and illogical, and the machines seemed touchy 
and unreasonable—that is, the computers seemed to emulate the stereotypical feminine 
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counterpart to the rational scientists and engineers surrounding them.  The computer as 
feminine was the logical extension of this phenomenon.  The computer was also seen as 
feminine in that it was often assigned the status of ‘helper’, or the one that performed the 
rote tasks dreamed up by the innovative and visionary man. This sense of the machine as 
irrational and subservient was captured in films like Forbidden Planet (Metro-Goldwyn 
Mayer, 1956) and Desk Set (20th Century Fox, 1957), and in the Twilight Zone episode 
“From Agnes with Love,” as well as in various newspaper and magazine accounts.  The 
machine in this light becomes a monstrous female that threatens to destroy men with its 
oversized and alien logic.  As Barbara Creed illustrates in her discussion of the monstrous 
feminine, the idea of the female castrator is prevalent in the American horror and science 
fiction genres as the object of desire that outstrips the category of object that has been 
inscribed upon her by the male subject.249  This reading is germane to our discussion of 
computers as encoded with a female set of referents in the American cinema of the 
1950’s and 1960’s, and how these codes marked computers as out-of-control objects that 
must be brought to heel as surrogate women in post-war America.  
The logic of the machine (not an inscrutable feminine logic, but a cold and 
impersonal one synonymous perhaps with the impersonal destruction of the atomic 
bomb) and the ability of humans to out-think machines creatively comes to the forefront 
of creative interpretations of computer technology.  Presaging the student movements to 
come, fictionalized encounters with mammoth machines often require the protagonists to 
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stake out their physical positions vis-à-vis computers—that is, to acknowledge the power 
of computers as existing within a very narrow band of experience.  The infallible logic of 
the machine could, with the help of syllogisms and logic games, be the cause of its own 
failure. If machines were logical then they were eminently sane.  To assert one’s primacy 
over the machine required a meta-consciousness that would appear to the machine to be 
insane.  Films like 2001: A Space Odyssey (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, 1968) and the 
television series Star Trek employed meta-solutions as devices to re-establish an ordered 
world where human men remained in control.  
Throughout this project I’ve argued that the use of computers as metaphors acted 
as a stand in for larger anxieties about postwar American culture and politics, and that 
computers were convenient artifacts for displacement of uncomfortable feelings of 
uncertainty about the future.  But more importantly, this displacement acted to assuage 
anxieties by helping to reestablish traditional values in the face of modernity.  The filmic 
discourse about computer technology re-inscribed the future as a continuation of the 
present and linked both with a romanticized view of the past. At the same time, films like 
Desk Set gently lampooned the rise of corporate efficiency and the threat of white collar 
obsolescence while reassuring viewers that the managers and owners always had the best 
interests of the workers at heart because profit and innovation went hand in hand with 
worker happiness and productivity. The role of computer anxiety in the films of the 
1950’s and 60’s was not to make viewers fear the future or to look at their present with 
foreboding, but rather presented a metaphorical mirror of social issues and perceived 
problems to solve on the way toward the re-establishment of equilibrium in the post-war 
world.  Prior to analyzing these films, however, it is important to describe the conflation 
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of women with technology and machines.    
Cyborgs: The Machine as Monstrous 
The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the 
illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not 
to mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are often 
exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are 
inessential.250 
 
Donna Haraway’s definition of the cyborg is relevant to our discussion of 
computer technology as a reflection on ideas of identity, specifically machine identity, as 
being both dependent and independent of human actors.  This duality in our definitions of 
machines has engendered a split—not so much in the identities of the machines in our 
midst, but rather in our own consciousnesses when we seek to describe computer 
technology as something engendered by human thought and ability, while at the same 
time separate, unique, and altogether un-human.  The creation of electronic ‘thinking’ 
machines is the creation of monsters, and Haraway’s description of the cyborg as 
“illegitimate” connotes this schism.  For Haraway, this illegitimacy is a matter to be 
celebrated as a source of power and an appropriation of the imprisoning structures of 
patriarchal technology by re-visioning these structures as an integral part of our identities 
in the modern world.  Haraway’s appropriation of the cyborg as a symbol connotes the 
hybridity and multivalent world where boundaries are blurred. It is the world portrayed in 
films like Blade Runner, a world of replicants and pacemakers—of avatars in cyberspace 
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and trans-species kinships.  It is a postmodern world hostile toward meta-narratives as 
hegemonic mechanisms.251   
The cyborg, a being that is both biological and mechanical, is a metaphor that 
engenders identity constructions as porous, heterogeneous, and multiple.  The structures 
of technology that act as limiting and defining tropes in a discourse that uses rigid 
categories and identifications as the means of control and coercion of biological bodies 
are assimilated into the body of the cyborg.  For Chela Sandoval, the cyborg is 
synonymous with third-world feminism, a de-colonizing project concerned with 
reappropriating technologies to break down Western, masculine hegemonies of 
technology as bounded and capitalistic and encouraging cross-species hybridity.252   Early 
computer discourse did not necessarily hold this view.  The machines that we had created 
were instead boundaries against which we defined ourselves in comparison with what we 
were not.  As Haraway states, “the relation between organism and machine has been a 
border war.”253   
Along with the more standard reading of computers as lifeless, soulless, thinking 
machines existed a different construct that relates computer consciousness as 
consciousness with a difference.  The cold calculations of the machine were not lifeless at 
all, but instead reflected a consciousness that took a recognizable form.  It is revealing 
that Haraway, Sandoval, and other feminist scholars have taken the idea and identity of 
the cyborg as a form of oppositional consciousness to the patriarchal constructs that 
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comprise much of modern science and technological thought.  In doing so they are re-
appropriating an identification of computers with women and feminine difference that 
was prevalent in the media culture narratives of the mid-20th century.   
Feminizing the Thinking Machine 
In the 1940’s, computers as objects took their names from computing as an 
occupation.  During the Second World War, the job title for the people who calculated 
firing tables for artillery shells and guns was ‘computer’.  These jobs were widely held by 
women with formal education in mathematics.  Along with the replacement of women 
workers by returning veterans at the end of World War II, one of the first moves to return 
women into the domestic sphere was the replacement of computers with electronic 
machines.254  As a 1950 article about the SWAC (Standards Western Automatic 
Computer) relates:  It took hundreds of girls a year and a half to compile the rocket-firing 
tables.  S.W.A.C. could have done the job in a month.”255  The new technology quickly 
eliminated the need for the human computers, and, within a few years, the job title had 
been erased—replaced by the artifact that appropriated the task.  The link between 
women and computers, at least as far as a mental image was concerned, endured for 
somewhat longer. 
Conflated with the fear that the ‘other-directed’ “Organization Man” of the 1950’s 
was the bellwether of a soviet or fascistic (depending on your political point of view) 
totalitarianism was the equally alarming fear that the post-war American male was 
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undergoing a crisis of confidence and had lost his nerve.  American masculinity was 
represented as key to American strength and the undue influence of women or any 
confusion over gender roles was dangerous. As one writer to the Chicago Tribune’s 
editor proclaimed, “Many civilizations owe their downfall to effeminate and corrupting 
influences of women […] A lesson is to be learned […] A strong America is a masculine 
America […] Don’t put skirts on Uncle Sam.”256   Arthur Schlesinger Jr., writing in 1956 
for Esquire magazine, detailed what he called a “Crisis of American Masculinity.”257  
Schlesinger, writing about what he saw as a ‘soft liberalism’ sought to reinscribe 
liberalism with a sense of masculine purpose akin to the active, results-driven attitudes of 
FDR’s New Deal policies and the victory over fascism in the second world war.  He saw 
a liberalism based solely on concepts identified with the welfare state as sapping the 
energy of the American left, and weakening the American character, as poverty and 
economic failure were, in his reading, things of the past or on their way to history’s 
dustbin.  The American consumer society, by providing jobs, higher wages, and objects 
to be purchased with discretionary incomes, was rapidly expanding the middle class.  But 
the expanding middle class, and the American worker in his suburban tract house, was 
experiencing a sort of spiritual malaise, a ‘crisis of masculinity’ where the very idea of 
manliness was tested by a lack of worthy adversaries and an overexposure to peace and 
the soft comforts of home.  Louis Lyon, in an essay on American manhood published in 
1956, explained the problem with the post-war American male:  
But remember that a man in a gray flannel suit is also a man and 
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that for two or three years he was away from you in one or another 
war.  For two or three years he lived as undomesticated men do 
live: without the bills and taxes perhaps, living among other men 
and not inhibiting man’s natural impulse to obscene language and 
obscene storytelling, seeing men die and perhaps expecting to die 
himself, free in the sense that he often had no idea what the next 
day would bring.   
There are certain deep and perfectly normal masculine drives that 
were “permitted” during a war as they are not permitted in a 
suburban backyard.  They are an inborn attraction to violence and 
obscenity and polygamy, an inborn love of change, and inborn 
need to be different from the others and rebel against them, a 
strong need for the occasional company of men only and an 
occasional need for solitude and privacy.  
Certainly all men do not feel these drives to the same degree.  And 
certainly these drives shouldn’t all be permitted in that clean, 
green, happy back yard.  But if they are always and completely 
inhibited—the man in the gray flannel suit will stop being a 
man.258 
The man in the gray flannel suit was, according to contemporary writers, barely 
hanging on to his dignity and masculinity in the suburban world of wives, children, 
dinner parties and lawns.  The very definitions of manhood were being eroded, 
especially, as Lyon asserts, after the masculine frenzy of the Second World War.  Other 
authors pointed to the middle class, white-collar life style as stifling and corrupting.  
William Whyte critiqued the Organization Man as lacking individuality and being a 
compulsive follower, while C. Wright Mills considered white-collar workers little more 
than ingratiated (although alienated) robots. 259  Newspapers and magazines were rife 
with articles concerning the threat of conformity, raising children to be individuals, and 
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wondering where it all went wrong (the answer to which often had to do with an 
abandonment of the Protestant work ethic and the loss of the entrepreneurial spirit).260  
The American male was embattled in the home and on the job and was perceived as 
pathologically weak and unable to meet the challenges of modern family life and a 
workplace that was quickly modernizing and automating.  The pressure of home and 
career was destroying the patriarchal structure and culture that men felt was their due.   
Emplotment and Gender Roles  
As Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner observe, technophobia in American 
science fiction films often reflect a social conservatism in which challenges to what they 
term ’natural’ social arrangements are camouflaged within the guise of out-of-control 
technology.261  Like the out of control libidinal energy of Austen’s heroines, the 
computer, as represented in film and television of the postwar era, revealed fissures in the 
façade of normalcy that pointed to a perceived weakness in the patriarchal structure of 
America.   The idea of computers exploiting a tear in the fabric of patriarchal dominance 
is engendered by a split in the way computers were described as limited in their capacity 
for creative thought.  This initial split between logical and creative thinking is, at first, a 
surprising intersection for a discussion of the gendered aspects of computer discourse.  
However as Sandra Harding points out, the division of labor is intrinsic to the 
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formulation of labor as either concrete or abstract.  Concrete labor is physical, embodied, 
and almost exclusively the work that men do not wish to do.262  Further, it is work that is 
largely made invisible by the necessity of its function—a support structure for the more 
abstract, conceptual mental work of men.  Alison Adam argues that this split results in 
the gendered positioning of artificial intelligence as masculine and disembodied.263   
Although this may be true for contemporary readings of technology, the historical 
discourse of computers as dependent and embodied objects suggests that the gendering of 
computers was often feminine, and this gendering played a role in reestablishing control 
over a frightening set of circumstances fore grounded by computer technology.   
Harding’s distinction between concrete and abstract work, with concrete work 
being feminine work, has as its expression parallels in the split between the work that is 
fit for humans, and that which should be left to computers.  The discourses that we have 
examined so far have sought to emphasize the differences in modes of thought, and have 
positioned the computer as a helper, not controller—a follower of orders (concrete), not 
the originator of commands (abstract).  But along with this assigned role, just beneath the 
surface of the discourse of control, lurked the anxiety of repressed surplus power that 
needed to be kept in check.  This surplus power, when linked metaphorically to (at least 
rudimentary) logic, presented early commentators with a mysterious combination of 
metaphorical association and stereotypes of feminine thought.   The idea that the inner 
workings of computers were sufficiently complex and nuanced to make an easy 
explanation of seeming inconsistency can be seen in the New York Times review of 
                                                 
262 From, Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives (Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press, 1991). 
263 Alison Adam, Artificial Knowing: Gender and the Thinking Machine (London: Routlege, 1998). 
149  
election night coverage in 1954:  “For several uncomfortable minutes the only 
explanation seemed to be that UNIVAC, though nominally sexless, was enough of a 
woman to have changed her mind.  Yes, insisted a C.B.S. spokesman, at 10:50 she had 
thought the Republicans would win the House after all.  At 11, she thought better.”264 
Forbidden Planet and the Machine as Helpmate 
In MGM’s 1956 science fiction film Forbidden Planet, directed by Fred M. 
Wilcox, we encounter the packaging of the existential anxieties concerning the status of 
the human mind in the computer age, along with a significant reflection on the ineffable 
power of human nature evidenced in the juxtaposition with machines.  On the one hand 
Forbidden Planet is a recasting of Shakespeare’s “The Tempest,” with Dr. Morbius 
(Walter Pidgeon) as Prospero and his daughter Altaira (Anne Francis) in the role of 
Miranda.  Miranda’s “What brave new world has such people in it” line is brought up to 
date and the heart of the matter stated clearly as “I’ve always so terribly wanted to meet a 
young man and now three of them at once!”  But the role of Prospero as the wronged 
philosopher king who works his magic in the spirit of revenge before softening in the 
face of his daughter’s love is complicated in the science fiction version of the story.  
Here, the psychic power of Morbius’ jealous protection of his daughter’s virtue is 
augmented by the artificial intelligence of the giant computer buried deep within the 
planet (this nameless computer represents Shakespeare’s Caliban, who is barely kept 
under control and who acts as signifier for the savage side of the human spirit). The 
resulting ‘monster from the id’ is Morbius’ repressed anger writ large: magnified by the 
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circuits in the electronic brain to monstrous proportions.  The consequences derived from 
this difference are significant in that what has changed in the telling of the story is the 
introduction of a technology designed to contain the minds of the former inhabitants of 
the planet, the Krell.  What Forbidden Planet proposes is a giant computer that, although 
lacking in a personality of its own, uses its power to augment the personality of Dr. 
Morbius who has learned some of the techniques needed to operate the machine. That is, 
the machine’s power is in its passive ability to magnify the already powerful 
subconscious desires of Morbius.  It is worth noting that it is Altaira’s barely contained 
sexuality that leads to the formation of the monster.  The potential loss of control or the 
exercising of repressed sexuality triggers an explosion of repressive force manifested in 
Morbius’ psychic projections.  
   On this level, the film works as an allegory for the rising abilities of computers in 
the early 1950s.  If the advanced technology developed by the Krell created a world 
where the minds of the Krell were augmented to the point of their own destruction in an 
orgy of violence (as Morbius reports), then the destructive potential of computers resides 
in their ability to enhance the powers of thought beyond the capacity of the human brain.  
The danger lies in the move toward ever increasing computational speeds.  If the 
computer is, metaphorically, an electronic brain capable of prodigious calculating feats, 
then the risk is in a failure to understand the nature of thought itself.  As we have seen, 
the issue surrounding the nature of consciousness and the redefinition of the nature of 
thought to preserve human uniqueness were already on shaky ground due to advances in 
computer technology and the metaphors used to describe it.  The faceless central 
computer of the Krell, capable of harnessing and magnifying Morbius’ unconscious rages 
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presented computers as ultimately uncontrollable forces when coupled with urges we do 
not understand.  Also, as an autonomously self-perpetuating and disembodied machine, 
the power of the central computer cannot be located or controlled and is independent of 
Morbius—acting only as a channel for his repressed urges.  As in Shakespeare, however, 
the central computer has its foil in the guise of another mysterious inhabitant of 
Prospero’s island.  In Forbidden Planet, the faceless central computer has its Robbie the 
Robot— a dependable Ariel to the unruly Caliban.   
Robbie represents the power of the Krell technology harnessed and diminished for 
the power of good, rather than the evil of the unconsciousness.  Robbie, built by Morbius 
from knowledge he’d acquired from the Krell memory banks, represents the wise 
husbanding of technology by a firm patriarchal hand.  The boundless and unbridled 
power unleashed by Morbius’ dreams and anxieties are, in his waking world, servants to 
his comfort, and a mothering caretaker for Altaira.  While at first glance, Robbie’s size 
and physical strength are daunting to the Commander and his crew, the uses of Robbie 
are quickly transferred to the domestic sphere, where we see Robbie fixing coffee, 
arranging flowers, and discussing dress patterns and ornamentation with the endlessly 
naive Altaira.  
The effect is a feminizing one—one that positions the robot within the domestic 
sphere as a surrogate mother—unquestioningly following orders and making life 
comfortable for her family.  It also pits the dependent/embodied version of computer 
technology against the much less controllable (and therefore more dangerous) 
autonomous/disembodied technology of the central computer.  The idea of the robotic  
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computer as the ultimate housewife is echoed in a New York Times discussion of the  
world of tomorrow envisioned by Alfred N. Goldsmith, “a consulting engineer who has 
played his part in the development of the phonograph, the motion picture, and radio 
communication in all its forms.”  Goldsmith, the article recounts, “would probably give 
us electrobots that at most can perform one or two tasks very well, such as sitting up with 
the baby, cooking and sewing,” and predicted that, “If you insist on having an electrobot 
that can scrub floors and add up 500 ten digit figures in a minute Dr. Goldsmith will let 
you buy it.”265   However, the New York Times noted in a previous article some years 
before, “Though all this goes far toward creating an automaton that will keep house and 
do simple cooking, the psychologists themselves point out that a twelve-year-old moron 
will have more real intelligence.”266  Positioning a computerized robot in the home does 
not mean that it takes a superior electronic brain to perform household functions, but 
rather the opposite, that because computers are actually stupid, the life of a housewife is 
appropriate labor.267   It’s worth noting that while engineers and writers and journalists 
spent their days envisioning computers into women, they spent the rest of their time 
envisioning women as automatons.   
That the housewife was replaceable as labor by robotic computers is only a small 
metaphorical leap for the fantasy writers of the 1950’s.  But the metaphor of the 
housewife as caretaker could be extended to the emotional labor of motherhood as well.  
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The 1962 episode of The Twilight Zone: “I Sing the Body Electric” (CBS, 1962), presents 
the mother as a replaceable commodity within the nuclear family.  The mother (who is 
not seen) has died, leaving behind a very busy husband and three despondent children.  
The father purchases an electronic grandmother to act as a surrogate for his wife and to 
raise his children.  The episode centers on a visit to the manufacturer to pick out the 
attributes the children want in their new relation.  The salesman takes them from display 
to display, showing them the individual components that will then be assembled into a 
grandmotherly form.  The female body is atomized for consumption—arms, hands, hair, 
eyes, torso—broken down as fetishized shapes.   
It is worth repeating that there is a conceptual difference between robots and 
computers that is germane to this discussion.  Throughout this project I have been 
concerned with images and impressions of computer technology, not robots, and it is 
important to distinguish between the two.  Robots, as embodied automatons, are 
presences that replace or replicate the physical properties of humans.  As such, robots 
emphasize the physical over the mental state of being as the body in the Cartesian duality 
of mind/body.  The computer, as an object, is much more abstract and is most often 
represented as a bodiless presence—a cube or slab, with no real insight into its inner 
workings other than some flashing lights.  The computer is, much more often than not, 
faceless.  It is this facelessness that makes computers at once inscrutable and arresting 
and allows the viewer to project a rich set of emotions and thoughts onto an otherwise 
blank canvas (for example, HAL’s ‘eye’ in 2001: A Space Odyssey).  The use of robots to 
represent femininity has, I believe, more in common with the fetishization of the female 
form as a compliant servant for male desire.  Computers could and were depicted as 
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female in a way that emphasized inscrutability and difference, or for comedic effect.    
The Krel computer (underground, chthonian, impassive) is more interesting for 
our purposes in that the explicitly underground nature of the machine emphasizes its 
inscrutable nature and uncontrollability.  As a repository for intellect, the Krel computer 
is almost infinitely large, its physical presence fading into the distance and into the depths 
of the planet’s interior.  With this nearly infinite capacity for ‘thought’ comes an equally 
large potential for unconscious desire, anger, and dread.  If the Krel Computer is a tool to 
accommodate Morbius’ mind grown grotesquely large, his psychological problems 
remain just as primal and are magnified with equal dispassion by the machine. In this 
way, Forbidden Planet offers a critique that is less about the dehumanizing aspects of 
technology, and more an examination of the effects of humanity on machines.  The Krel 
computer is equally adept at good or evil, and so requires a strong hand to guide its use.  
The instability and unresolved sexual tension that comprise Morbius’ interior landscape 
disqualifies him as a competent patriarch and leads to his (and the planet’s) destruction.  
The planet Altair, for all its promise, ends up as a ‘Forbidden’ place as a metaphor for 
Morbius’ unconscious desire for his daughter and his hermetic megalomania.  This 
disorder, magnified by the computer, is what must be brought under control through the 
narrative. The Krel computer is qualitatively different from the more acceptable, useful, 
and domesticated Robbie (as his friendly name suggests).  The computer’s ambiguity 
represents the chaotic realm of out-of-control desire. 
Desk Set: The Computer as Surrogate Female 
Computers did not always take the shape of women, however, to function within 
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the feminine space of the male imagination. The 1957, 20th Century Fox production Desk 
Set represents the computer as an object no less threatening than the room-sized machines 
that dwarfed the human engineers at the beginning of the decade.  In Forbidden Planet, 
Robbie’s robot form did help in representing him within the domestic sphere as a helper 
and feminine character (his facility in cooking, sewing and dress-making helped as well).  
The computer of Desk Set represented computer femininity without the obvious trappings 
of hearth and home, but by its construction within the traditional female space of office 
and clerical work.  Desk Set opens famously with an acknowledgment of IBM’s support 
in the making of the film.  Less famous, but more interesting is the initial set design for 
the opening credits of computer equipment laid out on a Piet Mondrian influenced floor 
painted with a grid of lines and blocks of color.  The cool intellectualism of Mondrain, 
juxtaposed with the computer equipment presents us, at a glimpse, with how we will be 
asked to contextualize the computer for the duration of the film—as an icon of modernity 
that is part of the contemporary landscape and as an object that signifies the 
contemporary world of style as well as of technological change.  The emphasis on style 
was promoted by the studio as a tie-in with department stores, with the co-stars of the 
film and their costumes on display at the Hecht department store in Washington D.C.268  
The computer “EMERAC” (“Emmy,” for short) is decidedly gendered and is referred to 
by her handlers (Spencer Tracy and Neva Patterson) as “she.”  The plot of the film 
revolves around efficiency expert Richard Sumner’s (Tracy) introduction of the computer 
into the research library of a large newspaper.  The head of the research department, 
Bunny Watson (Katharine Hepburn) pointedly exposes the limitations of Sumner’s 
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automation mindset, and also, his machine, while the two (predictably) fall in love.  Run 
by the cold, asexual Miss Warringer (Neva Patterson,) Watson and her research staff 
believe the EMERAC was designed to replace them.   “Emmy” parallels the true-to-life 
corollary ‘ERMA’ (Electronic Recording Method of Accounting), the automated check 
processing system introduced in 1956 for Bank of America.  The ERMA system was seen 
as a major step forward in the automation of clerical work, cutting check processing 
times and the clerical staff necessary for routine tasks.269  Like ERMA, EMERAC is 
represented as a source of technological unemployment that resonates topically with the 
anxieties of 1957.   
Sylvia (Dina Merrill): Well if we do get canned we won’t be the 
only ones to lose their jobs because of a machine.  
Ruthie (Sue Randall): I understand thousands of people are being 
replaced by these electronic brains. 
Bunny: Frightening, Gave me the feeling that maybe, just maybe 
people were a little bit outmoded.”  
Sumner: Wouldn’t surprise me a bit if they stopped making them. 
 
The film is designed as a study in contrasts, with the vivacious women of the 
research department juxtaposed with the blinkered purposefulness of Warringer and the 
single-minded Sumner.  Where the women of the office represent life in all its random 
and chaotic connections between text and context (including Bunny’s immense and many 
tendrilled ivy that snakes chaotically through her office), the crew responsible for the 
EMERAC is bound to narrow-minded reason that can’t see past the facts to the 
                                                 
269 The story of ERMA and the promise of office automation was celebrated in David Oakes Woodbury, 
Let Erma Do It: The Full Story of Automation, 1st ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956). 
157  
connections that they have to the flesh and blood world.270  At the film’s climax, the 
women have all been given pink slips (as has everyone in the company by the 
hyperactive EMERAC) and Miss Warringer is left alone to field research questions with 
her beloved computer.  As her nerves fray, so does EMERAC, leaving Bunny to rally the 
women with the charge “Let’s show them what real women can do!”  Bunny and her staff 
restore order out of EMERAC’s chaos, and Miss Warringer is escorted away from the 
scene.   Ironically, the computer, by taking an instruction literally, begins spewing out 
lines from Rose Hartwick Thorpe’s “Curfew Must Not Ring Tonight,” a poem 
concerning a woman’s successful attempt to forestall the fate of her beloved by 
physically stopping a bell from ringing—interrupting a technological process in order to 
short circuit a system.  Bunny continues to recite the poem as she and her team rightly 
interpret the request by relying on their tacit knowledge and experience.  Tacit 
knowledge, as Susanna Zuboff discusses, is a method of preserving one’s identity in the 
face of the standardization that accompanies, and is the prerequisite for, technological 
systems.271  The tacit knowledge Bunny displays is her mastery of creative, human, 
thought.  
At first, this appears to be a victory for the power of human femininity over the 
cold logic of the calculating machine.  But as the film ends, with Emerac malfunctioning 
yet again, Bunny’s hairpin is used to restore the machine to a normal operating state.  The 
machine is not removed, rather the machine and the feminine reach a sort of détente, with 
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the paternalistic Sumner enfolding Bunny in an embrace before the quiescent machine.  
The engineer who is the new controlling figure in the research department (and an 
archetypal ‘organization man’) makes both ‘women’ quiet.  As Bunny coos lovingly to 
Sumner, EMERAC hoots contentedly.  Rather than casting Bunny’s victory over the 
machine as a declaration of the intrinsic superiority of the women over the computer, and 
over the repressive order that brings automation to the forefront at the cost of less 
quantifiable human needs and desires, the two are equalized and positioned as two 
complementary opposites—tools used to perform the tasks too trivial for the dreamy 
engineer.   The conflation of the women in the research department (and women in 
general) and the computer was not lost on the reviewer from Time magazine:  
At long last, somebody has a kind word for the girls in the research 
department. The word: one of those electronic brains could do the 
job much better and with less back chat—and what's more, it 
would free the girls' energies for the more important job of getting 
a man.[…] 
But the real star of the show is Emmy. What red blooded movie 
going male will be able to resist the seductive lisp with which she 
murmurs pocketa, and ever so tenderly, queep? Indeed, what 
husband will not yearn for a female he can shut up, simply by not 
asking questions?272   
 
Desk Set is a fable of symbiosis between men, women, and computers that 
presents an updated utopian tableau to the dystopic vision of Fritz Lang’s Metropolis 
(UFA, 1927).  It is hard to overestimate the significance of Lang’s film to discourses on 
automation, robots, technology, and the effects of modernity on social conditions.  Lang’s 
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story of technological imprisonment, where faceless proles toil underground to support 
the rarified edenic world of the managerial class, is iconic in its expressionistic 
representation of technology as monolithic and forbidding.  However sanitized the 
politics of Desk Set in comparison with Lang’s dystopia, there are certain similarities 
between both films in their representation of the engineer, woman, machine triumvirate.   
It is, ultimately, the engineer (though temporarily misguided) who is restored to his 
position of authority after a malfunctioning machine threatens the social order.  In both 
cases, it is the woman (Maria/Bunny) who is instrumental in restoring order, and is 
perfectly willing to remain a junior partner in the business of progress.   
Overtly female gendered computers were not often as obvious as the 1964 
Twilight Zone episode “From Agnes with Love” (CBS, 1964), featuring Wally Cox as 
James Elwood, a prototype computer nerd who is the object of a computer’s affections. 
The computer, ‘AGNES’ is represented as a large, room-sized array of flashing lights and 
whirring tapes that towers above Elwood, diminishing him with her presence.  Through 
the course of the episode we realize that ‘she’ is in love with Elwood and is manipulating 
him to monopolize his attention.  AGNES is presented as coy and contrary, functioning 
only when she is in the mood.  Her programming and logic remain mysterious as she 
eventually drives Elwood mad.  As he is led away at the end of the episode, he warns his 
replacement not to fall for her feminine wiles and is dismissed as crazy.  The viewer is 
left with the distinct impression that AGNES is a femme fatale, using men and destroying 
them. Much like the protagonist in a noir film of the 1940’s, Wally Cox is led to his 
demise by an unhealthy attachment to a mysterious female.  As Rod Serling intones at the 
episode’s close: "Advice to all future male scientists: be sure you understand the opposite 
160  
sex, especially if you intend being a computer expert. Otherwise, you may find yourself, 
like poor Elwood, defeated by a jealous machine, a most dangerous sort of female, whose 
victims are forever banished—to the Twilight Zone." 
Episodes of The Twilight Zone tended to focus on robots rather than computers in 
matters of artificial intelligence.  Episodes like “The Mighty Casey” (CBS, 1960), “The 
Lonely” (CBS, 1959), or “The Lateness of the Hour” (CBS, 1960) asked viewers to 
empathize with robots as doomed to a sort of lesser humanity.  Twilight Zone episodes 
almost always turned on a plot twist at the end of the episode to bring an added sense of 
irony to the story.  The idea of technological unemployment was taken up on the show, 
with an ironic twist providing a caution to those who would rush automation at the 
expense of workers. In “The Brain Center at Whipples” (CBS, 1964), Whipple, the owner 
of a manufacturing firm, seeks to modernize and introduces machines to replace workers.  
The ironic conclusion of his actions result in not only his workers being replaced, but 
Whipple is replaced by the machine as well.   
Twilight Zone episodes that feature computers are significantly fewer but, like the 
episodes that feature robots, present the computers in a somewhat sympathetic light.  
Logic and madness are still polarities of human/machine difference, but in The Twilight 
Zone, it is the computer that can be compassionate in the face of insanity.  In the 1963 
episode, “The Old Man in the Cave” (CBS, 1963) the computer (personified as the old 
man of the title) is credited with keeping the community alive by determining what food 
is safe to eat after a nuclear war has all but destroyed civilization.  The villagers are 
rallied to destroy the computer by the leader of a squad of soldiers, who goads them by  
161  
revealing that they have given up their free will to a machine.  Once the machine is 
destroyed, the villagers freely consume the food the computer has marked as tainted.  
Poisoned by the food the computer warned them against, all the villagers die.  This ironic 
twist to the episode suggests that a technological brain may be best suited to navigating 
the dangers created by technology, and that the relationship between humans and 
machines have progressed past the point where we can simply function by turning them 
off.   
As computers and women were presented on equal footing in the service of men 
and their families, speculation on the future of homemaking presented a symbiotic 
relationship between women and computers. In the early 60’s, The New York Times 
reported that the 21st century home would likely include computer technology, but not in 
the form that we have in fact become accustomed to.  The modern household computer 
would “select the daily menu, program cooking, cleaning and laundry chores, locate 
family members and remind mother of dentist appointments.  The device should free the 
family for more creative work and play than we experience today.”  The benefits for 
women were obvious.  The “computer would free a woman to spend half her day 
preparing an exotic evening meal at which many foods would be tasted and consumed 
over a three-hour period.”273   
The diminished role of computers in the hands of women, though not reflective of 
the reality of women in the computer industry, was emphasized by reporters writing 
about women and computers with a sense of irony and deprecation.  Female engineers 
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were presented as cute, feminine, and the juxtaposition between female softness and hard 
(if not outright phallic) technology was emphasized.  As the New York Times described a 
woman engineer: “Bessy Sheng is a slight young woman with a voice as soft as a kitten’s 
cry.  But when she gives orders, a $350,000 machine sits up and obeys. Miss Sheng is a 
gentle rebuttal to the theory that brains are a harmful commodity for a female to 
possess.”274  The article goes on to describe her work by explaining, “Miss Sheng must 
cope with a wide range of problems.  A recent assignment took her to Wilmington Del. to 
program a powder-puff air derby.”275  Femininity and feminine pursuits were highlighted 
in proximity with computers, though one cannot help thinking that Miss Sheng’s male 
counterparts didn’t spend their time writing programs for powder-puff derbies.  As 
coverage of the 1952 presidential election was reviewed and reported, the computer in 
use at NBC, the “Monrobot” (in answer to CBS’s use of the UNIVAC) was less 
interesting than the woman chosen to operate it.  “Burkhart, who had received a doctor’s 
degree from NBC press agents, even compensated for his machine’s comparatively 
unimpressive appearance.  He arranged to have it operated by Marilyn Mason (also 
awarded a press agent’s doctorate), a beauteous brunette mathematician now known 
among her Prudential Insurance Co. associates as Marilyn Monrobot.”276  Mason’s 
experience as a mathematician was also sublimated to her appearance and was less 
important than her hair.   Marilyn Mason may not have held a doctorate (although she 
was granted one by NBC for her appearance on election night) legitimate doctors were 
not much better off in the way they were represented in the media.  Dr. Frances Bauer, 
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for example, was a pioneer in computer engineering and the creation of artificial 
intelligence. When she was interviewed in 1955, however, the emphasis was on 
describing the appeal of her work and the desirability of a career in computers for young 
women, “the opportunity for marriage is excellent—I met my husband in the Brown 
graduate school,”277 reminding women to keep their eyes on their domestic affairs.  The 
emphasis on traditional women’s roles evinced by these articles obscures the sometimes 
progressive attitudes companies had toward women employed in the early computer 
industry.  For example, writing about her experiences as a programmer and project 
manager for the Eckert-Mauchly Computer Corporation from 1950-1954, Adele Mildred 
Koss describes an atmosphere surprisingly lacking in overt gender bias.  In a period 
where women were expected to give up their careers for the sake of child rearing, Koss 
relates her experiences with flexible scheduling, working from home, and maternity 
leave, as well as an environment where women held management positions over men.  
Although her experience, as she relates it, was seemingly not unique, at least at EMCC, 
news and feature articles written about women in the computer industry had a decidedly 
different focus and approach to their material.278  
By casting computer systems as dependent systems, writers were able to ground 
the technology as metaphorically linked to earlier technologies that were ultimately seen 
as appendages to human drives and will. By emphasizing the physicality of the systems, 
the metaphysical possibilities of thought were minimized and the machine embodied as a 
concrete artifact that, though at times awesomely large, was finite where its mathematical 
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potential was not.  This finitude allowed the technology to be re-encompassed within the 
human mind as something real, not imagined.  Further, the reality of the systems could be 
linked to the domestic, prosaic world of the everyday—a mundane condition as drab as a 
housewife’s existence.  The chain of metaphors produced a set of inferences that were 
enjoined rather than linear.  The modality of this metaphor cluster was a reinforcing 
plexus of ideas that generated anxieties of difference that could be assuaged within the 
cluster itself.  The writers on computer technology in the 1950s produced a frisson of 
anxiety and then, through a linguistic slight of hand, corralled the surplus excitement into 
a discourse that reinforced traditional masculinity and the taming of new frontiers.  
Short Industrial and Educational Films 
Early reportage and media interpretations of computer technology hinged upon an 
underlying anxiety concerning the status of these new machines as challenges to accepted 
notions of human (specifically male) consciousness. As writers moved to interpret the 
significance of the new technology, they did it against a backdrop pre-populated with 
anxieties about the cold war, gender roles, and nuclear apocalypse.  Attempts to frame 
early computer technology sought to place it within preexisting categories of difference.  
By enframing computers as monstrous and sublime, writers on technology created an 
additional category of anxiety that they then sought to manage by re-categorizing 
computers as childlike, subservient, and feminine.  These metaphors resonated within the 
popular imagination to create a world of emerging technology that could function both as 
wondrous and commonplace.  The emphasis of the metaphors used to construct a 
discourse on computers was one of control.  The threat posed by computer technology, 
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though in some cases fancifully represented, reflected a genuine concern toward the 
function of human thought, consciousness and labor as projected into an uncertain future.   
As feminine or childlike metaphors were central to placing computers into a 
context that was more manageable and less threatening, short industrial and educational 
films were also produced to explain computer technologies to lay audiences.  The 
American design team of Ray and Charles Eames likely produced more industrial and 
educational short films on the subject of computers than any other filmmakers in the post-
war period. Starting in the early 1950’s the Eames’ explored information theory, 
mathematics, and computers as objects of aesthetic appreciation and wonder and 
attempted to explain the basic concepts behind complex machines and ways of 
representing information.  Beginning in 1953 with A Communications Primer, a short 
film very much in their consistent style of educational filmmaking with visual elements 
taken from close-up photography, typography, animation, and unusual camera angles 
with a voice-over explaining the abstract, technical concept of Claude Shannon’s 
communication process (source, transmission, signal, channel, receiver, decoded, 
destination and noise).  This film, though not explicitly about computers, did serve to 
illustrate the ideas surrounding information as atomistic elements that could be broken 
down into discrete steps that were at the heart of digital computing.  
The Eames’ most fruitful relationship in terms of filmmaking came under the 
patronage of IBM. Prior to their involvement with the Eames design house, IBM’s 
Military Products division had produced the 1956 film On Guard as an advertisement for 
its work on the SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) air defense system.   
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IBM’s work in providing the hardware for the SAGE system is highlighted in the film, 
juxtaposing shots of computer hardware, airplanes and missiles, and children playing to 
emphasize the central role IBM played in keeping American children safe.  Here the 
computer is part of a larger benevolent network of industry and the military dedicated to 
the protection of the cold-war homeland in what is clearly an advertisement of IBM’s 
power.  But from 1958 through the early 1970’s, Charles and Ray Eames made a series of 
short educational films that were considerably more subtle than the overt propaganda of 
On Guard.   The Eames films use the couple’s unique design sense to convey the beauty 
of IBM’s machines as small worlds of their own, and to illustrate the simplicity of the 
concepts underlying computer science.  
In 1958, The Information Machine (Man and the Data Processor), accompanied 
by the music of Elmer Bernstein (a collaborator on many of the Eames’ short films), the 
Eames’ presented an animated short considering the history of decision making based 
upon accurate and timely access to information.  The film equates human 
conceptualization, decision making, and memory with analogous electronic computer 
components.  The Information Machine was produced for the IBM pavilion at the 1958 
World’s Fair in Brussels, Belgium.  The IBM Mathematics Peep Shows (1961) were a 
part of IBM’s exhibitions at the California Museum of Science and Industry and the 
Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago.  Each two minute film was intended to 
illustrate a single mathematical concept with the intention of expressing mathematics as a 
series of discrete concepts that, when broken down, could be expressed simply, and in 
IBM’s case, electronically.  These films were incorporated into the multimedia shorts  
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exhibited by IBM at the 1965 New York World’s Fair.  
While IBM At the Fair (1965) consisted of a time-elapse montage of the IBM 
pavilion (also designed by Ray and Charles Eames) for the 1965 World’s Fair in New 
York, A Computer Glossary (or, Coming to Terms With the Data Processing Machine) 
(1968) sought to describe the computer by explaining the inner workings of a computer 
using highly technical jargon.  The effect is tongue-in-cheek obscurity.  The jargon is 
then translated with the use of simple animations to demystify the machine by explaining 
the computer using common language and using flow charts and decision trees in parallel 
with a man waking up and preparing for his day (shaving, having breakfast, etc.).  
Thematically, this film is much like 1953’s A Communications Primer, but with an 
emphasis on the cutting-edge technologies of IBM.   The Eames relationship with IBM 
allowed the computer manufacturer the opportunity to present their technology in a 
wholly favorable light, and in the best possible context for the company. Many of the 
Eames films were commissioned expressly for IBM sales and demonstration pavilions at 
various world’s fairs throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s.  The environment of the fair, 
with its emphasis on technological and manufacturing marvels, showcased IBM’s cutting 
edge technologies while emphasizing the wonders of a technological future.  As Robert 
Rydell discusses, the function of modern world’s fairs was to instill a utopian sense of 
wonder in the mind of the spectator, and to reinforce the teleological view of an ordered, 
ever improving vision of continuity and moral uplift.279  The function of these 
educational films was to place computers into the mainstream of technological 
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advancement, and to ground it within a Western tradition of technological determinism.  
In this way, computers were not intrinsically different from any other technology.   
Other educational films of note from the early 1960’s include Logic by Machine 
(Computer and the Mind of Man) (National Educational Television 1965).  This film 
(with music by the avant-garde composer Morton Subotnick) was produced through a 
grant from IBM as the first part of a series of films on computers produced by KQED San 
Francisco for National Educational Television (NET) the forerunner of PBS.  Logic by 
Machine is similar to the Eames’ film, The Information Machine, but dully and 
dispassionately narrated by mathematicians as talking heads.  Providing an educational 
look at mathematical logic and its translation into machine language, Logic by Machine 
had none of the hyperbole or scare tactics of contemporary filmic representations of 
machines.  In this account of computers, the machines are always in the service of human 
inquiry, and the idea that computers have abilities that outstrip human reason are simply 
not entertained.  
Also of note is 1960’s The Thinking Machine (CBS/Carousel Films), narrated by 
David Wayne and broadcast as part of the CBS Tomorrow series emphasized the more 
sensational aspects of computerization that fit more with the breathless accounts of 
anxiety producing machines than with the measured approach of the Eames’ films.  
Wayne presents examples of computers playing checkers (and winning), learning to 
follow instructions, and writing an episode for a television western, punctuating each 
sequence with a pause to reflect on his rhetorical questions like “Is man obsolete?” and 
“Can we stop machines from taking over?”  The program included a lengthy interview  
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with MIT computer engineer Dr. Jerome Wiesner, who acted to dispel the myths and 
fears that Wayne proposed.   
While Wiesner was busy trying to convince viewers that computers were not 
‘thinking machines’ regardless of the program’s title, his colleague and counterpart at 
MIT, Norbert Wiener, was making frightening headlines by stating that machines were 
fast approaching a point where they would be beyond the control of their human creators. 
“Thinking Machines Could Enslave, Even Destroy Man, Scientist Warns,” reported the 
Washington Post280, even though the content of Wiener’s talk as reported said nothing of 
enslavement.  Headlines and stories like The Los Angeles Times’ “Man Called Future 
Slave of Machine,”281 kept the idea of enslavement to machines alive. The sensationalism 
of the computer as existential threat constantly competed with educational attempts to 
provide a less hysterical view of computers as prosaic, but nonetheless interesting 
objects.  
The Childlike Machine 
Understanding the machines in terms of their limited capabilities precluded seeing 
them as a threat in the short-tem.  This emphasis on the limitations of computer 
technology was an almost constant companion to the descriptions of computers as 
accelerated thinking machines.  However impressive the new devices were, press releases 
were quick to add, as in this initial War Department press release from 1946, that 
“Sponsors of the ENIAC point out that it can carry out numerous ‘logical’ operations but 
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that it cannot do creative thinking.”282   Although the capabilities of the Mark II computer 
were touted as extraordinary, Time magazine found it necessary to add “the machine’s 
range of acceptance is strictly limited.  It cannot examine a field and a pretty girl, and 
conclude from the data available which would be more worth cultivating.”283  Or, the 
more highbrow variant:  
If there were a robot that could respond to beauty, it would make no 
distinction between a landscape and a Ninon de Lenclos.  All these 
automata must do what they are told to do.  Always there must be an 
order—a perforated ribbon or card, a magnetic strip, a stretch of light-
sensitive film, some external stimulus.  So there is no danger of man’s 
being conquered by his own mechanical creations, whatever Samuel 
Butler may have thought.284    
 
The computer’s calculating abilities may have outstripped the average man’s but men 
knew what to do with a woman!  The relative impotence of the computer, while on the 
one hand gendering the computer as male, presents its maleness in a stunted or 
diminished form.  The emasculating of robots is, of course, a popular trope in science 
fiction film: Star Wars’ (20th Century Fox, 1977) C3P0, Bruce Dern’s robot helpers in 
Silent Running, (Universal, 1970), the effeminate robot butlers of Woody Allen’s Sleeper 
(United Artists, 1973).  However, the 1970’s and 80’s also brought us hypersexualized 
computers: Demon Seed (MGM/United Artists, 1977), Saturn 3 (Associated Film 
Distribution, 1980), hypermasculine ones: Westworld (MGM, 1973), as well as 
hypersexualized and hypermasculine ones: Blade Runner (Warner Brothers, 1982).  
Concurrent with discourses of power and superiority, early computers were 
described as infantile and childish.  Going hand-in-hand with threatening speed of 
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electronic computers was a sense that the perceived intelligence of the machines, in as 
much as it was seen to have existed at all, was naïve, childish, and simple.  The 
identification of computers with children is, on one level, an extension of the metaphor of 
the engineer/scientist as creator—using his intellectual power to mimic or supplant the 
biological process of giving birth that is marked as feminine.  The masculine intellect and 
powers of masculine reason can perform the miracle of creation—appropriating the 
power of the feminine and maintaining the primacy of masculine work over feminine 
labor.  Reports of advancements in new technology appropriated the rhetorical flourishes 
of parenthood and the announcement of a new generation of computer often sounded 
more like birth announcements: “They’ve named him Whirlwind One.  At birth he’s 
faster, his proud parents say, than any of his older relatives.”285 
 If scientists and engineers give birth to new technologies, then it is hardly 
surprising to interpret these technologies through the language of childhood development.  
Waldemar Kaempffert, writing in the New York Times, described the engineers’ 
rationalization of the birth metaphor by explaining that “one scientist excused the absence 
of a colleague, the inventor of a new robot, with the explanation that ‘he just couldn’t 
bear to leave the machine at home alone,’ just as if it were a baby.”286   In another article, 
aptly titled, “Care and Feeding of Robots,” the author describes the principle engineer on 
the project as the new computer’s “constant companion.  He supervised its birth and 
nursed it through infancy.  Now, with his associate, Ralph Slutz, a scientist of Princeton’s 
Institute for Advanced Study, and an eager young staff of 50 young scientists and 
                                                 
285 R.B. Cole, "Whirlwind One: Speediest Electronic Brain," Science Digest, February 1952, 92. 
286 Waldemar Kaempffert, "Science in Review-Machines That 'Think' Arouse Some Thoughts at Institute of 
Electrical Engineers," New York Times, February 6 1949, E11. 
172  
technicians, he attends its growing pains.”287 
Of course, as computers are born, so do they mature, and the terms used to 
describe computers reflect the language used to describe childhood development.  
Norbert Wiener was reported as seeing “no reason why they can’t learn from experience, 
like monstrous and precocious children racing through grammar school,”288 in a Time 
magazine article titled “In Man’s Image.”  The title acts to encapsulate the full weight of 
the metaphor of man as creator with godlike overtones, while Wiener’s image of the 
computer is from a decidedly paternalistic vantage.  The computers are presented as 
learning as children do, in fits and starts, and as capricious at times: “The student put to 
the test at the University of Illinois was 8 ½ ft. tall, 10 ft. wide at the shoulders, and 
packed with green-faced cathode-ray tubes and little red neon lights,” Time reports, “like 
other electronic computers, ORDVAC is comparatively tongue-tied—like a bright child 
that won’t show off before company.”289  Meanwhile, Newsweek states that “whining like 
a spoiled child, the machine went about its work.  Yet five minutes later, for all its 
complaining, it had performed 500,000 additions, 200,000 multiplications, and 300,000 
other mathematical operations—a job that would have taken an expert mathematician 
many months.”290  The capriciousness of the computer didn’t undercut the power of the 
machine on the one hand, but allowed the computer to be reframed in a way that had a 
metaphorical resonance with the practical experiences of parenting.  The potential of the 
new technology preserves the importance of paternal control, naturally in the hands of an 
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enlightened father, who’s task is to guide a youth toward a respectable position in the 
social order.  When handled with a firm, paternalistic hand, a computer like the 
“MANIAC, now 9, is constantly showing how it can be an ever more useful member of 
adult society.”291 
The controlling metaphors of computer technology were used to position the new 
technology within the realm of the familiar social order, with the image of the benevolent 
father proudly bragging about the intelligence and athleticism of his progeny while 
indulgently marking its shortcomings as youthful folly.  The effect was to allow the male 
observer of the emerging technology to take a vicarious pride in the achievements of the 
engineers while not taking the threat to his manhood too seriously.  Or, as James 
Newman, writing in the New Republic, put it: “fears of mechanical calculators are, of 
course, nonsense. However brilliant the future of the electronic calculator, it will remain, 
except for specialized talents, zany in comparison with a half-witted boy of eight.”292 
This paternalism was necessary within the logic of the discourse of childlike 
machines.  In the same way that computers were presented as infantile and in need of 
instruction, early computers were also presented as requiring guidance to be of any use at 
all.  Here the controlling metaphors shift from the childlike to the decidedly inferior 
based upon their very structure.  Machines were naturalized as anthropomorphic figures 
bearing an uncanny, though predictable, resemblance to their creators.  The metaphors 
that emerged in the discussion on the status of computers as thinking machines, delivered 
another uncanny set of resemblances to past debates on the status of others as rational 
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creatures.  
Computers as Slaves 
The ontological status of thought in computers marked their existence as beings 
fit for consideration.  “Does SWAC really think? The answer depends upon your idea of 
what thinking consists of.  Robots like SWAC are really slaves in the way that they carry 
out instructions to the letter, and no more,”293 considers the New York Times as it works 
through this question in 1950.  The Reader’s Digest stretches the metaphor further by 
remarking that: “so many different kinds of mechanical slaves are being perfected that 
engineers now qualify for degrees in them; three technical magazines have recently 
begun publication to keep the mechanical slave trade up to date.”294  The idea of 
computers as slaves seems to have found a ready-made niche to occupy allowing racial 
arguments from the previous century to be recast in modern terms.  The discourse hinged 
on the idea of difference and sameness and the difficulty to be had in reconciling the two.  
If we say that machines think, what effect does that have on our status as the lone rational 
thinking entities on the planet? If in fact they are capable of performing tasks that we 
currently describe as thinking, what makes us different and therefore maintains our 
position as unique and privileged?  As Stuart Chase concludes, “The 701 and his brothers 
and cousins also store memories and learn from experience; [...] their power to imitate 
this function of the brain gives them the right to be called “machines that think.”295  And 
“[Norbert] Weiner believes that the human brain resembles a computing machine—and 
                                                 
293 "New Robot 'Brain' Cuts War Figuring," 21. 
294 Ira Wolfert, "What's Behind This Word 'Automation'," The Reader's Digest, May 1955, 43. 
295 Chase, 144. 
175  
vice versa.  Dr. Warren McCulloch, professor of psychiatry at the University of Illinois 
College of Medicine, goes further: he says that the brain is actually a computer, and very 
like the computers built by men.”296  Here, the ontological presence of thought is not in 
itself a deciding difference between humans and machines.  The determining factor 
becomes not thought, but how much thought, and what kind.  “McCulloch, a 
physiologist, pointed out that the electronic counterpart of a human brain would be about 
as big as the Empire State Building and would require for its “thinking” and other 
activities all the electricity that Niagara Falls could generate.”297  This way of visualizing 
though as brain power suggests the sublime reading of computers as capable of 
astronomical calculations pales in comparison to the power of the human brain. As 
Kaempffert concludes, “a comparison like that is the most flattering comparison that can 
be paid to the ingenuity that nature showed in designing the human brain.”298  Warren 
McCulloch’s observation of the relative abilities of computers was intended to put the 
machines into perspective and to attempt to move the terms of discussion away from a 
metaphysics of thought that posited a mind as distinct from the brain it occupies.  For 
McCulloch, human thought was ultimately reducible to a set of electro-chemical 
processes that could be imitated through mechanical means, though current technology 
would make a construction with the capacity of a human brain impossible. McCulloch 
posited that there were no qualitative differences in thought between humans and 
machines, only quantitative ones.  The difference becomes apparent in orders of 
magnitude: “A calculating machine with 10,000 tubes can be compared in intelligence 
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with a flatworm.” 299  The measure of the machine can be taken through analogous 
comparisons through the taxonomy of the animal kingdom, with the human brain 
working feverously at the top.  For McCulloch the eventual eclipsing of humans by 
computers was simply a matter of time, despite their relative primitive or underdeveloped 
nature. 
The upshot of this argument was that there remained certain types of thought that 
computers simply couldn’t do.  Computer’s couldn’t ‘reason’ or think creatively.   As 
Time magazine reported for their cover story on the MARK III, Howard Aiken (who was 
instrumental in the development of the MARK I, MARK II and MARK III computers) 
stated: “machines show, in rudimentary form at least, all the attributes of human thinking 
except one: imagination.  Aiken cannot define imagination, but he is sure that it exists 
and that no machine, however clever, is likely to have any.300  
 Aiken emphasized the difference between human minds and computers.  A 
machine, because of the intrinsic capabilities of the human mind for imaginative or 
creative thought, could not cross the frontier of consciousness.  J. Presper Eckert, The co-
developer of the ENIAC “disclaimed the idea that Binac, UNIVAC, or any other of the 
automatic computers now operating or being planned would be capable of intuitive or 
creative thought,”301 and the New Yorker opined “Their only advantage over the human 
mind has been in speed and accuracy.  They’ve never generalized from past events, as we 
do, and the ability to generalize is an important factor in learning.”302   Although Stuart 
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Chase calculated his sense of inferiority in the face of a machine that was 100,000 times 
his better, he also concluded “they will become more clever, rapid and useful in 
answering more kinds of questions.  But that is all they can do with questions.  They will 
never be able to ask one.303 
The opposite of creative thought, however logical, was a slavish devotion to 
orders that necessitated the continued role of master in the human computer relationship. 
As a reporter for Newsweek commented: “Although the experts use words like 
“memory,” they don’t like to hear their machines described as “brains.”  The mechanical 
computers have no creative ability; they merely follow instructions.”304  A writer for 
Science News Letter concurred: “They lack reason and cannot do what man endowed 
with reason can do, namely, screen sense from nonsense and make decisions from 
inadequate or even incorrect data. […] It is, therefore, “unthinkable” that they could ever 
outstrip and enslave man by their intellectual power, as some admirers of the electronic 
mechanisms have predicted.”305  More than a decade separates these two comments.  
What is surprising is the survivability of the anxiety that computers are destined to rule 
the world, and that it is creativity and reason that keep us afloat. 
Captain Kirk and the Meta-Solution   
As the 1960’s progressed, computers became more of an expected part of the 
high-tech landscape as portrayed on television and were used freely wherever 
calculations were needed.  The popular spy drama The Man from U.N.C.L.E. featured a 
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prominently placed computer that was integral to the agency’s success against their 
nemesis, THRUSH (a global syndicate dedicated to the enslavement of the world).  A 
cold war in miniature was played out in the episode, “The Ultimate Computer Affair,” 
(1965) when THRUSH seemed on the verge of developing a supercomputer that would 
outclass the U.N.C.L.E. computer, underlining the importance of maintaining supremacy 
in data processing ability.  This ability was routinely parodied in the Batman television 
series, with the “Bat-computer” routinely answering real-language questions with often 
oblique, terse replies printed on index cards.  The bat-computer’s answers to queries were 
often about as revealing as fortune-cookie fortunes, but were always immensely helpful 
to Batman in cracking the case.  In these television series, the computers were safely 
delegated to the role of helper and not portrayed as a threat. However fanciful their 
interfaces and the ability to process real language queries, the UNCLE and Bat-
computers kept to their assigned roles.  If they had any misgivings or feelings of 
superiority toward their human minders, they kept their thoughts to themselves.  They 
were symbols of a level of technological sophistication that was comforting in the face of 
criminal masterminds and global conspiracies.   
The representation of computers as childlike, that is, not masters of syllogistic 
logic, but merely novices, acted as a countermeasure to a sense of inadequacy in the face 
of technology.  This representation was prevalent in cinematic representations of 
computer technology in the 1950’s and 1960’s.  The machine’s slavish devotion to 
logical operations based on all-inclusive statements and binary set rules proves its 
undoing in many films and television programs of the era.  The plots of films as disparate 
as 1956’s Desk Set, and 2001: A Space Odyssey turn on the difference between humans 
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and computers as one of operational logic and a flexible interpretation of reality as multi-
faceted and open to interpretation.  
As the use of syllogisms to entrap computers into self-destructive loops served the 
immediate needs of the plot, a broader consideration of the use of this device 
demonstrates the hero as someone not bound by logic alone, but able to combine logic 
with a specific set of masculine traits that together create an idealized actor uncowed by 
the power of technology.  It is no accident that, in the universe of Star Trek and the 
starship Enterprise, Captain Kirk (William Shatner) is able to freely select from a toolkit 
that contains elements of logic, passion, sexuality, instinct, and reason as needed to fulfill 
his mission.  Note that Forbidden Planet is in many ways a prototype for numerous Star 
Trek episodes, as well as, to some extent, Jean Luc Godard’s Alphaville: A Strange Case 
of Lemmy Caution (Athos Films,1965).  Alphaville is a departure from the American 
films regarding computer technology in form, but not in content.  The rough outline of 
the plot—Lemmy Caution (Eddie Constantine) is sent to sabotage the totalitarian/fascist 
computer that rules Alphaville—would not be out of place as an episode of Star Trek. 
The computer has outlawed emotion and other illogical attributes of the human psyche.  
Lemmy, by reintroducing love into the vocabulary of the computer, causes it to 
malfunction, shorting out the control it has over the citizens of the town.  Like Star Trek’s 
Captain Kirk, Lemmy Caution uses a mixture of bravado, sexuality, and defiant illogic to 
confound the machine. The recurring motif in Alphaville, like Forbidden Planet, Fail 
Safe, and various episodes of Star Trek, is that science and technology are unbalancing, 
and that the presence of thinking machines leads to thinking like machines.  The 
compromises required to interface with machines creates a porous boundary between 
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human thought and machine logic, where humans quickly start thinking like machines, 
denying their less rational, subconsciously driven fears or desires.  
Star Trek reminds the viewer continuously that although Mr. Spock (Leonard 
Nimoy) is more knowledgeable, stronger, more logical, and in control of his emotions at 
all times, he is not the one in charge, but rather the second in command.  Kirk as a 
completely masculine character is presented, for all his flaws, as rightfully in control over 
the emotionless, and thus sexless and neutered Spock.  Spock, whose infallible logic and 
superior strength resembled the image of the computer as more, but still intrinsically less, 
than his human counterparts, was routinely compared with and accused of being a 
machine. 
Kirk: But only a machine, Mr. Spock.  The original Landreau 
programmed it with all his knowledge but he couldn’t give it his 
wisdom, his compassion, his understanding, his soul, Mr. Spock. 
Spock: Predictably metaphysical.  I prefer the concrete, the 
graspable, the provable. 
Kirk: You’d make a splendid computer, Mr. Spock.  
Spock: That is very kind of you, captain. 
  Kirk’s masculine bravado and swagger made him much more emotionally or 
instinctively driven, and thus less predictable than his logical science officer.  This 
unpredictability extended to the use of logical paradoxes as a timeworn method for 
undermining computers that had managed to get out-of-control. Kirk was masterful in his 
deployment of paradoxes to shatter the façade of computer supremacy that was typically 
granted to the machines by various populations and crewmembers.  Kirk often used a 
variation on the self-referential paradox (Epimenides Paradox: e.g. ‘All Cretans are 
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liars…’) to break out of a mechanical trap as in the episode, “I, Mudd” (NBC/Desilu, 
1967):  
Kirk: “Listen carefully, Norman.  Everything he says is a lie.”  
Norman (a robot):  “Everything he says is a lie.”  
Spock: “I’m lying.”  
Norman: “If everything you say is a lie and you say you are lying then you 




Norman, as a machine, is effectively locked-up by this circular logic with smoke 
pouring from under his collar.  The logic expressed here is the same as the logic 
embedded in Joseph Heller’s 1961 novel, ‘Catch-22’ that is a self referential and self 
canceling paradox is only possible within a proscribed space (for Heller’s Yossarian, the 
self-referential world of the U.S. military).  The closed space of formal logic that governs 
the universe of computer programs is the same type of bounded world.  The solution for 
the crew (and especially the captain) of the starship Enterprise is always to respond 
flexibly to the constraints of formal logic and to know when to break the rules as part of a 
meta-solution that redefines reality outward—changing the rules to exploit paradoxes that 
flummox machines.  For Norman the robot, all statements are always either true or false, 
never both, so the possibility of a sentence that contains its own negation is impossible.  
Forced to dwell upon this possibility, Norman the machine loops endlessly.  
 Just as Norman fails to think broadly enough to recognize the paradox for what it 
is and simply disregard it as an anomaly of human language, the rogue computer Nomad, 
in the second season episode “The Changeling” (NBC/Desilu, 1967) fails to grasp the 
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contingent nature of reality and falls into a trap of its own making, aided by Kirk:  
Kirk: “I created you?” 
Nomad: “You are the creator.” 
Kirk: “But I admit I’m imperfect—how could I have created such a perfect 
thing as you.” 
Nomad: “Answer unknown—I shall analyze— Analysis complete—
insufficient data to resolve problem — I am Nomad. I am perfect.  That 
which is imperfect must be sterilized.” 
Kirk: “You must sterilize in case of error.” 
Nomad: “Error is inconsistent with my prime function—Sterilization is 
correction.”  
Kirk: “Everything in error must be sterilized.” 
Nomad: “There are no exceptions.” 
Kirk: “Nomad.  I made an error in creating you.” 
Nomad: “The creation of perfection is no error.” 
Kirk: “I did not create perfection I created error.” 
Nomad: “Your data is faulty. I am Nomad. I am perfect.”  
Kirk: “I am the Kirk, I am the creator?” 
Nomad: “You are the creator.”  
Kirk: “You’re wrong. Jackson Roy Kirk, your creator, is dead. You have 
mistaken me for him. You are in error. You did not discover your mistake; 
you’ve committed two errors. You are flawed and imperfect. And you 
have not corrected by sterilization—you’ve committed three errors.”   
Nomad (in a high pitched voice): “Error! Error! Error!” 
Kirk: “You are flawed and imperfect!” 
Nomad: “I shall analyze… Error! An-a-lyze!”   
(Smoke and electronic buzzing. Nomad shakes and its lights flash 
randomly) 
 
The Nomad computer, with its sterilizing function, is the antithesis of Kirk and 
his masculine fecundity.  Although computers do not threaten Kirk and his crew in every 
episode, Kirk does establish a love interest in most.   At times, as in the “Requiem For 
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Methuselah” (NBC/Desilu, 1969) episode, the computer and the love interest are the 
same as Kirk falls in love with an android, who dies after getting stuck in a logic loop 
over the nature of love.  The computers in Star Trek, for all their technological and 
logical sophistication, remain naïve, and the representation of computers as either 
childlike or female worked both as a means of disempowering computers by relegating 
them to the status of helpers and as a means of re-inscribing machines as bound by a 
logic inherently alien to the controlling psychology of men.  The taming of computers, 
like the neutering of Spock, in the Star Trek universe represents the delegation of 
dispassionate logic to a junior partnership, and reinforcing the power of masculine illogic 
and disregard for formal constructs as the key to patriarchal domination.    
HAL Versus Colossus:  Two Films About Dominance 
“We are fighting not each other but rather this big rebellious computerized 
system, struggling to keep it from blowing up the world.”306 
 
By the mid-1950’s, automation and computers, though not clearly a threat in the 
real-world arena of employment, were nonetheless represented as an imminent threat to 
human individuality and freedom.  As we have seen in Chapter 2, this threat was linked 
metaphorically to the perceived threat of communism and the idea of the totalitarian mass 
man that had recently plagued Europe.  The idea of chess as a means of exploring this 
anxiety, especially with a computer that was not capable of playing the game as well as 
an amateur player, provided some relief from the fear of a communist or technological 
takeover.  The realm of popular science fiction television and film provided another, 
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more graphic representation of beating the computer at its own game.    
Paul Schrader, writing on the Charles and Ray Eames’ film “Powers of Ten” in 
Film Quarterly in 1970, preferred the technological integrity the Eames brought to the 
computer and to their view of the universe:   
The Interstellar roller-coaster ride of Powers of Ten does what the 
analogous sequence in 2001: A Space Odyssey should have: it gives the 
full impact—instinctual as well as cerebral—of contemporary scientific 
theories. (In comparison, 2001 […] seems astounding.) (italics in the 
original).307    
 
Schrader’s sympathy for the Eames’ experiments in giving weight and force to the 
prosaic objects that occupy their films, stands in studied contrast to the mythmaking and 
metaphysics that ground Kuberick’s approach to computer technology, and the 
relationship between humans and their machines.  Where, for Schrader (using Eames as a 
point of reference) a machine (any machine) is best seen as a tool for human development 
and expression, he is in no way interested in providing the machine with any agency, 
either as an intelligence or as a system with a gravity of its own.  By contrast, Kubrick’s 
exploration of systems and systemic thinking (which pervaded his films from Paths of 
Glory through the end of his career) presupposes that systems have an intelligence (if not 
a consciousness) that cannot be ignored if one wishes to transcend the limitations of 
technological society and oppressive systems.  
The relative naiveté of computers—their narrow bandwidth-- comes to symbolize 
the confining roles of traditional society and the process of immersion within the 
minutiae of everyday life.  From the rigid and sequential logic of computer programs, to 
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its demands for uniformity, computers were metaphors for a specific type of adulthood of 
social responsibilities, mortgages, and 9 to 5 jobs. The identification of computers with 
the daily grind is one way of interpreting Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey.  
Contemporary critics were in many instances unimpressed and baffled by film’s dialog, 
especially when juxtaposed with its breathtaking imagery.  As Stanley Kauffman, writing 
in The New Republic complained, “There are only 43 minutes of dialog in this long film, 
which wouldn’t matter in itself except that those 43 minutes are pretty thoroughly banal.”  
The world of dialog in 2001 is the world of bureaucracy and meaningless self-referential 
platitudes, and the relatively insipid nature of the exchanges tends to highlight just how 
far from the heroic the characters have strayed.  In many ways, the human characters are 
difficult to differentiate from the machines they share space with.  The rockets and space 
stations move with an elegant grace to Strauss’ ‘Blue Danube Waltz,’ while the humans 
jerky zero gravity walks seem more mechanical. Kubrick conflates the humans and 
machines to make his point that as our technology becomes more human, we have 
become more machine-like, until it is difficult to discern who is controlling whom.  What 
Kubrick proposes is, in effect, a successful completion of the Turing test where the 
machine can be confused with a human not only because the machine has become so 
lifelike, but because we have become so routinized and enveloped in our systems as to be 
synonymous with them.   
In this regard, Kubrick borrows from his earlier creation, the warped cyborg Dr. 
Strangelove, who is endlessly fighting with his prosthetic half while jerkily spouting 
technocratic advice that, for all its concern with human lives or experiences, could just as 
easily have come from a machine.  But the Kubrick of 2001: A Space Odyssey also owes 
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a debt to the film that can be thought of as the dramatic inverse to the black comedy of 
Dr. Strangelove— Fail Safe (Colombia Pictures Corporation, 1964).  Where Dr. 
Strangelove cast the technocratic thinking and apocalyptic scheming of the military 
industrial complex as comedy, Fail Safe takes on the same material with deadly 
earnestness. The apocalyptic energy of Fail Safe comes from the banal evil of everyone 
doing their jobs and performing as proscribed by their training and the demands of their 
processes. Early in the film, as two old pilots converse over a game of pool at the ‘Club 
Igloo’, the officer’s club at a base outside Anchorage, Alaska:  
Grady (Ed Binns):After us, the machines, we’re halfway there 
already. Look at those kids.  Remember the crews you had on the 
24s?  Jews, Italians, all kinds-- you could tell them apart, they were 
people. These kids, you open ‘em up and find they run on 
transistors.  
Billy: Aw, they’re good kids I tell ya.  
Grady: Sure, you know they’re good at their jobs but you don’t 
know them.  How could ya?  You get a different crew every time 
you go up.  
Billy: That’s policy Grady.  It eliminates the personal factor. 
Everything’s more complicated now—reaction time’s faster.  You 
can’t depend on people the same way.  
Grady: Who do you depend on?  You know something Billy, I like 
the personal factor. 
The assessment of Col. Grady is one that informs the entire film.  The systems 
that we depend on to give us an edge in the cold war have a dehumanizing effect.  The 
distinction between systems and the people trained to carry out the processes dictated by 
the systems becomes blurred to the point where there is no individuality or 
accountability.  Unlike Dr. Strangelove, where the systems are so totalizing that the only 
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response is absurdity (e.g. loving the bomb), the characters who inhabit Fail Safe are 
uneasy about the systems they perpetuate and question how they came to be so dependent 
on their systems.  A visiting congressman at Offit Air Force Base outside Omaha, 
Nebraska, while reviewing the cutting edge technology of the base’s early warning 
systems, comments, “To tell you the truth, these machines scare the hell out of me. […] I 
want to be damn sure that thing doesn’t get any ideas of its own.”  
General Bogan: (Frank Overton):I see what you mean Mr. Raskob, 
but that’s the chance you take with these systems.  
Congressman Raskob (Sorrell Booke): Who says we have to take 
that chance? Who voted who the power to do it this particular 
way?  
General Bogan: It’s in the nature of technology.  Machines are 
developed to meet situations.  
Congressman Raskob: Then they take over and start to make 
situations.  
General Bogan: Not necessarily 
Congressman Raskob: There’s always the chance, you said so 
yourself.  
General Bogan: We have checks on everything, Mr. Raskob —
checks and counterchecks.  
Congressman Raskob:  Who checks the checker?  Where’s the end 
of the line gentlemen?  Who’s got the responsibility?  
The confluence of everyone doing exactly what they were trained to do is a series of 
events that cascade into the destruction of Moscow by an American nuclear attack and 
the president of the United States’ decision to destroy New York to forestall a full-scale 
nuclear war with the Soviet Union.  Fail Safe makes clear that no-one is directly 
responsibly for any of the actions that take place, and this lack of responsibility makes 
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everyone culpable.  The president takes responsibility ultimately, but the film ends with 
no clear indication as to whether his gesture of destroying New York would, in fact, save 
the world.   
If the consequences of surrendering critical decisions to computers and systems 
lead to nuclear war in Fail Safe, it also lends a backdrop to the world inhabited by the 
crew of the Discovery in 2001: A Space Odyssey.  Just as in Fail Safe, the decisions that 
lead up to HAL’s  taking over the ship and killing the crew is are logical, though a 
common critical assessment of 2001: A Space Odyssey focuses on the insanity of HAL as 
the driving force behind the film’s relatively spare plot.  The madness of the machine, 
evidenced by its paranoiac murder of everyone onboard the Discovery spaceship, causes 
Dave Bowman (Keir Dullea), the lone survivor, to disconnect HAL and to face alone the 
black monolith circling Jupiter.  HAL is not insane at all, really.  It is simply that his 
operational logic does not require human beings, and so he is willing to dispense with 
them to eliminate what he computes as a real tactical threat to the mission.  The humans 
add little to the success of the mission in HAL’s estimation, and are no match for HAL in 
terms of intelligence.  Though he sounds ingratiating, he is at the same time 
condescending in his interactions with the crew.  The power of HAL, that he really 
controls the ship and through that the crew, is belied by his obsequiousness.   
  The visual universe of 2001: A Space Odyssey is rich with images to suggest that 
the human crew of the Discovery mission is enclosed within the all-seeing gaze of the 
HAL 9000 computer.  Our first glimpse of HAL (or at least his ‘eye’, which is all we ever  
see until we enter his ‘brain’ later in the film) is as an eye that reflects the entry of Dave 
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Bowman as he spirals around the core of the ship’s command module.  Just prior to the 
first shot containing HAL’s eye, we see Frank Poole (Gary Lockwood) running around 
the command module like a hamster on a wheel.  The connection between the crew and 
HAL is set up immediately as suggesting the relationship between the observer (HAL) 
and the observed.  The power dynamic between human and machine is decidedly in the 
machine’s favor. 
This disjuncture marks the first portion of the film on board the Discovery 
spacecraft as oddly tense for all its lack of action.  HAL’s dominance seems all the more 
out of place because of the lack of concern shown by Dave and Frank to the idea that they 
have been usurped by a machine.308  Like the organization man of the 1950’s the weak 
patriarchy of Frank and Dave creates a vacuum that leads to chaos. As in Desk Set, where 
the gendering of the EMERAC computer is much more explicit, HAL’s gender was, at 
least to some contemporary critics, decidedly androgynous.  In her review of 2001: A 
Space Odyssey for Film Quarterly, Judith Shantoff explains that “The ship is also run by 
the machine/human HAL, who talks in a male voice but has a red eye shaped like a 
female breast.  As soon as we hear the voice of this androgyne we know he’s a fink.”309   
Newsweek was more explicit in its gendering by stating that the section of the film that 
takes place on the Discovery spaceship was “a long, long stretch of very shaky comedy-
melodrama in which the computer turns on its crew and carries on like an injured party in 
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a homosexual spat.”310  
The gendering of HAL as ‘androgyne’ or homosexual matters in that it marks a 
difference that makes HAL sexually ambiguous and, like the childlike computers of Star 
Trek, prey to meta-solutions that the computer fails to grasp.  The undoing of HAL is his 
inability to consider the possibility that Dave could re-enter the ship without his helmet 
by exposing himself for a few seconds to the vacuum of space as he accesses the 
emergency airlock.  This solution to Dave’s seemingly insurmountable problem is, like 
the solutions deployed against the many controlling computers of Star Trek, a departure 
from the logical thinking of the machine to a meta-logical approach to problem solving 
that involves creativity, intuition, and perhaps a bit of luck.  Dave’s ability to outwit the 
machine comes from his ability to transcend the boundaries of logic systems and embrace 
a decidedly human approach to survival that, by succeeding, demonstrates his eligibility 
to enter the stargate and achieve next level of consciousness promised by the film’s end.   
But before that can occur, HAL’s impertinence has to be dealt with by 
disconnecting his higher logic circuits.  As HAL pleads for his consciousness, Dave 
disconnects modules from his circuit panel and HAL’s voice slows and slurs.  The 
electronic lobotomy Dave performs on HAL reduces him to a pliant, childlike state.  
Good afternoon, gentlemen.  I am a HAL 9000 Computer.  I 
became operational at the H.A.L plant in Urbana, Illinois, on the 
12th of January 1992.  My instructor was Mr. Langley, and he 
taught me to sing a song.  If you’d like to hear it, I can sing it for 
you.”  
Dave: Yes, I’d like to hear it HAL, Sing it for me.  
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HAL: It’s called Daisy… Daisy, Daisy, give me your answer, do.  
I’m half crazy…311  
HAL regresses to a child singing a song as Dave floats inside his womblike interior, 
suggesting the link between his new passivity and femininity. As Donald Palumbo 
suggests, the science fiction generic trope of merging with technology or penetrating 
technological systems is sexual in nature, and explicitly coded with masculine sexuality 
and desire.312  Dave’s successful reestablishment of his authority over the machine allows 
for his own rebirth to occur.  
Throughout the sequences showing life aboard the Discovery spacecraft, control 
is given over almost completely to the ship, with HAL as the brain.  HAL boasts about 
his perfection to the BBC interviewer while Dave and Frank give hesitating, equivocating 
answers as to whether or not HAL has real emotions and what it’s like to work with him. 
HAL controls this small universe, and the crew, because of their dependence on 
technology, is no match for HAL’s logic. Like Colossus: The Forbin Project, directed by 
Joseph Sargent, the thinking power of the machine is expressed relatively, with 
comparisons to human ability made over the chessboard.  In 2001: A Space Odyssey, 
HAL defeats Frank, who reacts as if the defeat is no surprise.  The Colossus computer 
beats Forbin, who again seems resigned to the defeat.  The chess match, like the abstract 
mathematical symbols that flash across Colossus’ (and HAL’s) screens is a marker of his 
intelligence.  Besting humans at chess in these films is a visual shortcut for demonstrating 
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intellectual mastery.  But unlike HAL, Colossus does not have to face a human adversary 
versed in the tactics of meta-solutions.  The creativity shown by Dave in 2001: A Space 
Odyssey is never matched by Forbin, or any of his staff in Colossus: The Forbin Project.   
Unlike 2001: A Space Odyssey, Colossus: The Forbin Project is decidedly cynical 
in its portrayal of humanity as caught within a technological prison.  The film opens with 
Dr. Charles Forbin walking thorough his grand invention—the Colossus computer.  The 
shots of the computer and the scale of the machine are reminiscent of the endless 
computer core in Forbidden Planet with its array of uniform corridors of blinking lights. 
The effect is both to demonstrate the scope of Forbin’s achievement, and the scale of the 
‘brain’ he has created.  As Forbin exits the computer and activates the computer’s 
defenses, we become aware of how deeply embedded Forbin, and by extension we, are in 
the military-technological matrix of the cold war.  At a press conference announcing the 
activation of Colossus, which was designed to take over all command and control 
functions for American nuclear defense, Forbin tries to dispel the common anxiety of 
what would happen if the machine took it upon itself to act.  
Forbin: Colossus’ decisions are superior to any we humans can 
make.  It can absorb and process more knowledge than is remotely 
possible for the greatest genius that has ever lived.  And even more 
important, it has no emotions.  It knows no fear, no hate, no envy.  
It cannot act in a selfish fit of temper.  It cannot act at all if there is 
no threat.  
Is Colossus capable of creative thought? Can it initiate new 
thought? I can tell you that the answer to that is no.  However, 
Colossus is a paragon of knowledge, and its knowledge can be 
expanded indefinitely.  I hope, along with all the scientists that 
helped make this particular project, that the immense power of this 
computer will not only be used for the defense of this country, but 
also hopefully as an aid to the many problems we face on this 
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Earth. 
The Colossus computer begins learning exponentially and, by linking up with its Soviet 
counterpart (the Guardian computer), learns to hold the world hostage to its nuclear 
forces.   
In gendered terms, Colossus is decidedly male. Unlike HAL who is ambiguously 
gendered, the Colossus computer is commanding and forceful and backs up its threats 
with decisive force.  It sits at the head of the military industrial complex and is able to 
order soldiers to kill and assassinate as needed.  Where HAL reverted to trickery to 
achieve its ends, Colossus simply issues orders to be carried out.  Because Colossus is so 
unambiguously portrayed as masculine, the meta-solutions that should be open to Forbin 
are co-opted by the computer.  Forbin is left with feeble attempts at trickery that are 
doomed to failure.  His greatest success against the machine is to convince it that he has 
sexual needs that must be exercised in private. He uses this deception to communicate 
with his secretary without being observed by the machine, in order to plot Colossus’ 
overthrow.  By the end of the film, that overthrow has receded to hopelessness as 
Colossus begins remaking the planet to its specifications.  
The moral of Colossus, the Forbin Project is not simply that we are at the mercy 
of our machines, but like the chess playing machines that populated the imaginations of 
the 1950’s, the Colossus computer occupies a metaphorical role not so much as machine, 
but as a control system that asks for obedience in exchange for a specific version of 
utopia.  In this view, Colossus is raw ideology borne out of cold war paranoia.  As an 
overarching and overreaching protective system, Colossus resembles the caretaking 
robots in Jack Williamson’s dystopic 1947 novella With Folded Hands, in which alien 
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robots, charged with protecting human beings from harm, slowly disallow any human 
activity.  The forceful caretaking of the robots, like the forceful dominion of the Colossus 
computer, make their human subjects weak, dependent and emasculated.   
The contrasting visions of 2001: A Space Odyssey and Colossus: The Forbin 
Project, are simply exercises in which the better man wins, where winning means 
subjugating the other in a reenactment of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic.  Like 
Hegel’s parable, self-awareness (consciousness) comes by recognizing the consciousness 
of the other.  The enslavement of one by the other is a product of fear.  For Forbin, his 
fear of annihilation marks him as the slave of the machine who has no fear of death.  
Acceptance of this is predicated upon the acceptance of the consciousness of the 
machine.  By granting the machine consciousness, and with it a tacit acceptance of it as 
an equal, the characters that populate Colossus: The Forbin Project, have ensured their 
slavery.  By extension, by constantly delegating machines to a subaltern status, 
specifically marked as feminine, not only did the men of the post-war era grant 
themselves an out from eventual enslavement by machines, but reinforced their embattled 






Chapter 4: “We Have Your Mechanical Brain—Give Us Justice,” 




“Within the vast hierarchy of executive and managerial boards 
extending far beyond the individual establishment into the 
scientific laboratory and research institute, the national government 
and national purpose, the tangible source of exploitation disappears 
behind the façade of objective rationality.  Hatred and frustration 
are deprived of their specific target, and the technological veil 
conceals the reproduction of inequality and enslavement.  With 
technological progress as its instrument, unfreedom—in the sense 
of man’s subjection to his productive apparatus—is perpetuated 
and intensified in the form of many liberties and comforts.”313 
      
As computers became more commonplace, and more attached to centers of 
commerce, industry, and the military, they were conflated with the repressive structures 
of capitalism and the modern state.  While dominion over computers was possible only 
for  those who already controlled them,  the people in control of the machines were also 
in control of the ‘system’ that waged war.  The student uprisings gave voice to discontent 
and made use of the computer as a potent icon of state repression, threatening machines 
on campuses across the U.S. as proxies for a military-industrial complex that remained 
out of reach.  
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Radio, television and film narratives perpetuated totalitarian anxieties among the 
generations of Americans coming of age after the Second World War, making 
technological anxiety commonplace in the speeches, pamphlets, and manifestos of the 
student movements of the 1960’s.  By updating classic narratives of persecution and 
redemption against overwhelming odds, filmic representations of computers took cues 
from journalistic reportage, and positioned iconic representations of modernity as 
totalizing and dehumanizing. To be suspicious of large-scale technologies was to be 
skeptical of the intentions of those who controlled these technologies, or to have doubts 
that there was anyone in control at all.  The computer representing the machine of late 
capitalism was a recurring motif in the language of the protest movements that gave the 
computer a symbolic value, helping to position it as a legitimate target for protest actions 
on college campuses across the US (and in one notable instance, Canada).   
Of course, the most subtle and paradoxically, the most expressive occupation and 
destruction of a computer center in the 1960’s did not take place on a college campus, but 
rather on the cinema screen.  Stanley Kuberick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey paints on the big 
screen both the logic and the anxiety of computer as an icon of control.  The HAL 9000 
computer, which has become sentient and has plotted against and murdered all but one of 
the crewmembers on the ship, is ‘killed’ by the remaining crewmember, Dave Bowman, 
in a moving scene that provides the viewer, at least for a moment, with genuine sympathy 
for the computer.  As Dave floats within the womblike interior of HAL’s electronic 
circuitry, his act of disconnecting the computer is one of both terrorism and survival.  
Because the computer’s voice is in some ways more human, more expressive than the 
people who occupy the ship or the myriad bureaucracies back on Earth, his pleading is 
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genuinely moving.   
However much our sympathies lie with the computer, our empathies are firmly 
grounded within the experience of Bowman.  He is, after all, like us both in form and in 
temperament and, like the protestors acting upon their convictions in the real world, he is 
performing the task of throwing his body upon an odious machine.  The act of computer 
center occupations as a form of protest in the 1960’s is, like the act of disconnecting 
HAL’s higher functions, and act that metaphorically reinforces the human body’s 
centrality in the narrative of human experience.    
Societies often invest new technologies with portentous meanings-- granting them 
status as saviors or destroyers of civilization.  New technologies, as Sherry Turkle points 
out, operate as a sort of Rorschach test for the anxieties of their age.314  Computer 
technology was no different.  From its inception, the development of computer 
technology offered up a mirror that reflected the hopes and anxieties of the post-war 
world.  Computer technology, born out of the juggernaut of the second world war and 
often, at its inception, paired with its darker sibling the atomic bomb, came to represent 
many of the anxieties felt by people struggling to make sense of what was to be come the 
cold-war world.  Fears of economic displacement, totalitarianism, the death of the 
individual and the rise of other-directed groups of like-minded wearers of 
indistinguishable gray flannel suits plagued a population that also worried about the rise 
of a cold, calculating communism and automated factories.   
At the center of this anxiety stood the computer as an icon of both the heights of 
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capitalistic enterprise and ingenuity and the dread that the machines were, in fact taking 
over and that we would be little more than cogs or some other replaceable part.  Lewis 
Mumford best expressed this sort of strong determinism in the first half of the 20th 
century.315  Mumford, writing in the era of the assembly line and mass production, drew 
upon the development of clocks in Benedictine monasteries to tell the story of the 
introduction of mechanical time and its impact on routines previously regulated by 
natural cycles and the rhythms of the human body.  For Mumford, the development of the 
mechanical clock did not only provide a manner for measuring time, but for regulating 
and regimenting bodies and minds.  Whatever good comes from machines, Mumford 
contended, comes at a cost in freedom.   
Although this strong program in technology studies has been superceded by 
theories that are not as monolithic as Mumford’s theory of megamachines, his approach 
to technology remained a popular one within the media culture of the 1950’s and 1960’s, 
both in the mass media and the underground press as technology appeared to continually 
spiral farther and farther out of control.316  This attitude toward technological change and 
the impact of machines was especially acute for the first generations growing up along 
side computers.  Computers were equated with human thought and represented as 
machines that think like we do—only faster, from the very first press release touting the 
development of the ENIAC in 1946, to the Vietnam Era anxiety concerning the collection 
and collating of personal data within the federal bureaucracy.  The emphasis on 
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standardization and the artifacts of computer technology (e.g. punch cards) demonstrates 
the degree to which the computer as an icon of modernity as order was inbricated into the 
language of discontent in American life.  
As student groups became more vocal in demanding a say in their academic lives 
and began to respond to the hypocrisy of the university environment, it made sense that 
they would target the computer as an icon of what Paul Edwards calls the ‘Closed 
World’.  The computer was targeted at first not because of its linkage with the military—
the military-industrial-academic axis was not exploited as a site of protest by the anti-war 
movement until after the first computer center occupations had already taken place.  The 
original motivation for targeting computer data centers as sites for protest stemmed from 
the value of the data center as a physical investment and a site of prestige on university 
campuses, connected by the students with the prevailing view of computers as icons of 
standardization, regimentation, and dispassion. Once the computer center was breached 
as a site for protest, however, the practice became more commonplace and more violent, 
culminating in the bombing of the University of Wisconsin computer center, the 
University of Kansas computer center and the attempted bombing of the computer center 
at New York University in 1970.  Targeting computer centers as sites for violent 
resistance marked a shift from the politics of the civil rights movement to the radicalized 
left of the anti-war movement.  The destruction of computer centers (or their being held 
hostage) reinscribed the computer as a site of weakness within the closed world culture.  
The large computers and mainframes of the late 1960’s were seen as nerve centers that 
could be taken and held, disrupting war research and threatening the university as a 
machine for learning.  It stripped the computer of symbolic dominance, replacing it with 
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a sort of impotence in its interactions with the physical world.   
 
Ground Zero at the University of California at Santa Barbara  
North Hall Seized 
As we go to press, approximately 20 black students have 
barricaded themselves inside North Hall and the computer center.   
They have vowed not to leave until Chancellor Cheadle answers all 
their demands.  
The black students say, ‘leave us alone and we’ll leave the 
computer alone… We have your mechanical brain—give us 
justice.’317 
  
The first recorded protest occupation of a computer center on a college campus 
was the October 15th, 1968 occupation of the computer center at the University of 
California at Santa Barbara.  The Black Student Union students demanded a “black 
studies program, black faculty, increased admissions for black students and black coaches 
in the athletic department,”318 and staged a one-day sit in and occupation of the college 
computer center effectively holding the computer hostage and barricading themselves in 
the computer center with baseball bats, gas masks, and fire extinguishers.319  The Black 
Student Union was a new fixture on the UC Santa Barbara campus in the affluent Santa 
Barbara community (known at the time as a bastion of the John Birch Society), and a 
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product of federal Educational Opportunity Program mandates to further integrate college 
campuses across the United States.  The Black Student Union made repeated demands for 
more African American faculty and for courses that focused on ethnic studies.  Although 
no explicit threat of violence was made toward the computer, the choice of the computer 
center as the location for the sit in was clearly an attempt to position themselves in 
proximity to a large and expensive piece of equipment as a means of getting the attention 
of the school’s administration.   
Previous protest by the students had not been fruitful and the students felt ignored 
by the administration.  Students claimed that UC Santa Barbara Chancellor Vernon 
Cheadle was “dragging his ass on the issue of justice and completely avoiding the subject 
of institutional racism.”320  By changing tactics and seizing the UC Santa Barbra 
computer, this protest would prove largely successful after the students left without 
incident.  The students had reportedly “disavowed the use of violence,”321 and although it 
is unclear from the reporting whether the students intended to use the bats and fire 
extinguishers on the computer, or on anyone who attempted to remove them, the choice 
of the computer center as a site of occupation suggests the former.  Within a year, the 
university Chancellor pushed through reforms in the university’s administration and 
presided over the creation of an African-American studies program.  The following fall, 
more than 400 African-American and 225 Mexican-Americans were enrolled and the 
university had its first black student body president.322 
 After twenty years in the public eye as a technology that had come to be an icon 
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of modernity that emphasized alienation, control, conformity, and a system that was 
widely considered dehumanizing, it is not altogether surprising that the computer was 
finally the focus of a concrete, rather than a rhetorical attack.  What may be more 
surprising is that it took as long as it did for an organized group to identify the 
computer’s iconic value as a significant site for a protest action.   Because the computer 
was a symptom of American antipathy towards changes in the social landscape that 
seemed to displace individual needs and local eccentricities in favor of standardized 
forms of consumption, rationalized workplaces, and systemized and routinized daily 
existences, the computer represented all that was dehumanizing in one compact iconic 
representation.  However, the fundamental acceptance of computers as objects points to a 
more complex relationship between Americans and the iconic importance of computers.  
Arguably, the totality of hegemony surrounding American business culture produced an 
environment where computers, and all they represented, were a natural part of the 
capitalist landscape to be navigated and negotiated, just like unemployment, economic 
downturns, old-boy networks, or shareholders.  The size, inscrutability, and implacable 
logic of computer systems were symbols of bureaucratic excess and self-perpetuating 
orders of complexity.  So while, on the one hand, the computer as an icon represented 
many of the fears of Americans in the post-war era, there was never a concerted 
movement to slow the development or deployment of computer technology—no 
American Luddite movement sabotaged the big machines from IBM, Unisys, or 
Burroughs Corporation.  The most militant expression of antipathy towards computer 
systems was found in student movements during the 1960’s.  Student activists, fighting 
for a number of causes, saw in the large centralized mainframe computers of the 1960’s a 
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perfect target, both symbolically and tactically, for focusing attention on their grievances. 
 The occupation of the computer center at the University of California at Santa 
Barbara, though peaceful, was part of an increased militancy on college campuses on the 
part of minority students.  Pressing their demands for recognition and needing to be taken 
seriously as a social force, they had legitimate grievances concerning institutionalized 
racism in American life in general and on college campuses only slightly less so.  The 
murder of Martin Luther King in April of 1968, along with the murder of Robert 
Kennedy and the police riot outside the Democratic National Convention in the summer 
of that year had created strains within the various student political movements as to 
whether or not non-violent actions were appropriate in an atmosphere of political 
assassination and a war in Viet Nam that continued to escalate.  The student civil rights 
movement was the first to see the advantage of the computer as a target of protest and 
leveraged the rhetorical and the iconic value of the computer as expressed a few years 
before in Berkeley on the University of California campus in the context of the free 
speech movement.   
 
The Berkeley Free Speech Movement: Punch Cards and Identity 
 By the fall of 1964, many students returning to the Berkeley campus of the 
University of California had participated in the Freedom Summer organizing and voter 
registration drives across the Deep South.  Energized by their encounters with the 
Congress on Racial Equality, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, as well as their exposure to the poverty, 
204  
racism and institutionalized injustice of the south, students attempted to continue 
organizing and agitating on the Berkeley campus.  This proved difficult because of the 
authority of the university, as interpreted by its board of regents, to regulate the types of 
organizing permitted on campus and the strong sense of responsibility to act as 
chaperones of youth, in loco parentis.   
The sense of enclosure felt by students entering college in the 1960s as 
exemplified by the Berkeley FSM took the form of metaphorical comparisons between 
humans and computers, universities and factories, students as punch cards, and a general 
feeling that students were being processed like raw materials, data points, or figured to be 
tabulated and output as generic types (the engineer, the chemist, the technician) to fit the 
needs of American industry.  The university, instead of being an environment for 
investigation, was an assembly line for winnowing and categorizing students as raw 
materials.  The emphasis on standardization and the artifacts of computer technology 
(e.g. punch cards) demonstrates the degree to which the computer as an icon of modernity 
as order was imbricated into the language of discontent in American life.  As student 
groups became more vocal in demanding a say in their academic lives and began to 
respond to the hypocrisy of the university environment, it made sense that they would 
target the computer as an icon of the “machine.” 
Along with the computer, the punch card symbolized a dehumanized and 
impersonal world where individuals could be reduced to and defined by data points— a 
pattern of holes in a card to be read, tabulated, and organized by a machine.  The punch 
card seemed a two-dimensional portrait of an individual that could be slotted into a 
205  
particular role useful to the larger construct that was modern capitalist society323.  The 
punch card, as an artifact of the computer, was emblematic of how humans were to 
interface with machines.  The cards became a potent symbol and a site of resistance to 
what was seen as a system that digested human beings and produced cogs in the machine 
of industry.   
At the University of California at Berkeley, as at many other college campuses, 
computers were used to facilitate admissions and student registration.  But Berkeley was 
also the site of a campus-wide series of protests in 1964-1965 that served, in some 
regards, as a template for campus protest movements throughout the 1960’s.  Although 
the Berkeley Free Speech Movement began as a series of protests against the university 
administration’s decision to limit the types of organizing and political activity permitted 
on campus, the protests presented a platform for students to voice their resentment toward 
the university as part of a system that Hal Draper conflated in his pamphlet “The Mind of 
Clark Kerr,” as “The University Factory and the New Slavery.”324  The idea that the 
purpose of the university was to provide industry with the skills and talents it required 
were part of Kerr’s organizational approach both to Berkeley, where he was the 
chancellor, as well as the University of California system, over which he was president.  
For the students, this preparation for a life in the service of capitalism left the student as 
no more than a “student-cog” in the “machine” that was a “knowledge factory.”325  
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Although the language of the factory was prevalent, the students actively appropriated the 
computer punch card as a symbol of their status as data to be processed within the 
system.  
Although the students at the University of California at Berkeley stopped short of 
taking over the computers on their campus, the Berkeley Free Speech movement 
provided the students who followed its example with a vocabulary for describing their 
experience which appropriated the computer as a metaphor of the Berkeley Free Speech 
movement and the protests of 1964-1965.  The famous 1964 speech by Mario Savio, a 
Berkeley student, set the tone for both the protest movement against Dean Clark Kerr’s 
policy banning political action on the Berkeley campus as well as situated the conflict in 
terms of the student’s relationship to the educational ‘machine’ of Berkeley’s 
Multiversity:  
There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes so 
odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you can't take part; you 
can't even passively take part, and you've got to put your bodies 
upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the 
apparatus, and you've got to make it stop. And you've got to 
indicate to the people who run it, to the people who own it, that 
unless you're free, the machine will be prevented from working at 
all!326 
 
Savio was speaking of the university system as an educational machine, but he was also 
staking out a metaphorical relationship to computers and data processing.  Other students 
in the Berkeley protest movement took the metaphor further and made it more explicit by 
wearing IBM punch cards pinned to their clothing with slogans like, “I am a UC student.  
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Please don’t bend, fold, spindle or mutilate me.327  The equation of the student with the 
punch card and, by extension, the petition to be treated at least as well as the card, 
represented an ironic comment on the university system where students increasingly 
viewed themselves as raw materials in a machine or data points in a system.  For all the 
students’ pleas to be handled with some measure of care, the Berkeley student 
newspaper, the Daily Californian, held out little hope and explained that that the 
registration process would ultimately leave students “torn, mutilated or spindled by an 
IBM machine.”328 
 The machine metaphor was not just the student’s response to the university 
system of which they were a part at the University of California at Berkeley.  Clark Kerr 
had, in the months previous to the actions surrounding the Free Speech Movement in the 
fall of 1964, spoken of the university in exactly the same terms as the students.329  Both 
the students and the administration agreed that the university was an “information 
machine,” and a “knowledge factory,” the difference was that one side saw this as a 
benevolent evolution and the other as an abomination. 
The Free-Speech Movement brought the metaphor of the computer as 
synonymous with the system of administration to the forefront of the student movement.  
Two years earlier, in 1962, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) included a critique 
of technology and automation in their “Port Huron Statement.”  The SDS did not offer up 
automation as a metaphor for a broader cultural anxiety like the Berkeley Free-Speech 
Movement did, but rather saw technology as one of the core issues challenging American 
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democracy in the 1960’s.  As they explained in the Port Huron Statement:  
the entrenchment of totalitarian states, the menace of war, overpopulation, 
international disorder, supertechnology--these trends were testing the 
tenacity of our own commitment to democracy and freedom and our 
abilities to visualize their application to a world in upheaval. […] We 
oppose the depersonalization that reduces human being to the status of 
things.330   
 
The SDS critique of technology was bound up in a larger critique of class that owed 
allegiance to the old guard American Left that saw the utilization of information 
technologies as inherently a capitalistic exercise with “automation confirming the dark 
ascension of machine over man instead of shared abundance, technological change being 
introduced into the economy by the criteria of profitability -- this has been our 
inheritance.”331  Supertechnology, for the members of SDS included both the weapons of 
the military-industrial complex, as well as the technological system, driven by computers, 
responsible for command and control functions.  The “supertechnology” required that 
people be reduced to “the status of things” providing an argument that the Berkeley Free 
Speech Movement would echo in their identification with punch cards and their desire to 
reinhabit a physical body, not only the virtual one recognized by the machine.  It was this 
body that they hoped to throw against the machine to make it stop.  The anxiety 
concerning technology was given a name by the popular press and reporters explained 
that, “Like most modern citizens, college students understandably feel threatened by the 
mechanization of life—The IBM-card syndrome.”332  The Berkeley students were not 
alone in their anxiety.  Not only were they like most citizens as the news account 
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described, but other campuses were following suit in their own way: “According to the 
Collegiate Press Service, 2800 students at the University of Colorado took part in a novel 
protest—the ‘bitch-in’—against being ‘folded, spindled or mutilated.”333    
The fallout from the Berkeley Free Speech movement was that student concerns 
were taken seriously and reporters found that while, “at the start of every semester you 
always hear the same tired jokes about ‘educational factories’ and about the computers 
that assign you classes […] Well you don’t hear those jokes this time—they’re not funny 
anymore.”334  The reporters were, for a time, somewhat sympathetic—at least in the New 
York Times, which reviewed the scene as reported by C.B.S. television: “The most vivid 
and persuasive argument advanced by the students concerned life in a huge institution in 
which the individual feels reduced to a punch card.”335  Even the Wall Street Journal was 
sympathetic: “The origins of depersonalization lie in the high degree of standardization 
needed to use computers effectively.  As computer activities spread, individuals tend to 
feel molded to fit the computer’s needs rather than the other way around.”336  The article 
concluded that it was, “probably is no accident that during the first of our major campus 
riots, at Berkeley, major resentment was directed toward punch cards and computers.”337 
  In addition to this change in perception of the students and their grievances was 
the awareness that the student’s rhetorical attacks against computer technology were not 
an attack on the computers as objects, but as symbols of a system. College admissions 
offices were not going to be cowed into abandoning computers simply for what the 
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computers symbolized.  As the New York Times reported, “The issue has been a 
prominent one ever since the riots at the University of California at Berkeley, during 
which students complained that they were mere cogs in a vast impersonal education 
factory and pinned on computer punch cards as badges of protest.”338  The article’s 
interview with Elmer Hans Wagner, registrar and admissions officer at the University of 
California at Davis, concluded that “that automation made everyone uneasy and that the 
punch cards were a ‘scapegoat’ in a situation where issues other than computer 
technology were involved.”339 
Computer Center Occupations: Challenging the Consensus 
Mr. Wagner was correct in his assumption.  For all the rhetoric surrounding the 
machine, the system and the computer as an icon of a world structured to foreclose 
identities and possibilities outside the logic and needs of American business and 
government, it must be stressed that the youth movements of the 1960’s did not identify 
themselves as anti-technology in general, or anti-computer in particular.  As Fred Turner 
discusses in his book, From Counterculture to Cyberculture, it is a common 
misconception to conflate the youth movement critiques of control technologies with a 
desire to eliminate these technologies altogether.  As Turner demonstrates, youth 
movements, specifically the back-to-the-land and communard movements that were 
ostensibly dropping out of society were also embracing new technologies to make 
frontier life possible.  In particular, the communards embraced sophisticated ideas about 
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information sharing, networks, cybernetic principles, and computers as information 
processing machines that in many ways laid the foundation for the personal computer 
revolution of the 1970’s and 1980’s.340   
If the students were not against technology, and were not interested in abandoning 
a technological lifestyle, but rather were, in some instances, concerned with taking 
technologies with them into the various commune and back-to-the-land environments that 
were growing in popularity as the 1960’s progressed, they were against what technology, 
specifically computer technology, had come to represent.  As Stewart Brand writes in his 
1987 foreword to Ted Nelson’s 1974 Computer Lib, “The enemy was central processing, 
in all its commercial, philosophical, political, and socio-economic manifestations.”341  
Brand likens large, mainframe-driven computer processing to Ken Kesey’s ‘Big Nurse’ 
from his One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1962).  Nelson’s tract is, more than 
anything, a call to liberate the computer from its imprisonment within a matrix of 
professional abstraction and specialized information workers (which he refers to as the 
computer ‘priesthood’) whose work was to provide masses of data for increasingly 
obscure and unaccountable corporations and government agencies.   
The ‘commercial, philosophical, political and socio-economic manifestations’ of 
central processing, as Stuart Brand puts it, were the symbolic baggage of large computer 
systems in the 1960’s, baggage largely inherited from both the uses of computer 
technology and the rhetoric of computer anxiety from the 1950’s.  These manifestations 
are largely symbolic, and the revolution Brand describes (and Nelson predicts) is a 
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revolution that seizes upon the computer’s symbolic value and reinscribes the artifact 
with a new meaning.  But the symbolic value of the technology was, in the 1960’s still 
concentrated in what Brand calls the ‘central processor’ the large stand-alone computer 
that occupied an increasingly common place in the center of university administration, 
and functioned as a prized representation of a school’s endowment and fundraising 
prowess.   
 
The pattern of student occupation of computer centers as a locus for pressing their 
demands accelerated in 1969 with five university campus protest movements focusing on 
computer centers.  Out of the five occupations in 1969, three were the result of civil 
rights issues stemming directly from policies or faculty members on the campuses, with 
students agitating for a greater say in curriculum decisions and the hiring of minority 
faculty.  Of the two anti-war protests, one (at the University of Maryland) was a direct 
action against CIA sponsored research at the university and the other, at the State 
University of New York at Stony Brook, was part of a larger set of coordinated protests 
against the escalation of the Viet Nam war.  Students claiming to be members of Students 
for a Democratic Society seized the University of New York at Stony Brook computer 
center and caused the staff to shut down their computer because, as a SDS spokesman 
stated, the university president had “failed to meet demands […] that he end all military 
research and recruitment on the campus, and not increase the rent on dormitories by 
$150.”342  The student organizers complained that the university had ignored previous 
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petitions, discussions, rallies, and other forms of peaceful protest.  SDS was also active 
on the University of Maryland campus, occupying the computer center there in protest of 
CIA sponsored research.343  The Stony Brook protest is interesting in that the list of 
demands was extended to include not only war-related issues on campus, but issues 
surrounding student living conditions as well.   
The SUNY Stony Brook and University of Maryland actions were part of a larger 
string of stoppages spearheaded by MIT students and researchers in the spring of 1969.  
The MIT “one day moratorium on research” was supported by students at Columbia, 
New York University, and the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, as well as the University 
of Wisconsin and the University of California at Berkeley.  The goal of the work 
stoppage was to protest the university as a research arm of the military, and specifically 
the use of computer technology in the war effort.  As part of the protest, dozens of 
computer engineers took up positions outside New York’s Rockefeller Center chanting, 
“we will not program death!”344  This was not the first action of computer engineers 
against the war.  The preceding spring, an organization comprised of computer 
professionals calling itself the ACM or Anti-Complicity Movement issued a statement 
against the war and a refusal to work on military contracts.345 
The table below lists the computer center protest actions reported by the 
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mainstream media, beginning with the first protest in 1968 and ending with the last 
reported protest in 1972.   
Date Location Action Stated Reason 
October 15, 1968 UC Santa 
Barbara 
Occupied Computer Center Civil Rights: Student 
Protest (controversy over 
minority hiring and 
ethnic studies 
curriculum) 
January, 1969 University of 
Pittsburgh 
Occupied Computer Center Civil Rights: Student 
Protest (controversy over 
minority hiring and 
ethnic studies 
curriculum) 






Civil Rights: Student 
Protest (racist professor) 
April 24, 1969 University of 
Maryland 
Occupied Computer Center Anti- War Protest 
(Protest CIA sponsored 
research) 
May 2, 1969 Howard 
University 
Occupied Computer Center Civil Rights: Boycott  by 
Sociology and 
Anthropology Students  
May 9, 1969 NY State 
University at 
Stony Brook 







Beaver 55-- Anti-War 
Protest 






(Computer belonged to 
the Atomic Energy 
Commission). However, 
the ransom was $100,000 
to be used to post bond 
for a jailed Black Panther 





Controversy over ethnic 
studies program 
August 24, 1970 University of 
Wisconsin 
Computer Center Bombed, 
one student killed 
Anti- War Protest 
December, 1970 University of 
Kansas- 
Lawrence 
Computer Center Bombed Unclear-- Campus unrest 
due to the firing of black 
assistant administrator, 
but the bombing was 
unclaimed and unsolved 
February 10, 1971 Stanford 
University 
Occupied Computer Center Anti- War Protest 
May 10, 1972 University of 
Wisconsin  
Computer center vandalized  Anti- War Protest 
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April 25, 1972 NY State 
University at 
Stony Brook 
Computer center vandalized  Anti- War Protest 
Table 1: Actions against computer centers as reported in the national media 1968-1972.  (Sources: 
Los Angeles Times, New York Times and Washington Post newspapers.)  
 
A pattern of escalating violence is represented in the table, as well as a shift in the 
rationale behind the protest action.  Out of the first seven protest actions from 1968 and 
1969, all but two are civil rights protests on college campuses and all but two are 
resolved without damage to the computer system.  The following seven protest actions 
occurring between 1970 and 1972 are almost a mirror image of the first seven, with six of 
the seven occurring as protests against military involvement on college campuses and six 
of the seven ending in damage to the computer or all out destruction of the computer 
center.    
Protest as Kynical Action: Opposing Cynical Reason 
From 1968 to 1972 the mainstream media in the United States recorded over a 
dozen protest actions against university computer centers.  Various student protest 
movements and groups from campuses across the U.S. adopted the tactic in a non-
coordinated action to force college administrators to address their grievances.   The 
protest actions had mixed results as a form of protest, but the tactical logic of occupying 
computer centers was supplemented by the attack on computers as symbols of the 
relationship between the state, capital, and human beings.   The symbolic value of 
computers in this context is evident in the coverage of occupations by the alternative 
press and the mass media of the Vietnam War era.  As the war escalated, so did the 
violence of the protest actions.  What began as a mode of peaceful (but forceful) 
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demonstration culminated in random destruction and vandalism of computer centers 
because of what they represented in terms of a military presence on campus, and their 
overall iconic value as nexuses of power in the relationship between the military and the 
academy.   
Because much of what the military spent on computer technology on college 
campuses was filtered through various other organizations like the National Science 
Foundation and The Rand Foundation, it’s difficult to get a full picture of exactly how 
much investment the American military had in college campuses in the 1960’s. As 
Margaret Pugh O’Mara points out, the post-war research university was a construct based 
upon strong and long lasting links to government and especially military research 
projects.346   The expense of early computers (often in the millions of dollars) made 
government subsidies attractive, often regardless of the strings attached.347  The diffuse 
and often classified relationship between universities and the U.S. military aided the 
impression that any computer on a college campus was likely involved in some sort of 
work for the military or the government at large.     
Discussion of the marginalizing effects of computer technology and the use of 
computers as iconic images during protest actions in the early and mid-1960’s gave way 
to a more active engagement with the icon as more than just a symbol, but a physical 
presence that could be manipulated for ideological or tactical ends.  The difference 
between the two stages of student movement politics and the transformation of the 
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computer as icon to computer as artifact is what, speaking in other terms, Peter Sloterdijk 
presents as cynical in what he terms “enlightened false consciousness.” Unlike the false 
consciousness of Althusser which stood in opposition to what he considered true 
(Marxist) consciousness—the understanding of hegemonic manipulation and ones 
imbrication in the world of capital—Sloterdijk posits enlightened false consciousness as a 
loss of faith in values that were once seen as absolute (ideology) but still perform the 
rituals and act as if the ideological position were still tenable. It is not the disillusionment 
with one ideology that leads to the embracing of new ideological constructs, but the 
‘enlightened’ sense that all ideologies are untenable.  So one goes through the motions as 
one would if under false consciousness, even though one is aware that this too is just a 
performance.  Sloterdijk’s antidote to this is to embrace ‘Kynicism’, which is a refutation 
of ideologically bound logic by means of regrounding in the body.  As Sloterdijk 
explains:  
The philosopher [Theodore Adorno] was just about to begin his 
lecture when a group of demonstrators prevented him from 
mounting the podium... Among the disrupters were some female 
students who, in protest, attracted attention to themselves by 
exposing their breast to the thinker. Here, on the one side, stood 
naked flesh, exercising ‘critique’; there, on the other side, stood the 
bitterly disappointed man without whom scarcely any of those 
present would have known what critique meant... It was not naked 
force that reduced the philosopher to muteness, but the force of the 
naked.348 
 
It is this emphasis on the body that is central to the tactic of occupying computer 
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centers as a form of protest.  Computers as icons of abstraction were easily relegated into 
a realm of existence beyond the normal functioning of most people’s daily routines.  The 
confrontation of the computer as a concept with the force of actual protestors invading 
the computer center, a sealed, climate-controlled set of rooms within the already rarified 
atmosphere of the college campus, acted to reground the computer in the physical world 
as an object, not an abstraction, and as such, as something that could be threatened with 
force, or used as a bargaining chip in ongoing confrontations with college administrators.  
At the heart of kynicism is the force of the ideologically naked body that stands as the 
ultimate counterpoint to all modes of coercive logic.  The body that Sloterdijk posits as 
central to the kynical mode is the same body that Mario Savio calls down upon the odious 
machines of the Berkeley multiversity, with the same effect.  The desire is to stop the 
machine from functioning by either standing in solidarity or (in Sloterdijk’s case) 
rendering mute an outmoded ideology by literally stripping bare the body as subject and 
offering it as wordless critique.   
The approach to computers and the occupation of computer centers, as a form of 
protest action that is signified here does not, as I mentioned above, reflect a deep-seated 
anxiety towards computers as artifacts or information technology as a class of objects.  
The rationale behind computer center occupations as a form of protest has much more to 
do with the iconic status of computers in the research university, and the status of 
computers as metaphors for a system that was increasingly viewed by students as corrupt 
and insensitive to their needs.  
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For Pierre Bourdieu, the zone of social interaction between groups is always 
embedded in class relationships and defined by legitimating discourses that operate over 
what he terms a ‘social field’—that is, the social arena in which the rules of interaction 
apply.  In this formulation doxa refers to the unquestioned truths that provide the basic 
assumptions that lie behind any discourse— the rules that govern a community’s 
collective sense of reality and determine what is conceivable within the specific logic of 
the system.   This specific logic comprises the basic assumptions of the community and is 
thus incontestable as a definition of the community’s commonsense world.  This 
worldview is arbitrary, masked by the naturalization of the rules of what is permissible, 
circumscribed by what is possible within the system.349  The social field is the zone of 
capital accumulation and exchange where, as Bourdieu states, “In the struggle to impose 
the legitimate vision, in which science itself is inevitably caught up, agents possess power 
in proportion to their symbolic capital, i.e. in proportion to the recognition they receive 
from a group”350 
The ability to define the doxic aspect of culture is typically embedded within class 
structures, in a way similar to Gramsci’s definition of hegemony as the ‘common-sense’ 
of the bourgeoisie class.  In both Gramsci’s and Bourdieu’s readings, the class that 
defines the values of the society as a whole does so in such a way as to naturalize what is 
in fact an arbitrary construction.  The conflict over orthodoxy which is perpetuated by 
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class in Gramsci’s and Bourdieu’s theories spill over into generational conflict in the case 
of the student movements.  The euphemisms and metaphors of the student movements 
used to describe cultural anxieties in terms of the power of computers was, in this 
analysis, a matter of responding to technology as divorced from the concerns of the 
student movements, but significant doxic symbols to the universities that housed them.  
Controlling the computers was an appropriation of social capital that gave voice to a class 
of Americans that were otherwise silenced.  
Destroying the Machine: George Williams University 
This emphasis on the computer as an icon to be exploited for its symbolic value is 
seen in the first civil rights protest action to end in the destruction of the occupied 
computer center.  During the February 12, 1969 destruction of the Control Data 3500 
computer at George Williams University in Montreal, Canada, students, protesting the 
actions of a junior professor with a history of snubbing black students in his classes, 
attacked the computer with fire axes and dumped hundreds of thousands of computer 
punch cards into the street from the computer center’s ninth-floor windows.  As the cards 
filled the street below, the students burned printouts before police stormed the ninth floor 
and arrested 96 students, half of them black and many from the Caribbean.351   The 
complaint against the professor was under investigation at the time of the protest and he 
was later exonerated.352  Like the protest in the fall of 1968 at the University of California 
-Santa Barbara, the computer center was chosen as the site of occupation because of “the 
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high value of the equipment.”353  However, the destruction of the computer equipment 
had the opposite effect that the University of California protest had achieved peacefully.  
In the aftermath of the destruction of the George Williams University computer, the 
protesters were jailed, some were deported, and the university put in place stringent 
security measures throughout the campus, with students forced to submit to checkpoints 
and searches.   
The destruction of the George Williams computer brought to the surface the 
inherent paradox of direct physical action in the case of computer sabotage as a kynical 
move toward the alignment of words and deeds.  As one commentator pointed out:   
The faculty is the most remiss group of people in this whole affair.  
After years of yelling destroy the computers that are taking away 
our work and dehumanizing our relationships with students, they 
start hollering for a lynching when someone finally did it.  They 
found out that the computers had also been in charge of issuing 
their paychecks.  Oh, yes.  Someone has desecrated the temple, 
smashing their god.354 
 
The author’s position points to the logical conclusion of the reinscription of computer 
systems as physical artifacts instead of icons of modernity and monolithic control.355  The 
author also taps into what could best be described as a growing sense among the left that 
computer systems were legitimate targets in their own right because of what they 
represented in practical terms.  Affirming this position was The Fifth Estate, a Detroit 
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underground newspaper, during a 1968 review for a musical album by the Velvet 
Underground:  
Have you ever seriously considered what your role in society will 
be after the impending Cybernetic revolution?  What will you (yes 
YOU) do when the machines do all the manual labor and the 
computers run all the machines?  
On a much larger scale, how will you as a part of society be able to 
maintain your ego as the Superior Being on Earth when machines 
have replaced you in all your work functions and can do a better 
job? 356 
 
The rhetorical question puts the reader squarely in the position of understanding the 
direct impact of computer technology on the life of the individual.  Admittedly, the 
author is projecting into a possible future, but the certainty of the rhetoric is consistent 
with the sense of inevitability captured even in the mainstream press.357 
The computer was targeted at first not because of its linkage with the military. 
The military-industrial-academic axis was not exploited as a site of protest by the civil 
rights movement until after the first computer center occupations had already taken place.  
The original motivation for targeting computer data centers as sites for protest stemmed 
from the value of the data center as a physical investment and a site of prestige on 
university campuses, connected with the prevailing view of computers as icons of 
standardization, regimentation, and dispassion.  
The narrative arc of the computer center occupation and destruction protest 
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actions trended toward violence as computer centers were identified with the American 
war effort in Viet Nam and the anti-war movement became more militant in their actions.  
The protest action at George Williams University could be seen as a fluke—student 
activists getting out of hand due to fatigue, stress, or a desire to make a direct statement 
and end the occupation decisively.  However, the George Williams Computer Center 
destruction ushered in a wave of protest actions that largely skipped occupation and 
moved squarely into destruction as the purpose of the activity.  Of the protest actions 
directed toward computer centers after 1969, only one action protesting the war or the 
university’s complicity in military research was planned solely as an occupation with no 
intention to damage or destroy the computer system—the 1971 Stanford University 
protest, rapidly broken up by police with five arrests.  The Stanford protest was part of a 
coordinated, nation-wide protest action intended to draw attention to the expansion of the 
war into Laos.358   
The only post-1969 action directed at a computer center to protest a civil rights 
cause was the May 21 destruction of the Fresno State Computer center in May of 1970.  
The computer was destroyed by firebombs as part of a larger action described as a 
‘rampage’ of ‘100 minority students’.359  The students were protesting the firing of 
Marvin X from the Ethnic Studies department and additional purges of liberal faculty 
members.  The action did not result in the rehiring of any of the terminated faculty and 
exacerbated differences between the town of Fresno and the university.360  The 
destruction of computer centers increasingly took on the appearance of frustration and 
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became more anarchic and less the work of organized political groups.  An attempted 
firebombing of the New York University computer center as part of a protest action in 
May of 1970 was the reaction to the university’s refusal to negotiate with students 
holding the computer hostage for a $100,000 ransom to be paid as bail for a jailed Black 
Panther activist.361   The students’ original intent was to leave peacefully and hold a press 
conference denouncing the computer, which was owned by the Atomic Energy 
Commission, but after their demands were ignored, the fuse to the bomb was lit and the 
protestors fled.  Dr. Robert Wolfe (an assistant professor of history) and Nicholas Unger, 
a graduate teaching assistant in physics, were arrested following a grand jury indictment 
on charges of threatening to destroy the computer if the ransom was not paid.362  The 
professor and the student instructor pled guilty and were sentenced to 90 days in jail.  
This action, as part of the nationwide flurry of protest actions following the May 4, 1970 
Kent State University murder of anti-war protestors by the Ohio National Guard, was the 
only action against a computer that involved the arrest of a faculty member on a college 
campus.  That a faculty member was involved (and further, was one of the chief 
organizers of the action) speaks to how widespread a form of protest the targeting of 
computer centers had become.   
 The Industrial Revolution is Over and We Lost.363 
The politics of computer destruction, by the late 1960’s had moved away from the 
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campus and into the mainstream.  Underground anarchists published manifestoes on 
computer destruction.364 As computer protest actions moved off campus, businesses were 
increasingly targeted with companies like Dow chemical experiencing constant sabotage 
threats,365 and one attack on their tape library in Midland, Michigan in 1969 that 
destroyed data and punch cards, but no systems.  It is clear from tracing the evolution of 
protest actions directed toward computer systems that the only gains made were made by 
the civil rights protestors who occupied the computer centers for tactical reasons and 
literally, as Mario Savio put it, threw their bodies on the machine to make it stop.  The 
universities were only prone to negotiate when they had something to lose, not when the 
object (in this case the computers) were already lost.  The violent actions were, however, 
not targeted at the universities as organizations, but rather at the government as the maker 
of war and the purchaser of war materials, technology, and research into more efficient 
ways of killing.  The universities were trapped in their own devil’s bargain of needing the 
funding that only the Pentagon could provide, but having to house and maintain the 
iconic presence of the military as abstract killing machine on campuses predisposed their 
campus to erupt into protest.   There is no evidence to support the rationale of the war 
protestors that their actions concerning computer center bombings would in any way 
hasten the end of the Vietnam War, but, unlike the civil rights protestors, they had 
nothing to bargain with. 
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Similarly, Harvey Matsusow’s 1968 The Beast of Business, detailed page after 
page of what he considered ‘Computer Atrocities’ before laying out a chapter of strategic 
interventions and sabotage techniques to allow the reader to, “locate the particular area 
for your attack, and help in preventing the computer from taking over.”366  Matusow’s 
organization, The International Society for the Abolition of Data Processing Machines, 
advertised in several underground journals in England and the United States, where he 
presumably found a sympathetic ear among the protest movement.  Organizations like the 
Liberation News Service, an information clearing house for the underground press across 
the United States and Canada frequently reported on the use of computers by federal and 
state governments:  
Big Brother in Action 
Washington insiders informed LNS recently that the National 
Bureau of Standards has been given a series of high-level computer 
projects.   
NBS will begin by gathering information about computers 
themselves and keeping it in one place.   
The Bureau is cooperating with the Civil Service Commission to 
collect data about government workers to provide a centralized 
personnel data bank.  
The FBI has asked the bureau to develop new fingerprinting and 
identification equipment, and NBS computers will be used to 
collect all unclassified federal scientific reports for storage and 
future distribution. 367 
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The story, whether true or not, is hardly informative.  The effect, however, is to add to the 
growing concern about technology in the hands of the state and an increasing sense of 
foreclosure that verged on paranoia.  Liberation News Service also reported on rumors 
that computers were no match for humans: “Several recent discoveries concerning the 
relative logical potentials of men and computers have led to somewhat contradictory 
results.  In terms of pure reasoning power and memory ability, machines have it all over 
men.  But findings show the machine to be much more vulnerable to breakdowns than the 
durable human brain.”368  Stories like this hearken back to the rhetoric of anxiety seen in 
the earliest descriptions of computer systems in the late 1940’s and suggest how firmly 
entrenched this perceived antagonism was, and how deeply felt.   
The rise of the American underground press in the mid-1960’s was a product of 
dissatisfaction with mainstream media culture and its antagonistic relationship with 
various youth movements and subcultures.  As such, as James Lewes has written, the 
underground press had a relationship with their readership that was much more 
responsive to the attitudes (and prejudices) of their audience than larger, mainstream 
media outlets.369  Unattributed teasers like, “University of Southern California 
researchers have designed a method for a computer to “tell at a glance” what the chances 
are for any juvenile to turn into a delinquent,”370 were rampant in the pages of the 
underground press, as well as dystopic stories about rampant technological police states 
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of the future.371  The federal government was, of course, using computer technology as 
part of its arsenal of weapons in its war on the various leftist, anti-war, and civil rights 
groups of the era. 372   The increasing paranoia of the left (if increasingly well founded) 
coupled with a state increasingly invested in computer technology for both domestic 
monitoring and military uses, produced an environment where computer systems were no 
longer viewed as iconic or even tactical sites of strategic value for the purpose of 
negotiation.  
The systems were synonymous with the war as both icons and as tools of the 
military-educational complex.   The underground press was filled with articles that 
exacerbated the sense of alienation experienced by the anti-war left.  In addition, 
underground newspapers outlined methods for sabotaging computers or that showed 
computers’ alternately as monolithic and all-encompassing systems, or as illusions of 
control perpetuated by the state.  “Worlds Longest Undefended Computer,” detailed 
border patrol checkpoints linked by computer373 (worthwhile information for draft 
dodgers fleeing north); while “Technology of Computer Destruction,”374 and “Computer 
Destruction”375 were titles that were fairly self-explanatory, and “The Cosmic Gestapo 
Computer”376 took a more holistic view of computers and their adversarial nature.   The 
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Winnipeg, Ontario Artisan detailed methods for what it called “grid smash” as part of the 
“Special Obliteration Issue” that called for overt acts of sabotage and the need to smash 
all technological-economic and educational networks.377  It was clear that by the close of 
the 1960’s, the underground and student movements had moved beyond talking about 
computers as metaphorical quantities and into the realm of direct action.   
Attacking the War Machine: Destruction as Protest 
Once the computer center was breached as a site for protest, the practice became 
more commonplace and more violent, culminating in the bombing of the University of 
Wisconsin computer center, the University of Kansas computer center and the attempted 
bombing of the computer center at New York University in 1970.  The targeting of 
computer centers as sites for violence marked a shift from the movement politics of the 
civil rights movement to the radicalized left of the anti-war movement.  
The bombing of the Army Mathematics Research Center at the University of 
Wisconsin at Madison was the most destructive and the only deadly bombing of a 
computer center as part of anti-war protests.  The August 24, 1970 bombing of Sterling 
Hall by a group of Marxist-Anarchists calling themselves the ‘New Year’s Gang’ was 
intended as a strike against “American imperialism, fascism, and the monster that is an 
outgrowth of corporate capitalism.”378  The gang of Karl and Dwight Armstrong, David 
Fine, and Leo Burt were responsible for several attacks on campus military targets and a 
failed attempt to bomb the Prairie du Sac hydroelectric dam before their decision to blow 
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up the Army Mathematics Research Center and the computer equipment inside.  Their 
bomb, a truck filled with ammonium nitrate-fuel oil (ANFO), detonated prematurely and 
killed Robert Fassnacht, a graduate student physicist doing research unrelated to the 
military.379  The underground press roundly condemned the killing of Fassnacht, but 
largely accepted it as a necessary sacrifice for the struggle.  The Ann Arbor Argus, the 
official newspaper of the White Panther Party was pragmatic in its approach to the 
bombing and the murder:  
Far fucking out, we say—but wait, what’s this?  A man lies dead 
from the blast, and no pig either—just a grad student.  The pig 
press is screaming murder and a lot of our people are not so sure. 
[…] But that don’t mean that the whole thing was wrong—no way. 
[…] It should be clear that we dig the bombings and the bombers, 
that they have carried the level of struggle far higher than most of 
us have dreamed of. 380 
 
Supporters of the bombing together with the bombers issued a release to the underground 
press that was picked up by many of the major underground newspapers. The supporters, 
though not as enthusiastic as the White Panthers, were determined to put the event in 
context and to remind readers that the computer and the Army Math Research Center 
were directly involved in war work.381  The computer and the research center were 
irredeemably connected to the Vietnam War and were thus considered reasonable targets 
for paramilitary action.   
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The Wisconsin bombing did shock the protest community as much as the mainstream 
media, but unlike the mainstream, the underground press was more circumspect in their 
condemnation and instead justified the action as saving lives by frustrating the war effort, 
if only for a short while.  The difference in coverage by the mainstream media and the 
alternative press of the computer center bombings at the University of Kansas and the 
University of Wisconsin in 1970, as well as the non-violent occupation of computer 
centers across the United States highlight the differing symbolic values of computers in 
the anti-war movement.  While the mainstream media focused on the destructive nature 
of the attacks, the cost of damages, and the criminality of the event, the alternative press 
emphasized the symbolic value of the attacks, not solely as tactical strikes against a 
military target, but symbolic strikes at the “machine” and what it represented 
existentially.  The Madison bombing did not slow the pace of attacks on computer 
centers, however, with another bombing of a computer center at the University of Kansas 
occurring a few months later, in December of 1970.  Unlike the Madison bombing, the 
Lawrence, Kansas bombing was never solved, and no one came forward to take credit for 
the bombing, or provide a statement as to what the bombing was intended to produce.  
The University of Wisconsin computer center was attacked again in 1972-- its windows 
were smashed during an anti-war protest.382 
 
Conclusion 
Last week, 75 singing and chanting welfare mothers—black, Puerto Rican, 
and white—occupied the welfare department’s new computer center in 
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Government Center. […] The government doesn’t make mistakes that big 
on computers that are used in collecting taxes or guiding missiles, but they 
don’t mind being sloppy when the only thing at stake is the lives of poor 
women and children. […] About 40 uniformed cops, some with helmets, 
waited in the next room, but hadn’t been ordered to clear the computer 
area.  Demonstrators said this was partly because they were afraid of 
damaging the computer and partly because of the presence of a liberal 
welfare lawyer.383 
 
The era of computer center occupations as a form of protest coincided with the era 
of student and youth protests centered on the civil rights and Viet Nam war protest 
actions.  By the early 1970’s the phenomenon had largely faded from college campuses. 
The reasons for this are likely linked to the diminishing of protests on college campuses 
as a result of the winding down of the war and the tapering off of the civil rights 
movement as an organized movement by the mid 1970’s.  As a tactic for political action 
and recognition of grievances, computer center occupations and computer center 
destruction had decidedly negative results in almost all reported cases.  With the 
exception of the first computer center occupation at the University of California at Santa 
Barbara in 1968, almost no other protest occupation involving computer centers achieved 
their aims.  They were for the most part ignored, or, when the actions of the students 
involved the destruction of computer equipment or its attempt, criminal charges were 
brought against those involved without further discussion of the protestor’s grievances.  
Civil rights protestors faired better.  About 30 African-American students ended a sit-in 
in the University of Pittsburgh’s computer center after Chancellor Wesley Posvar agreed 
that a director and assistant director for a proposed black studies institute would be 
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appointed in June and provided with funds to carry on their work.  He also agreed to ask 
the university senate to establish January 15, the birthday of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., 
as a school holiday and to allow black students to be absent on Feb. 21, the anniversary 
of the death of Malcolm X. 384 
 The protest actions did garner some media attention however that would likely not 
have been present if the protestors hadn’t threatened multi-million dollar computer 
systems.  The retail value of computer systems was routinely included in mainstream 
news reports of student activities against computer centers, often in the headlines or lead 
paragraphs for the stories.  Ironically, the demands of the students were typically buried 
near the bottom of the stories and in some cases, not mentioned at all.  As if a student 
protest needed no rationale, reporters seemed at times to suffer from protest fatigue.  Not 
surprisingly, the underground press emphasized the reasons behind the protest action, not 
caring much for the specifics of the computer or its value other than that it was reportedly 
expensive and an important marker of prestige for the university.  
 The matter of prestige that computers brought to the university was a double-
edged sword.  Computer technology and the resources to maintain it were not an 
inexpensive proposition, often outside the ability of colleges to provide for themselves 
without some support from outside the academy.  This support, in the guise of 
government research projects, often required universities to engage in research that 
directly benefited the military while it fought an increasingly unpopular war. On most 
campuses, having a computer meant having a contract to do research for the United 
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States military.  This link to the military made computer centers attractive sites for protest 
and, of the sites that experienced some sort of destruction, anti-war protesters were likely 
responsible.  The resonances between the computer and the war made the computer a 
legitimate target in the eyes of protestors, not just a site of protest, but a site that could be 
damaged and with it, the war effort it supported.   
 Of course, there is no evidence to suggest that students destroying computer 
centers in any way hastened the end of the war.  The destruction of computer centers 
seemed, in all cases, an act of frustration more than a tactical goal.  Just as protests 
throughout the 1960’s became more militant and violent as the police escalated violence 
against the protestors, so too did protest actions that involved computers.  A Roman 
Catholic nun, Sister Jogues of the New York Order of the Sacred Heart of Mary, was 
sentenced to 18 months for plotting the kidnapping of Henry Kissinger and bombing 
computers at the Pentagon. Acting as part of the Harrisburg Six, a group that included a 
priests, ministers, and nuns, Sister Jogues was imprisoned for refusing to testify in the 
plot, but did not deny the anti-war aims of the group.385   
 Throughout the 1960’s and into the early 1970’s the value of the computer as an 
icon underwent a change in stature that was reflected on college campuses across the 
United States.  Starting with the Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic 
Society and the manifestoes of the Berkeley Free Speech movement, computers were 
synonymous with a closed world system and iconic of the victory of information over 
humanistic claims.  As Peter Sloterdijk explains in his critique of the technological 
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anxiety of Weimar Germany:  
[T]echnology presses in on the old humanism in a provocative 
way.  In this period, the conceptual association of ‘the human 
being and technology’ becomes a compulsive connection, from the 
heights of bourgeois philosophy down to school essays.  The 
schema for thinking is this: Technology takes the ‘upper hand’; it 
‘threatens’ to degrade human beings; it ‘wants’ to make us into 
robots.  But if we pay attention and keep our souls in shape, 
nothing will happen to us.  For technology is, after all, there for 
people and not people for technology.  The image is approximately 
that of a seesaw.  On the one end site the threatening, the alien, 
technology; on the other, the humane spreads out and, according to 
whether oneself or the alien presses harder, the seesaw falls to one 
side or the other.  The more immature the thinking, the heavier the 
humane end.386  
 
The anxiety produced by technology was not an anxiety based in a real encounter with 
computers, but a defense against a perceived threat.  As historian of technology Stephen 
Shapin commented, “a given technology’s grip on our awareness is often in inverse 
relationship to its significance in our lives.” 387  I would extend this to include our 
imagination as well.  The lasting impact of the computer protest actions of the 1960’s and 
1970’s is not in the victories they achieved either in shortening the war or in establishing 
ethnic studies programs or increasing minority hiring.  The occupation (and occasional 
destruction) of computer centers served to demystify the artifact and strip from it some of 
its iconic baggage as the scourge of modernity.   
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 Conclusion: From Machines to Data 
 
Most of the advanced industrial nations of Western Europe and North 
America share concerns about the social impact of computer-based 
personal data systems. Although there are minor differences in the focus 
and intensity of their concerns, it is clear that there is nothing peculiarly 
American about the feeling that the struggle of individual versus computer 
is a fixed feature of modern life.388 
 
The authors of the 1973 report released by the Health, Education, and Welfare 
Department, Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems 
(named the Richardson Committee after its chair, Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare Elliot L. Richardson) show how ingrained, by the early 1970’s, anxieties 
concerning computer technology had become.  The framing proposed by earlier writers 
and journalists for how computers were to be viewed and understood had, by 1973, 
become part of the official doxa of the state.  The struggle between individuals and 
machines had been codified and was a natural feature of contemporary society for the 
foreseeable future.  The conceptual struggle between humans and machines that had been 
deployed as the background over which the story of computer technology was reported, 
filmed and televised was adopted as the natural state of the modern world.  The authors 
of the report were clear in their representation of computers as a sublime force that 
needed to be confronted.  The committee’s report was the culmination of several years of 
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hearings on the viability and desirability of a national archive of electronic information 
first proposed in the mid-sixties, and their recommendations hinged on the threat for 
privacy abuse that such a database might encourage.   
 
Computers and Privacy 
The idea that computer databases (or ‘databanks’ in the terminology of the post-
war era) presented a threat that was more substantial than those prophesied in earlier 
accounts was first voiced by Richard Hamming, a researcher at Bell Laboratories in 
1962.  Hamming detailed the ways in which databases, by their very existence, would 
have a deleterious effect on personal privacy.  “How do we know that this is always 
being used for the benefit of the individual?” he asked.  “How can we be sure that this 
information will not be used against a person?”389  Hamming cited the potential use of 
computers to track travel reservations, income, and medical data and expressed a concern 
that the data could possibly be pooled and manipulated to garner a profile of an 
individual’s habits and tendencies that would be out of the person’s control.   
In 1965, the non-profit Social Science Research Council proposed the creation of 
a national clearing-house of available statistical information to be housed in a large data 
center.  This National Data Center recommendation was endorsed by the Bureau of 
Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget) in a draft proposal to congress.  
This proposal, and the hearings held in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the 
                                                 
389 John A. Osmundsen, "Expert Fears Harmful Effects Amid Benefits from Computers " New York Times, 
January 1 1962, 33. 
238  
Senate, generated a great deal of comment in the mainstream media and, for most 
journalists, presented a more tangible example of a computerized threat than the futuristic 
and often imaginary computer abilities that made up the iconography of the 1950’s.   The 
hearings held in 1965 and 1966 by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the House Committee on Government 
Operations, Special Subcommittee on Invasion of Privacy included testimony from 
computer manufacturing executives, federal agencies, the RAND corporation and Vance 
Packard, author of the The Hidden Persuaders, a 1957 best seller about media 
manipulation and subliminal messages. Packard noted the similarities between the 
National Data Center and what he saw as Orwellian social control: “The file keepers of 
Washington have derogatory information of one sort or another on literally millions of 
citizens,” Packard claimed,  “Big Brother, if he ever comes to these United States, may 
turn out to be not a greedy power seeker but rather a relentless bureaucrat obsessed with 
efficiency.”390  Packard’s remarks were included in a front page story in the Washington 
Post that led with the sentence, “A special house subcommittee was urged yesterday to 
shore up the right to privacy before it gets swallowed up by government computers,” and 
described witnesses as assail[ing] the plan as a ‘threat to individual liberty,’ a harbinger 
of Big Brother, and a mechanized suffocation of the American dream.”391    
Packard, six months later, authored a long piece on computers and privacy for the 
New York Times.  Focusing on the proposed National Data Center he advocated against 
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the previous summer, Packard outlined the prevailing arguments against a centralized 
database. Packard’s concerns that central databases encouraged a ‘depersonalization of 
American life’ echoed the Berkeley Free Speech Movement’s criticism of the university 
as knowledge factory, where humans are little more than raw materials or statistical 
fodder. He also criticized centralized databases as likely to “increase the distrust of 
citizens in their own government and alienate them away from it,”392 and that centralized 
databases are error prone and it is difficult to correct errors or allow for extenuating 
circumstances. Packard argued that the most dangerous hazard that databases possess is 
that they concentrate power in the hands of “the people in a position to push computer 
buttons.”393   
Data and Control 
Packard’s comments presaged the central arguments of the 1960’s student 
movement’s turn to open confrontation in their protests against university and 
government policies, and pointed to a further rationale for why computer systems were 
the target of so many protest actions.  The anxiety about computers was an expression of 
the fear of the data computers contained, and further, the motivations of those with access 
to this data.  The existence of a centralized database along the lines of the proposed 
National Data Center seemed to re-enforce the fears of a growing segment of the 
American population  that their government was not necessarily to be trusted to act in 
their best interest.  Look magazine asked: “The computer data bank, will it kill your 
                                                 




Coupled with this distrust of government, was the concept that such a database was, at its 
core, un-American.  Alan F. Weston, professor of public law at Columbia University 
testified that: 
From the time he started driving or took a transportation facility to work 
(leaving a record at toll or ticket booth) until he arrived home at night, a 
person’s movements and actions would be in the computer’s memory 
systems.  At every step—when he parked at the garage, when he entered 
the office and ‘registered in’, when he used the telephone, his luncheon, 
his attendance at the theater or the ball game, his store purchases, his stay 
at the motel, his visits to the doctor—all these would be on record.’395 
 
Charles Reich, a professor at Yale Law School testifying before the House 
Committee in 1967, made the argument that with a national database, “we would have a 
situation in which nobody got a second chance, no matter how young, no matter how 
foolish, no matter how easily explained the circumstances; we would establish a doctrine 
of no second choice, no forgiveness.”396  He concluded that, “one life, one chance only.  
That seems to me very different from the American dream.”397  Dr. Reich’s comments 
suggest how the concept of computerized databases resonated with earlier conflations of 
computer technology with un-American forces in world politics, specifically Soviet and 
Chinese totalitarianism.  This critique sums up several of the thematic narratives of post-
war computer anxiety.  Reich’s reading of American history as a site of erasure and re-
creation relied upon a view of the American experience as uniquely individualistic, one 
that echoed earlier critiques of post-war ‘Organization Men’ and ‘other-directed’ 
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followers of mass-movements.  The idea that the function of computer technology was to 
enclose and categorize individuals was a response to increased routinization in the 
workplace, and the sense, first proposed by Turner at the end of the nineteenth century, 
that the enclosure of the American frontier brought to an end a decidedly American 
character.   
 At the end of the 1966 hearings into the need for a National Data Center, both the 
U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate remained unconvinced that the need for a 
centralized government data center outweighed their concerns over privacy.  Hearings 
were held again in 1967 and in 1968 with the same result.  The committees and various 
witnesses feared that once such a center was established, it could (and likely would) 
expand beyond control.  There was also a level of mistrust between the legislature and the 
executive branch, over who would control this information.  As written, the National 
Data Center would be part of the executive branch. The thought that personal information 
would be warehoused and manipulated by the executive branch of governemnt likely lent 
a degree of empathy on the part of the congressmen to the witnesses who saw the 
database as the equivalent of ‘Big Brother’.  The committees agreed with the technical 
argument that the existing system of disconnected data systems was inefficient, however, 
they also believed that such decentralized inefficiency was amenable to congressional 
oversight, whereas centralized efficiency would be more difficult to check.  In 1966, 
1967, and 1968, the proposal for the National Data Center was rejected.  
 Of course, proposals for centralized databases and increased efficiency were 
unlikely to stay dormant for long.  When the proposal for a National Data Center was  
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derailed, several states, and municipalities pushed forward with smaller initiatives.  Even 
local debates received national attention.  When the municipal government of Santa Clara 
County in California began efforts to roll out a centralized database of its own, the 
possible repercussions were news in Chicago:  
Many residents of big, rapidly growing Santa Clara County will find their 
names indexed within the next year in a centralized computer system.  At 
least sketchy information in personal ‘dossiers’ will be available after that 
time to authorized inquirers in seconds or minutes. […] Some officials 
themselves have raised questions about invasion of privacy and the 
concept of a close watch on activities of individuals by ‘big brother’. […] 
The pooled information could include a person’s education, grades, credit 
rating, income, military service, employment, and almost anything else, all 
wrapped in one package.   
 
Unlimited capacity for information storage combined with instantaneous 
retrieval would seem almost irresistible temptation to record more than is 
warranted and ‘retrieve’ for unethical and/or illegal purposes.  The toy 
could easily become a monster.398 
 
As civil rights actions and anti-war protests increased in frequency and violence, 
the government on all levels responded to the threat with the purchase and deployment of 
more and more computerized systems to track arrests, suspects, and persons of interest.  
Although the rationale behind these systems was, at least on the surface, the desire to 
fight crime, the databases were rarely portrayed in a positive light to the public by the 
media, and were often described as much more sinister than the criminals they were 
supposed to track:   
The huge computerized intelligence systems being considered by the 
California Council on Criminal Justice is only symptomatic; the disease is 
everywhere.  New York police have a magnificent new computerized 
information network; Chicago police had one before them.  Much of the 
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data in these banks is ‘sociological’, personal.  
 
And behind all this information stands the new generation of computers 
ready to process it all instantly.  So the people in their bunkers must fear 
not only the radical and the criminal, but the government tirelessly 
building what the English writer Nigel Calder calls ‘the infrastructure of 
tyranny’—all this information.399 
 
Like those who testified before the Senate and the House in 1966 and 1967, writers about 
computers invested the concept of a central database with a portentousness borne from a 
generation of anxiety about the computers ability to irreparably damage society.  The 
difference was that the computer itself was no longer the agent of our demise, but a tool 
for those who built the ‘infrastructure of tyranny’.  The people in control of the 
technology would, it was feared, be in control of our past and with it our futures.  Mary 
Daniels with the Chicago Tribune predicted that: “everybody’s past will be available in a 
computer print-out to anyone who knows how to punch the proper keys.  If things go the 
way they are, America will be turned into a one-chance society in which you’ll never be 
able to live down your past.”400 
 Consumer advocate Ralph Nader, in a speech in the fall of 1970, suggested to his 
listeners that an out of control government database was not the only type of computer 
system to be afraid of.  Nader stated that “people are being alienated by the way national 
data banks, owned by credit companies, banks, insurance companies, employment 
bureaus and others are being used and shared,” and that the massive accumulation of 
secret personal data on millions of people was a “perilous threat to civil liberties.”401  The 
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article headline for the story covering Nader’s speech for the New York Times, “Nader 
Fears Computer Will Turn Us into 'Slaves’,” reused the same tropes to describe 
computers that deployed a decade before to describe Norbert Wiener’s prophesies of a 
machine driven society.  But here the context shifts.  The computer is not the master, but 
rather the master’s tool.  As Nader continued, “This is leading to a significant kind of 
tyranny. […] The key democratic principle of a man’s control over his life is being 
abused.  And unless we do something about it, we’re suddenly going to wake up and 
realize we’re a nation of slaves’.402  
Congressional Hearings and the Privacy Act of 1974 
Despite the concerns of citizens, consumer advocates, and congressmen, the 
proliferation of databases continued unabated.  Claims of efficiency and the demands of 
business outweighed any attempt to seriously derail the investment in new technology.  
This is not to suggest that a sense of urgency and foreboding did not continue to surface 
at fairly regular intervals.  One of the more consistent critics of computerized 
recordkeeping, Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, held numerous hearings on the 
subject of computers and privacy.  Ervin was popular with the press and the American 
people for his folksy populism and wit.  He was consistently represented as siding with 
Americans against the threat of an intrusive state.  The press played up this threat with 
claims that “the police, security and military intelligence agencies of the Federal 
Government are quietly compiling a mass of computerized and microfilmed files on 
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hundreds of thousands of law abiding yet suspect Americans.”403  Ervin was consistently 
obliging with colorful speeches calling computer systems “A mass surveillance system 
unprecedented in American history,” within which “rests a potential for control and 
intimidation that is alien to our form of Government and foreign to a society of free 
men,”404 and reminding audiences that “a computer has a memory but it has no 
compassion.”405    
In an odd twist on the conflation of computers with a sort of monstrous female, 
The New York Times reported:  
Senator Ervin already has disclosed that the Dragon Lady of the State 
Department, Director Frances Knight of the Passport Office, has at her 
disposal a computer bank of 243,135 names of persons considered—not 
necessarily proven—to be subversive or to fail to ‘reflect credit on the 
United States.406 
 
Frances Knight, described in a 1970 Time magazine article as a “Women's 
Liberation movement unto herself”407 for her rise to the head of the State Department 
Passport Office, and for her lawsuit against the State Department for sexual 
discrimination when she discovered that her leadership of the Passport Office did not 
translate into a rise in pay grade to equal her male counterparts. Her ‘dragon lady’ label 
reflected her status as an agitating female, her use of computers simply added to her 
emasculating personae.  In language that suggests that the her command of computer 
systems equals control over lives, The New York Times places Ms. Knight in a matrix of 
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power and control that is only heightened by her access to computers.  The chauvinism of 
1970 was not far removed from the depictions of women and technology in the 1950’s.   
In Ervin’s 1971 hearings on computers and privacy, Arthur Miller, a law 
professor at the University of Michigan, testified that “information gathering and 
surveillance activities of the Federal Government have expanded to such an extent that 
they are becoming a threat to several basic rights of every American—privacy, speech, 
assembly, association and petition of government.”408   Reporters commented that 
testimony revealed how, “inaccurate and unrefuted derogatory information is disgorged, 
citizens are turned down for jobs or insurance or loans.  Worse, they have been 
blackmailed or have suffered reprisals.”409 
Miller’s opportunity to testify came, in part from having authored the book, 
Assault on Privacy Computer: Data Banks and Dossiers in 1971.  In reviewing the book 
for the New York Times Review of Books, Robert Sherrill describes data collection as 
“prying intimate data from a person is kind of rape, and it usually achieved on the same 
terms of the old droit du seigneur.  If you want security, you’ve got to put out.”410  
Sherrill also gives a nod to “brainy young people, bless their hearts, who have shown 
several universities and corporations that they are capable of breaking computer codes 
and mucking up, or erasing, official tapes that contain information offensive to them.”411  
This acknowledgement of the techniques of protestors and radicals both confers some 
mainstream legitimacy on them, as well as providing an example of just how far into the 
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mainstream their arguments (and more obliquely, their methods) had become.  The 
conflation of ‘prying’ data from individuals with ‘rape’ speaks to how alarming the 
thought of using databases to maintain information on American citizens was, as well as 
how adversarial the relationship was between the public and the state in matters of 
privacy.  Sherrill ends by stating that, “an angry public should seize congress by the 
lapels” and demand regulations to safeguard privacy and to allow people the right to 
review their electronic dossiers.412 
As Congress continued to wrestle publicly with the subject of databases and 
privacy, the feelings of the American public were not as easy to gauge.   A 1970 Harris 
survey outlines the extent to which individuals felt that their privacy was threatened by 
computerized databases in a way that suggests that the anxiety represented in the media 
may not have been felt as strongly by the general public.  When asked if they felt their 
privacy was being invaded, 34 percent answered in the affirmative.  When the pollsters 
asked more specific questions about computers and privacy, only 19 percent expressed 
the feeling that “computers which collect a lot of information about you” posed a 
threat.413   Less than one in five persons felt threatened by computers as a practical 
concern.  This suggests that when viewing computers as tangible artifacts with specific 
functions (e.g. data management) the people participating in the survey were not as 
alarmed as members of the media.  They were interested in threats to their privacy, but 
less concerned with the computer’s role in their lives.   
 In 1973, the Richardson Committee, after several years of study and collected 
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testimony, issued a set of recommendations on the status of computer databases and 
privacy, as well as proposals for the rights of the public to know the details of the 
information the government had gathered.  The recommendations were summarized in 
the report’s executive summary as follows:  
1. There must be no data record-keeping systems whose very existence is 
secret.  
2. There must be a way for an individual to find out what information 
about him is in a record and how it is used. 
3. There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him 
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other 
purposes without his consent.   
4. There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of 
identifiable information about him.  
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating records 
of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their 
intended use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of 
the data.414 
 
The recommendations reflect the change in emphasis away from computer technology as 
inherently suspicious, and identify instead the focus of suspicion as inherent within 
government.  The recommendations, with their emphasis on personal privacy and 
personal access to information stored in their name, effectively position the American 
public, as a set of individuals, as owners of information.  This active relationship to 
information signals a shift away from the more passive relationship with computers as 
artifacts in the 1950’s.   
By the spring of 1974, the proposals of the Richardson Commission were used as 
ammunition to quash the Government Accounting Office’s new attempt for a National 
Data Center.  Rechristened as FEDNET, the data center was intended to bring together 
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the data from disparate agencies within the Federal government, as well as the military.  
By the end of the year, the recommendations were codified and signed into law as part of 
the Privacy Act of 1974.  
What Happens to Machines? 
The FBI is gearing up to create a massive computer database of people's 
physical characteristics, all part of an effort the bureau says to better 
identify criminals and terrorists.  
 
"It's the beginning of the surveillance society where you can be tracked 
anywhere, any time and all your movements, and eventually all your 
activities will be tracked and noted and correlated," said Barry Steinhardt, 
director of the American Civil Liberties Union's Technology and Liberty 
Project.415  
 
The debates that generated the anxieties placed upon computer technology by 
writers (and audiences) suspicious of the new machines in their midst are, of course, still 
with us and, not surprisingly, we respond to these anxieties by displacing them onto a 
new set of perceived intruders and interlopers.  As the 1960’s came to a close, anxiety 
concerning sentient computers faded from the popular cultural landscape and was 
replaced by a more tangible concern about the data housed within the machines, and the 
power of information as a means of social control.  If the 1960’s brought into sharp relief 
the disjuncture between the state and its citizens, the distrust engendered by this 
disjuncture was layered into the American cultural landscape of much of the 1970’s and 
provided the subtext, if not outright subject of countless cinema and television artifacts 
from the 1970’s.   
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The conflation of the state and the machine that preoccupied the counterculture of 
the 1960’s became hegemonic in the 1970’s with the political crises of Watergate, the 
end of the Viet Nam War, and economic recession.  The suspicion and resentment that 
the anti-war left felt toward the American government was widespread, and 
disenchantment with the political process extended into the middle-class and into middle-
America.  At the heart of much of this distrust was the power of information and the 
shadowy, unaccountable organizations that seemed to control it.  Science fiction films 
from the 1970’s that anthropomorphized computer intelligence and prophesied 
totalitarian dystopia at the hands of machines appear, by this time,  quaint and outdated.  
Films like THX-1138 (Warner Brothers, 1971), Westworld (MGM, 1973), Futureworld 
(American International Pictures, 1976), Logan’s Run (MGM, 1976), and Demon Seed 
(MGM, 1977) approached computer technology as sinister and conniving entities 
consciously seeking to destroy and control in ways that seem more at home a decade 
before.  Conversely, films from the 1970’s that focus on information and data 
manipulation as central to the plot seem more a part of the decade.  The Conversation 
(Paramount, 1974), The Parallax View (Paramount, 1974), Chinatown (Paramount, 
1974), and Nashville (Paramount, 1975), all contain elements of paranoia, but more 
importantly, they all reflect anxieties concerning the control of data, how it can be 
manipulated, and how it can be used to wield power.  The decline of computer anxiety in 
the 1970’s goes along with the rise of information anxiety.   
James Beniger suggests at the conclusion of his book, The Control Revolution, 
that the information society, and with it computer technology, did not spring 
unannounced upon an unsuspecting public, but rather that the seeds of the movement 
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toward information control technologies were sown in the 19th century and were plain to 
see.416  While Beniger’s narrative of the control revolution as a reaction to the 
technological changes of the industrial revolution accounts for the antecedents to 
computer technology, he overlooks the importance of how this technology appeared to a 
public largely ignorant of the ramifications of information control, and the impact it 
would have on their lives.  The American public, recovering from the Second World War 
and coming to terms with the idea of the atomic bomb, had reason enough to be anxious 
about another technology that promised to further impact their livelihoods and their 
survival.  The general unease about the post-war economy and the return to depression-
era job losses due to the introduction of automated control and computer technologies 
was fertile ground for imagining the worst aspects of potential change.  
Computers did not maintain their status as icons of anxiety, arguably, because of 
both their demystification as artifacts and because the monolithic systemic threat that 
they had come to represent was seen to be rife with cracks, fissures and fault lines.  The 
system implied by the military and economic juggernaut that was post-war America had, 
by the 1970’s, morphed into an economy in recession, a failed colonial war, and 
breakdown in basic services.  If the computer represented the victory of the control 
revolution that would undo American civilization, it would have to wait in line behind 
more immediate concerns.  In a way, the displacement of social anxieties onto the 
computer was a luxury that 1970’s America could not afford.   
Throughout this project I have emphasized that metaphors concerning computer 
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technology were more than simple shortcuts to help lay audiences understand something 
new.  From the earliest descriptions of computers found in the print media of the late 
1940’s, it was clear that our understanding of computers was shaped to fit the contours of 
post-war America.  Fears of a return to the economy of pre-war, Depression-era America 
were emphasized by highlighting that computers were capable, like the machines that 
supplanted workers in the 1930’s, of displacing a whole new class of American workers 
in the 1950’s.  The regimentation and routinization of work necessary to the successful 
integration of computers into American business reminded many reporters of the 
regimented world of the Soviet Union and Communist China.   
 For all the negative, if not hostile, rhetoric surrounding computers it is surprising 
that they were assimilated into the American economy as quickly as they were, without 
some public reaction reminiscent of the Luddites of 19th century England. It is here that 
another side of the framing of computers came to the fore.  However computers were 
represented as job destroyers and implacable forces of control, there was a consistent 
counternarrative that successfully positioned computers as no more than any other natural 
force that was there to be tamed and brought to heel.   
The challenge of computers was like the challenge of a sublime nature 
successfully harnessed by our ancestors, and the sublime forces of the 20th century, from 
atomic bombs and energy, to computer power, were there to be tamed by a new 
generation of men.   This same formula applied to the metaphorical relationship of 
computers to women.  Computers were linked to femininity so as to suggest that control 
of one would provide a key for controlling the other.   
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 Computers, and our relationship to them were, from the outset, shaped by 
anxieties concerning control and power.  The generation of students that came of age in 
the 1960’s found themselves in the midst of power struggles with entrenched attitudes 
and conventions concerning race and gender, and faced with the prospect of fighting a 
war that was, from the outset, ill-defined and largely unwinnable.  It is not surprising that 
their frustration would take the form of a critique of power and they would appropriate 
computers as potent icons of conformity and repression.  Given the control that 
universities like the University of California at Berkeley had over students, it wasn’t a 
terrific leap to conflate the student’s experience with that of raw data waiting for 
processing by the university machine.  Once students realized that the actual campus 
computers were often research tools paid for and maintained with money allocated by the 
U.S. military, the identification of computers with a corrupt system and a hated war was 
not far behind.   
  It is clear the violent actions against computer centers did not hasten the end of 
the war, but were instead acts of frustration against a hegemonic system that seemed to 
allow no challenge to the status quo.   But the student movements were successful in 
using the iconic power of computers that had built up over twenty years of rhetoric within 
the culture of the media to garner a voice.  If the computers represented power, then 
taking control of the computers was to demonstrate the limitations of state control.  The 
breathless language used to describe computers in the post-war period seem more than a 
little quaint as that era fades farther into the past.  The anxieties about control and power 
are still with us, however.  Successful contemporary science fiction films like The Matrix 
Trilogy  (Warner Brothers, 1999, 2003), Minority Report (Twentieth Century-Fox, 2002) 
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and I, Robot (Twentieth Century-Fox, 2004) to name a few, speak to the durability of the 
metaphorical weight still attached to computers and their iconic value in addressing 
contemporary concerns about information, privacy, and the rights of the individual in a 
climate of distrust and uncertainty for the future.  
Throughout this history, computer technology was represented in the popular 
media with guarded optimism.  While on the one hand computer technology was an 
example of American ingenuity and modernity, a leading technology for an advanced 
culture, the ramifications of this technology left writers and commentators uneasy.  The 
implications of the technology revealed anxieties in the American culture of the 1950’s 
and 1960’s and then sublimated those fears within a naturalized discourse of 
technological determinism and American exceptionalism.  The fear and anxiety produced 
by the encounter with computer technology was harnessed within media culture and 
recycled as evidence of the triumph of the American way as individualistic, capitalistic, 
and confidently masculine.  The tactical logic of occupying computer centers to protest 
the use of college computers for war work was supplemented by the attack on computers 
as symbols of this relationship, and the relationship between the state, capital, and human 
beings.   The symbolic value of computers in this context is evident in the coverage of 
occupations by the alternative press.  What was once represented as an abstract source of 
anxiety and uncertainty was, by the end of the 1960’s literally held hostage as a symbol 
of a corrupt and impotent system. 
More importantly, the use of metaphor was not ‘value neutral’ but rather served to 
provide an outlet for anxieties that did not compromise the established order.  Throughout 
the 1950’s and early 1960’s the metaphor of the computer ‘naturalized’ computer 
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technology and masked the real decisions behind its deployment.  Decisions that were 
made to increase productivity, profitability, and to eliminate classes of jobs were 
screened from critique by the monolithic approach to the computer as akin to a force of 
nature, or something that was there and thus had to be used.  In this way, the computer as 
a technological artifact resonated with its deadly sibling the atomic bomb.  (It also 
resonates with the choice of a monolith as the fetishized object of 2001: A Space 
Odyssey).   
The naturalization of computer technology as an existential threat provided a 
surrogate victory over the Soviets in terms of the cold war.  The totalitarian aspects of 
machine logic resonated with the machine-like personification of the Soviet system.  The 
consistent victory over computers in the realm of chess was a metaphorical victory over 
the Soviet Union.  Like the Soviets, however, the computers were never defeated totally, 
but rather vanquished to return stronger another day.   
The symbolic relevance of the computer as an icon of conformity, totalizing 
systems, and dehumanizing processes was incorporated into the rhetoric of the Berkeley 
Free Speech Movement.  As the student movement progressed throughout the 1960’s the 
computer as metaphor was reinscribed upon the physical artifact of the computer as 
object.  Computer centers on university campuses became targets for protesters as objects 
to be held hostage, vandalized, and destroyed as part of a larger movement against the 
Vietnam war, but also as part of the civil rights movement.   
One of the results of the student movement’s appropriation of computer 
technology as physical artifacts for political ends is the demystification of the computer 
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as an object.  By seeing computers as hostages or bargaining chips, the radical left 
stripped the computer of agency and turned it back into a tool both symbolically and 
practically.  The countercultural embrace of computers in the 1970s as a tool for 
liberation and self-realization owes a debt to the civil rights and anti-war movements that 
preceded for rethinking the antagonism between humans and machines and 
reemphasizing the significance of power derived from control.  Computer technology was 
and remains a tool for managing information and data and it was the counterculture’s 
understanding that information and data are required components of control and power.  
In this they shared an awareness and concern with earlier describers of computers as 
dehumanizing.   
The metaphors used to describe computers were a means to assimilate a new 
technology and place it within an existing matrix of meaning along with countless other 
new objects that were developed and introduced to consumers in the years following 
World War II.  But the metaphors were something more.  The use of computers as icons 
of modernity allowed computers to be used as surrogates for other issues that were part of 
post-war American culture, and the anxieties latent in the Cold War, post-war 
unemployment, the role of women, and the rise of the military-industrial complex found a 
common shorthand in descriptions of computer technology as a repository for concerns 
about an uncertain future.  And further, the use of these metaphors shaped the way we 
thought about computers as thinking machines and as electronic surrogates that in turn 
shaped the way we thought about the Soviet Union, feminism, corporate America, and 
individuality.  As the development of personal and home computers brought about 
computers as an “object to think with,” to borrow Sherry Turkle’s definition, the artifact 
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had already existed in a metaphorical space for most Americans in the Cold War era.   
Computers, as technological artifacts, were (and still are) emblematic of 
technological society. The role of computers in military research into nuclear weapons, 
their adoption into business and accounting fields, and their representation as the most 
rational of technologies for a rational world created an environment where any anxiety 
about the modern world could be depicted by using the computer as icon.   The computer 
as an icon of modernity symbolized both the aspirations of America’s mastery of 
technology and our fear of what that mastery involved.  But the anxiety concerning 
computers masks something else.  Computer anxiety or discomfort toward the 
technologies embedded in the computer as an icon did not explicitly reveal a latent 
technophobia in American culture.  To the contrary, Americans were no less enamored of 
technology in the 1950’s and 1960’s than they are now and, given the tenor of many of 
the articles and stories from the post-war era, perhaps were more so.  But the approach to 
computer technology within the media was strangely schizophrenic.  For all the 
celebration of the new and exciting ‘electronic brains’ and the self-congratulatory tone of 
writers reveling in ideas of post-war American exceptionalism, many, perhaps most, of 
the press of the day tempered their excitement over the promises of the technology and 
meditated as well upon the portentous aspects of computers as planting the seeds for 
humanity’s downfall.   
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